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Abstract
My dissertation explores three core questions. First, how is information regarding the
preferences of judicial actors communicated within the American federal judiciary?
Second, can U.S. Supreme Court justices meaningfully signal their policy preferences,
vis-á-vis their decisions, to judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals? Finally, what im-
pact do such signals have on the propensity of lower courts judges to follow the prece-
dents of the Supreme Court? The primary objective of this project is to identify the
conditions that either increase or decrease the likelihood that judges on the courts
of appeals comply with the precedents of the Supreme Court. I develop a theory
in which information regarding the preferences of judicial actors flows dynamically
within the courts. Specifically, I theorize that key Supreme Court signals and circuit-
level influences, together, drive circuit court attentiveness to precedents. Lower court
application of the Supreme Court’s decisions, in turn, communicate information up
the judicial ladder of the policy position of precedents. My findings demonstrate that
not only is the Supreme Court capable of communicating information, but that such
cues substantially influence lower federal court decision making and their interpre-
tations of precedent. My results notably depart from earlier findings in that they
demonstrate that ideological preferences has a more nuanced impact on the adoption
of the Court’s precedents. This study contributes to our understanding of learning
within the judicial hierarchy by identifying new mechanisms through judicial decision
makers are able to communicate their legal and policy preferences. The implications
of my analysis offer new insights on the influence of stare decisis and decision-making
behavior within the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“Unless we wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system, a
precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts.”
– U.S. Supreme Court, Hutto v. Davis (1983)
The American federal judiciary is a hierarchical entity. Hierarchical institutions
frequently encounter the challenge of the principal’s inability to monitor the actions
of its subordinates. The prodigious amount of decisions issued by the lower courts,
each year, make oversight a near impossible task for the U.S. Supreme Court. Given
finite resources, how can Supreme Court justices monitor, much less, compel the
lower courts to follow their precedents? The literature on judicial impact suggests
that Supreme Court justices are concerned with the long term policy implications
of their decisions (Baum 2006; Caldeira, Wright, and Zorn 1999; Maltzman, Spriggs,
and Wahlbeck 2000; Segal and Spaeth 2002). As such, policy oriented Supreme
Court justices should be particularity interested in maximizing the impact of their
decisions on the lower courts, because it is in these venues where most legal disputes
are ultimately adjudicated. The most effective way, then, for the justices to achieve
their policy goals is to monitor aggregate levels of lower court compliance with their
precedents.
Regrettably, little empirical work examines the impact of Supreme Court decisions
from an aggregate perspective. Instead, most existing studies on judicial impact
address a very different question. Generally, the research question is a variant of
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the one posed by a recent important contribution to the impact literature, “why do
lower courts defy (or alternatively, comply with) high court precedent?” (Westerland
et al. 2010, 892). That is, the focus of most judicial impact studies is to analyze
individual judge or panel decisions to follow or shirk from Supreme Court precedent.
The primary objective of most existing research designs, then, is to identify the causal
factors that increase, or decrease, the likelihood of a judge, or lower court panel, to
comply with the precedents of the Supreme Court. Such a focus, while informative,
does not assess the cumulative impact of Supreme Court decisions on the lower courts.
As a consequence, critical questions on the overall policy impact of the Court remain
unexplored.
Empirical work on the American courts generally suggests that the lower federal
appellate courts adhere to the preferences of their Supreme Court superiors. Follow-
ing the seminal work by Songer, Segal, and Cameron (1994), a number of studies
suggest that the interactions between the U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal ap-
pellate courts is one that evinces characteristics of a principal-agent relationship.
These principal-agent accounts suggest that the Supreme Court effectively achieves
its policy preferences by strategically monitoring and correcting non-compliant lower
court decision-making behavior, especially from ideologically distant lower court pan-
els (see Boucher and Segal 1995; Cameron, Segal, and Songer 2000; Lindquist, Haire,
and Songer 2007). However, the assertion that U.S. Courts of Appeals decision mak-
ing is a function of a principal-agent relationship is disputed by a number of studies.
Studies that examine the degree to which lower federal court judges modify their
behavior to avoid reversal by the Supreme Court find little empirical support for
such theoretical propositions (Klein 2002; Klein and Hume 2003; Luse et al. 2009).
Instead, analyses of voting patterns indicate that court of appeals judges more fre-
quently vote their sincere policy preferences in the cases most likely to be reviewed
by the U.S. Supreme Court than in other cases (Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek
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2006; Bowie and Songer 2009). While these studies improve our understanding of
the impact of Supreme Court decision making, many important questions remain.
First, can Supreme Court justices meaningfully signal their legal and policy prefer-
ences vis-á-vis their precedents to judges on the lower courts, particularly the U.S.
Courts of Appeals? Second, what impact do such Supreme Court signals have on the
likelihood and the propensity of the circuits to rely on the precedents of the Court?
Finally, how is information regarding the legal and policy preferences of judicial actors
communicated within the judicial hierarchy?
A Framework for Learning in the Judicial Hierarchy
In this dissertation, I offer a theory in which information regarding the preferences of
judicial actors flows: top-down, from the Supreme Court to the lower courts, bottom-
up, from the lower courts to the Supreme Court, and horizontally, within and across
the jurisdictions of the circuits. I theorize that key Supreme Court signals and im-
portant circuit-level influences, together, drive circuit court attentiveness to the High
Court’s precedents. The lower court application of the Supreme Court’s precedents,
in turn, communicate information up the judicial ladder of the policy position of
precedents. This upward transmission of information helps inform justices with their
certiorari decisions. In addition to these conventional channels, I argue that judges
on the courts of appeals also convey vital information that is transmitted horizon-
tally to other judges within the same circuit and to judges across the various circuits
within the U.S. Courts of Appeals. My framework suggests that information regard-
ing the preferences of judicial actors flows dynamically across these three channels in
a feedback loop that ultimately shapes the breadth and scope of precedent.
I make the case that a series of signals by justices of the Supreme Court pro-
vide important informational cues that influence the propensity of judges on the U.S.
Courts of Appeals to rely on a given precedent of the High Court. Specifically, I the-
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orize that the Supreme Court’s use of summary decisions, which explicitly reference a
recent plenary precedent in close proximity to the time the precedent is issued signals
the import of a precedent to judges on the courts of appeals. The intuition behind this
expectation is that when the Supreme Court is willing to grant certiorari to one or
several additional petitions to issue summary decisions in conjunction with a plenary
ruling, the Supreme Court not only overturns additional appeals court decisions, but
demonstrates its willingness to grant review and overturn similar decisions by the
courts of appeals in the future. While the various signals by the Supreme Court
likely influence circuit reliance on the Supreme Court’s precedents, I argue that the
impact of such signals is moderated, to some extent, by influences at the circuit-level.
My theory is premised on the belief that rather than a deference to the perceived
preferences of the justices, judges in the Courts of Appeals take their roles as arbiters
of law seriously. I argue that an important mechanism through which appeals court
judges respond to the precedents of the Supreme Court is based on norm of horizontal
stare decisis. That is, a seemingly important factor in determining the likelihood that
a circuit relies on a Supreme Court precedent is influenced by how previous panels
within the Courts of Appeals have interpreted a given precedent. Previous research
demonstrates that the ‘vitality,’ or strength of a precedent, consistently impacts how
the lower federal courts respond to the Supreme Court’s precedents in future decisions
(see Hansford and Spriggs 2006; Westerland et al. 2010).
Precedents that have been interpreted positively compared to the frequency of
negative treatments impact the ‘legal strength’ of a precedent. I similarly hypothesize
that as the ratio of previous positive to negative interpretations of a Supreme Court’s
precedent by the circuits increases, the likelihood that a circuit will rely on a precedent
increases. I believe that such ‘vital’ precedents are more likely to be cited and followed
by subsequent panels of judges in cases that come before the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
This is because when appeals court judges either positively or negatively apply a
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Supreme Court precedent, their action impacts circuit law. Additionally, I make the
case that circuits responding to a Supreme Court precedent that emerges from the
review of the same circuit increases the probability of future reliance of a precedent.
My intuition here is that when the Supreme Court issues a precedent that is based on
a review of an earlier decision by a circuit, in issuing the new precedent the Supreme
Court not only sets broad national policy, but its actions directly impact existing
circuit-law within the circuit in question. As such, I expect that circuits responding
to a Supreme Court precedent that originates from the same circuit to have a higher
likelihood to rely on a new precedent compared to the other circuits. Moreover, I
argue that differences in ideological preferences at the Supreme Court and circuit-level
moderate the propensity of a circuit to rely on a precedent of the Supreme Court.
In order to test the theoretical propositions, I rely on three major sources of
data for the analysis. I obtain information on the Supreme Court’s formally argued
decisions from the expanded U.S. Supreme Court database. I obtain data for the
Supreme Court’s summary decisions by collecting original data on every summary
decision issued by the Court via the bound volumes of the ‘United States Reports.’
Finally, I obtain data on courts of appeals citations and interpretations of the Supreme
Court’s precedents via the Shepard’s Citations service. To test the utility of the
Supreme Court’s summary decisions signals, I examine the universe of all Supreme
Court decisions between 1994-2005. This period represents the longest natural era of
the modern U.S. Supreme Court. I depart from previous research designs by altering
the unit of analysis to ‘circuit-year-Supreme Court precedent.’ This means that for
each Supreme Court precedent in the sample, I examine the responses of each circuit
to each individual Supreme Court precedent every year a precedent is available within
the sample. My analysis suggests that the presence of such a summary decision signal
serves a positive monotonic influence on the propensity of the courts of appeals to
rely on a precedent of the Supreme Court. The implications of this new theoretical
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finding offers an important development for future inquiries on judicial impact and
shed new light on our understanding of the policy impact of the Court.
The Supreme Court’s Summary Decisions
A fundamental shortcoming of decision analyses of the U.S. Supreme Court is exclu-
sion of a large portion of the Court’s decision-making docket, which are the summary
decisions of the Supreme Court. The general belief among many scholars is that sum-
mary decisions are inconsequential to decision making analysis. With rare exception,
much of the literature has altogether ignored any potential effect of including sum-
mary disposition as part of Supreme Court analysis (but see Benesh 2008; Brenner
and Stier 1996; Bruhl 2009; Songer and Lindquist 1996). This, I argue, is attributable
to a number of factors. Foremost is the fact that the nature of the Supreme Court’s
summary decisions is generally misunderstood. For instance, the strongest propo-
nents of the attitudinal model equate the majority of summary decisions to certiorari
denials. In their seminal work on the attitudinal model, Segal and Spaeth (2002, 247)
proclaim that the U.S. Supreme Court’s summary decisions are “meaningless because
they are the same as cases in which certiorari is denied”. Segal and Spaeth’s position
on High Court’s summary decisions is unambiguous and one that they consistently
repeat in their work (see also Segal and Spaeth 1993, 1996). However, the position
that summary decisions are the same as certiorari denials is difficult to reconcile in
light of the fact that summary decisions include an explicit statement by the justices
that the “petition for certiorari is granted review.” To put it another way, it is theo-
retically not possible for Supreme Court justices to issue a summary decision without
granting certiorari.
A more credible authority in explaining the nature of summary decisions is the
Supreme Court itself. In Lawrence v. Charter the Court provides important insight
on the justices utility of these decisions. The justices state that a grant, vacate, and
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remand (GVR) order, the most frequently employed form of summary decision, is the
process to vacate “any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before
it for review” (166). The opinion in Lawrence adds that “this Court has the power to
remand to a lower federal court any case raising a federal issue that is properly before
us in our appellate capacity” (163). Summary decisions have been issued “in light
of a wide range of developments, including our own decisions, State Supreme Court
decisions, new federal statues, administrative reinterpretations of federal statues, new
state statues, [and] changed factual circumstances” (164). In Lawrence, the justices
go further to explain the use of summary decisions as a means to “[conserve] the scarce
resources of this Court that might otherwise be expended on plenary consideration”
and to “[alleviate] the potential for unequal treatment that is inherent in our inability
to grant plenary review of all pending cases raising similar issues” (163).
The justices of the Supreme Court maintain that summary decisions, like all other
cases granted certiorari, are granted review because the Court has decided that there
are compelling reasons for it to take action. The implication of this argument is
that in the absence of such compelling reasons, the Court would deny review rather
than granting certiorari and then issuing a summary decision. The grant of review
on certiorari separates both summary and plenary decisions from the thousands of
certiorari petitions the Court receives and simply denies. More substantively, a cer-
tiorari denial allows the lower court decision to stand, whereas, a summary decision
frequently disturbs the lower court by either vacating or reversing the previous deci-
sion of the court below. Thus, a denial of certiorari means that the Supreme Court
does not create national precedent, the outcome for the parties remains unchanged,
and the precedent established below as binding circuit law remains in place. By con-
trast, most summary decisions mean that the previous outcome no longer holds and
a binding circuit precedent no longer has the force of law.
Another way to differentiate between denials of certiorari and summary decisions
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is that while a certiorari denial has no effect on other decisions by either the same or
other lower courts, summary decisions have a broader effect on the lower courts. For
instance, the Supreme Court’s summary decision in Youngblood v. West Virginia1
vacates and remands an earlier ruling by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia. While this summary decision only disturbs the ruling of the court directly
below, other district, circuit, and state courts either cite or follow the Youngblood
decision on more than 150 occasions. This is a clear indication that lower courts in
our judicial system consider summary decisions to be important relevant precedent.
The Court’s summary decision in Lawrence has similarly been cited by other lower
courts. In fact, some lower courts interpret the Lawrence decision to give all appellate
courts the authority to vacate (or reverse) and remand, any decision that the lower
court believes to be incorrectly decided, has a strong likelihood to be erroneous, or
does not take into consideration a recent intervening decision that could affect its
outcome.
The Supreme Court’s summary decisions are binding decisions that declare the
prior lower court decision null and void. In Hicks v. Miranda the justices unambigu-
ously declare that the “lower courts are bound by [the] summary decisions of this
Court.” As a matter of law, no party or court may rely on the prior precedent of the
lower court which has been reversed or vacated by a Supreme Court summary deci-
sion. Through a summary decision the Supreme Court is instructing a lower court to
take two actions. One, the lower court must issue a new decision, because the prior
decision is no longer in force. Second, upon reconsideration, the lower court must
address the precedent the Supreme Court references within its summary decision. As
such, summary decisions provide lower court judges with important information on
the legal authority to consider prior to issuing a new decision while simultaneously
1 While Youngblood emanates from the Supreme Court reviewing a state court decision, the Supreme
Court’s actions in this case demonstrates its ability to review and issue important summary deci-
sions from both state and federal courts.
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communicating that the justices are more inclined to review, vacate, and remand
lower court decisions in a particular area of law.
Given the discussion above, I argue that the Supreme Court’s summary decisions
are an important instrument for the Court’s commitment to achieving legal consis-
tency, legitimizing newly created precedent and correcting egregious legal errors by
the lower courts in determining case outcomes and their interpretations of Supreme
Court precedent. Specifically, I contend that the justices employ summary decisions
as a low-cost alternative to granting a case formal review in pursuit of their legal
policy goals. Since there are a finite number of sessions in which the justices may
schedule and hear oral arguments to an accepted petition, the justices must be strate-
gic in scheduling oral arguments for cases that hold the greatest import and cases
where the application of the law is unclear. However, in instances where the direc-
tion of the law is clear but lower court responses are not in-line with the preferences
of the justices, the Court may grant certiorari to a theoretically infinite number of
petitions without expending their finite resources and systematically correcting the
non-compliant actions of the lower courts. While these summary decisions come at a
low cost they also provide a smaller policy benefit to the justices, in that summary
decisions do not set broad national precedent. However, the aggregate impact of
the collection of the Court’s summary decisions is one that can broaden the scope
of a given precedent and convey important information about the preferences of the
justices to judges on the lower courts.
The efficacy of the Supreme Court’s summary decisions to influence future judi-
cial decision-making behavior and attentiveness to the Court’s precedents remains
unresolved and engenders some disagreement among judicial scholars. One view is
that the Supreme Court’s summary decisions are relatively minor, inconsequential
decisions limited to a single case. This view suggests that beyond the instant case, a
Supreme Court’s summary decision has no legal value and does not impact attentive-
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ness to the Court’s precedents (i.e., see Segal and Spaeth 2002). The belief is that
each Supreme Court summary decision should be viewed in isolation and when com-
pared directly to a formally argued decision of the Court, the impact of any given
summary decision is relatively minor. This conceptualization represents the tradi-
tional approach to modeling the impact of the Supreme Court’s summary decisions.
I argue that an alternative way to gauge the impact of the Supreme Court’s summary
decisions is to not consider these summary decisions in isolation but rather their col-
lective impact. I argue that because the Supreme Court often issues several summary
decisions “in light of” a given precedent in a given area of law there is a cumulative
effect of these summary decisions. When the U.S. Supreme Court grants certiorari
to several additional petitions, nullifies the previous lower court ruling, and directs
lower court judges to issue a new ruling “in light of” of a specific plenary precedent
this has important implications for the overall impact and attentiveness to a given
precedent of the Court. In fact, a recent study by Benesh et al. (2014) finds that in
92% of the cases remanded to the courts of appeals with a GVR, the circuit court
responded by issuing a new opinion that substantively interpreted the “in light of”
precedent referenced within the GVR (171). The practical effect of this sequence of
events is for appeals court judges to apply the Supreme Court’s precedent to a wider
set of cases as they address the Supreme Court’s remands. Thus, the Supreme Court’s
summary decisions appear to be a useful mechanism for the justices to achieve greater
adherence to the their precedents by the lower courts.
Overview of the Dissertation
While compliance and implementation of legal precedents is the subject of a growing
number of studies, scholars have paid relatively scant attention to the cumulative
impact of the Supreme Court on the lower courts. Moreover, little work highlights
the process of learning within the judicial hierarchy. In the following chapters, I offer
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a new theory and new empirical tests that provide novel insights on the nature of
the relationship between the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
In Chapter 2, I present a theoretical framework on how information flows dynami-
cally within the federal judiciary that helps shape the scope of legal precedents. My
theoretical starting point is grounded in the assumption that U.S. Supreme Court jus-
tices are policy entrepreneurs who are attentive to aggregate patterns of lower court
implementation of their decisions. I argue that various explicit and implicit signals
by the U.S. Supreme Court influence the decision-making behavior of judges on the
U.S. Courts of Appeals. Circuit responses to the Supreme Court’s precedents, in
turn, provide important information to the justices from which they can strategically
audit and reverse non-compliant decisions. From the general theoretical framework,
I derive a number of new, falsifiable propositions, which I assess within the three
empirical chapters of the dissertation.
In Chapter 3, I investigate various signals sent by the justices on the U.S. Supreme
Court to judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Principally, I argue that the U.S.
Supreme Court’s reversals convey important information on the preferences of the
justices vis-á-vis their precedents. I hypothesize that policy oriented justices with
finite resources can effectively monitor the lower courts by being attentive to aggregate
trends of compliance. I make the case that Supreme Court justices can use this
bottom-up flow of information to monitor the actions of individual circuits and then
review and sanction the circuits that are least supportive of the Court’s preferences.
In doing so, the justices can demonstrate their willingness to sanction lower court
behavior that consistently deviates from its legal and policy preferences. My results
demonstrate Supreme Court reversals, indeed, exert a strong positive effect on future
circuit court adherence to the Court’s precedents.
Chapter 4 examines the efficacy of the Supreme Court’s signals on future courts
of appeals attentiveness to its precedents. More specifically, I investigate the prob-
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ability of judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals to either comply or shirk from the
preferences of the Supreme Court in light of the various Supreme Court signals. The
key expectation is that lower court implementation of Supreme Court precedent is
most likely when the Supreme Court issues one or more summary decisions “in light
of” a recently announced formally argued precedent. Further, within this chapter, I
also consider a broader theoretical perspective in which influences at the circuit-level,
such as ideological preferences of the judges within a given circuit, constrain the im-
pact of the Supreme Court’s signals. I design a new test for gauging the impact of
Supreme Court signals on the principal circuit from which the justices draw the case
against the sister circuits. My analysis demonstrates that not only is the Supreme
Court capable of communicating information regarding their preferences but it is also
able to substantially increase the probability with which all circuits comply with its
precedents in the presence of such signals. The results suggests that the circuits learn
about the policy space of precedents from both the Supreme Court and each other.
Chapter 5 explores the causal mechanisms that influence circuit court adherence
with the Supreme Court’s precedents. A shortcoming of previous analyses is the
inability to address concerns of spuriousness and lack of causal tests. The lower
courts have a general tendency to behave as good agents even in the absence of
legal and policy directives from the Supreme Court. Therefore, it is necessary to
assess whether signals by the Supreme Court have a causal relationship with the
frequency with which the lower courts implement the precedents of the Court. This
chapter provides both qualitative and quantitative evidence in support of the causal
claims. My results demonstrate that in the absence of key Supreme Court signals,
the Court’s precedents are implemented with a substantively lower propensity within
the decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Chapter 6 concludes with a discussion
of other important findings, avenues for future research, and the theoretical and
empirical implications of this project.
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Chapter 2
A Theory on the Dynamic Flow of Information
in the American Federal Judiciary
At the center of judicial politics is the analysis of judicial decision-making behav-
ior. Most frequently the focus of such analyses are decisions by the U.S. Supreme
Court (e.g., Baird 2007; Baum 1997; Caldeira and Wright 1988; Hall 2010; Pacelle,
Curry, and Marshall 2011; Perry 1991; Pritchett 1948; Schubert 1965, 1974; Segal,
Spaeth, and Benesh 2005). A voluminous literature examines the factors that in-
fluence the behavior of the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court. These studies find
that several factors influence the decisions of Supreme Court justices, which include
ideological preferences, legal and precedential stimuli, institutional constraints, and
strategic considerations. A very large number of studies suggest that ideologically
driven, policy-oriented preferences strongly influence on the decision-making behav-
ior of Supreme Court justices (see Collins 2008; Rohde and Spaeth 1976; Segal 1997;
Segal and Spaeth 1993, 1996, 2002; Spaeth 1979; Spaeth and Segal 1999). More recent
work demonstrates that law and precedent exert an important influence on the deci-
sions of the justices (see Bailey and Maltzman 2008; Bartels 2009; George and Epstein
1992; Hansford and Spriggs 2006; Lax 2007; Lindquist and Klein 2006; Richards and
Kritzer 2002; Segal 1984; Wedeking 2012). Yet other studies suggest that strategic
and institutional influences drive the decision-making behavior of Supreme Court jus-
tices (see Epstein and Knight 1998; Hammond, Bonneau, and Sheehan 2005; Murphy
1964; Randazzo and Waterman 2011, 2014; Wahlbeck, Spriggs, and Maltzman 1998).
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Although the U.S. Supreme Court is the focus of most judicial studies, much of
the law is adjudicated within the U.S. Courts of Appeals (Hettinger, Lindquist, and
Martinek 2006; Klein 2002; Posner 2010). This is due to the fact that intermediate
appellate court judges are effectively the final arbiters of most legal appeals within
the federal courts (George 1999; Howard 1981). Given this reality, several studies on
decision-making behavior within the U.S. Courts of Appeals indicate that ideological
preferences influence the behavior of appeals court judges (Boyd, Epstein, and Martin
2010; Songer 1982; Songer and Haire 1992). Zorn and Bowie (2010) find that while
ideological influences are prevalent in the lower federal courts, the impact of attitudes
is less pervasive at lower levels of the judiciary. Most judicial scholars are in agreement
that while ideology has some impact on decisions by the U.S. Courts of Appeals, its
impact is not as vigorous as it is within the decision making behavior of the U.S.
Supreme Court. Indeed, a large body of work confirms support for the the strength
of legal influences in motivating the decisions of judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals
(Benesh 2002; Cross 2003, 2007; Klein 2002; Songer and Haire 1992; Songer, Sheehan,
and Haire 2000, see). For instance, Cross and Tiller (1998, 2155) note that judges
on the “lower courts are presumed to adhere to the self-enforcing principle of stare
decisis and to apply the doctrines of higher courts to the particular facts of the
underlying case.” Corroborating this perspective are a series of interviews conducted
by Klein (2002) and Bowie, Songer, and Szmer (2014) where circuit court judges claim
that law and precedent exert a forceful influence, which often outweighs ideological
considerations in motivating the behavior of judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
Yet other studies find that federal appellate court judges face a greater number of
institutional constraints, which includes an adherence to collegial norms (Hettinger,
Lindquist, and Martinek 2003a,b, 2006; Kastellec 2011; Kornhauser 1992; Lindquist,
Martinek, and Hettinger 2007), large caseloads (Bowie, Songer, and Szmer 2014; Klein
2002; Songer, Sheehan, and Haire 2000) and the likelihood of review, either en banc
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(Blackstone and Collins 2014; Clark 2009; Giles et al. 2007; Giles, Walker, and Zorn
2006) or by the U.S. Supreme Court (Black and Owens 2012; Caldeira, Wright, and
Zorn 1999; Haire, Songer, and Lindquist 2003; Lax 2003; Lindquist, Haire, and Songer
2007; Songer, Ginn, and Sarver 2003; Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994). The insights
generated from these studies provide researchers with a thorough understanding of
the key influences on decision-making behavior within these courts.
While scholars generally tend to examine decision-making behavior within the
U.S. Supreme Court or the U.S. Courts of Appeals, in isolation, recent research
sheds important light on the nature of the relationship among these courts. Studies
of lower court interactions with the U.S. Supreme Court overwhelmingly suggest
that the lower federal appellate courts are highly responsive to the precedents of
the U.S. Supreme Court (Clark 2009; Corley 2009; Fowler et al. 2007; Klein and
Hume 2003; Pacelle and Baum 1992; Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994; Westerland
et al. 2010). Judge Posner (2010, 145) explains that the reason for such constancy
is due to the fact that “judges are strongly motivated to adhere to precedent, not
only because they want to encourage adherence to the precedents they [themselves]
create” but also “because they want to limit their workloads.” Posner adds that,
“adherence to precedent does this both directly, by reducing the amount of fresh
analysis that the judges have to perform, and indirectly, by reducing the number of
appeals” that would originate from non-adherence to the Supreme Court’s precedents.
To be sure, in a prominent recent analysis, Hansford and Spriggs (2006) find that the
U.S. Supreme Court’s preferred policy positions and treatment of its own precedents
largely influence future lower court responses to precedent. Other empirical work
on judicial impact also demonstrates that the lower federal courts frequently follow,
and rarely defy the Supreme Court in terms of explicitly challenging the broader
authority and legitimacy of a Supreme Court precedent (Benesh 2002; Benesh and
Reddick 2002; Canon and Johnson 1998; Johnson 1979; Luse et al. 2009; Songer 1988;
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Songer and Haire 1992; Songer and Sheehan 1992; Wahlbeck 1998). Thus, the general
conclusion derived from these studies is that a principal-agent relationship is in effect
within the American judiciary. These important studies are informative, but how
exactly do Supreme Court justices communicate their preferences to judges on the
lower courts? Additionally, are potential signals by the justices capable of increasing
lower court compliance with the Supreme Court’s decisions?
A key assumption within the existing impact literature is that Supreme Court
justices are policy-maximizing individuals who are interested in the broader impact of
their decisions especially within the judicial hierarchy. However, a pervasive problems
in most hierarchical organizations is the inability of the principal to monitor the
actions of all of its subordinates. The U.S. Supreme Court similarly faces significant
resource constraints that limit the ability of the Supreme Court to monitor the actions
of every three-judge panel on the courts of appeals. How then can policy oriented
justices ensure that their preferences are largely followed by the courts below? I
provide a framework in which the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court are able to
signal their preferences regarding their precedents and demonstrate their willingness
to sanction lower court behavior that deviates from its legal and policy preferences.
Within this framework I also argue that the justices rely on important informational
cues from judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals and monitor the actions of courts of
appeals by circuit rather than three-judge panels and then review and sanction the
circuits that are least supportive of the Court’s preferences. I then provide a broad
framework in which I argue that information regarding legal precedents flows in not
one, but three different directions. I offer a theory in which information regarding
the preferences of judicial actors flows: (1) top-down, from the U.S. Supreme Court
to the lower courts, (2) bottom-up, from the lower courts to the to the Supreme
Court, and (3) horizontally, across the jurisdictions of the circuits within the U.S.
Courts of Appeals. I argue that all three of these channels together influence the
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development of legal doctrine within the federal judiciary. My theoretical framework
is premised on the belief that informational cues from Supreme Court justices and
judges on the courts of appeals provide decision makers at each level of the judiciary
with opportunities to learn, which impacts future responses and attentiveness to
legal precedents. From this general framework, I develop more precise theoretical
propositions within the empirical chapters of this dissertation.
Information Diffusion and Learning in the Judicial Hierarchy
Students of the American judiciary have long sought an answer to the puzzle of
judicial behavior. What factors drive the decision-making behavior of U.S. Supreme
Court justices? Similarly, what elements influence the decisions of judges on the
U.S. Courts of Appeals? A related puzzle that emerges from these questions is what
factors determine attentiveness to legal precedents and how does law develop within
the judicial hierarchy? Finally, if the U.S. Supreme Court is indeed ‘supreme’ and
all decisions by it binding on the courts below, why do judges on the U.S. Courts of
Appeals frequently follow some Supreme Court precedents but not others?
Previous studies demonstrate that both U.S. Supreme Court justices and judges on
the U.S. Courts of Appeals have at least some policy preferences that they attempt
to pursue within their decisions (see Baum 1997; Brenner and Stier 1996; Epstein
and Knight 1998; Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek 2006; Maltzman and Wahlbeck
1996; Mishler and Sheehan 1993; Owens and Wedeking 2012; Segal and Spaeth 2002;
Spaeth and Segal 1999). A growing number of studies suggest that while these judicial
decision-makers have policy goals their policy ambitions are constrained, if not exten-
sively, to some minor extent, by the law (see Bailey and Maltzman 2008, 2011; Bartels
2009; Kritzer and Richards 2005; Klein 2002; Lindquist and Klein 2006; Maltzman,
Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 2000; Richards and Kritzer 2002; Songer and Lindquist 1996).
What then drives attentiveness to legal precedents? Studies centering on lower court
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and Supreme Court interactions are not uniform in their beliefs about the nature of
the association and the mechanisms that entrench the durability of legal precedents.
Existing studies, while informative, are often at odds with each other regarding the
influence of legal and policy preferences at each level and the transmission of this
information. There are two primary sets of accounts that attempt to explain how
decision-makers at different levels of the judicial hierarchy learn and communicate
their preferences.
Top-Down Influences within the Judicial Hierarchy
The traditional view is that the primary mechanism with which information is trans-
mitted about legal and policy preferences is that the information flows from the top
down the judicial ladder. That is, key information about the breadth and scope
of a legal precedent flows from the U.S. Supreme Court down to the judges on the
U.S. Courts of Appeals. This information can be interpreted as a number of explicit
or implicit signals by the justices to circuit judges on how to apply the Supreme
Court’s precedents. For instance, one such signal is Supreme Court vitality, which
is a measure that captures the propensity with which the U.S. Supreme Court pos-
itively or negatively applies its own precedents. Supreme Court vitality is the net
difference between the total number of positive minus the total number of negative
applications of a Supreme Court precedent in subsequent Supreme Court decisions.
Hansford and Spriggs (2006) find that the Supreme Court’s preferred policy positions
and applications of its own precedent strongly influence both future Supreme Court
and lower court responses to precedent, even after controlling for ideology (see also
Corley 2009; Corley and Wedeking 2014; Kassow, Songer, and Fix 2012; Spriggs and
Hansford 2002; Wedeking 2012; Westerland et al. 2010). Similarly, the important
work by Fowler et al. (2007) demonstrates that the lower courts are significantly
more likely to apply a Supreme Court precedent in subsequent cases if the precedent
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is embedded in a broad and endogenous network of Supreme Court decisions (see
also Fowler and Jeon 2008). Building on these existing theoretical frameworks, my
expectation is that positive applications of the Supreme Courts precedents, by the
Court itself, should serve as an important signal to lower court judges that a given
Supreme Court precedent is still relevant, important, and good law. I contend, how-
ever, that signals such as precedent vitality are markedly conditioned by factors at
the lower court level. I expand on the premise of this important institution later on
in this chapter.
Other signals or informational cues that the justices provide to lower court judges
include the size of the majority coalition with which a Supreme Court decision is
announced. For instance, a unanimously decided Supreme Court decision communi-
cates to lower court judges that the justices are in agreement on the disposition of
a particular case and how the given precedent should be applied in similar factual
situations. A unanimous decision also conveys that if a panel of lower court judges
shirks from such a precedent there is a higher probability that the justices will reverse
a lower court decision if it is granted review. By contrast, a 5-4 Supreme Court deci-
sion that is split along ideological lines conveys the information that there is a lack of
consensus on how to apply a given precedent in related disputes. Previous research in
fact suggests that increases in the size of the voting coalition that issues a precedent
has a demonstrable impact on how much support a Supreme Court decision receives
from the lower courts (Canon and Johnson 1998; Collins 2011; Corley, Steigerwalt,
and Ward 2013; Hansford and Spriggs 2006; Johnson 1979, 1987; Spriggs and Hans-
ford 2001; Wedeking 2012). In particular, Kassow, Songer, and Fix (2012) find that
for state high court application of Supreme Court precedent, the margin by which
the justices issue a decision predicts the likelihood of positive treatment. Similarly,
Corley (2009) finds that plurality decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court have a signifi-
cantly lower likelihood of positive treatment by the U.S. Courts of Appeals compared
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with decisions that are based on majority opinions. Other analyses note that the size
of the majority coalition that issues a given precedent may also signal that the Court
is less likely to overturn or modify precedent in subsequent decisions (Benesh and
Reddick 2002; Black and Spriggs 2013; Corley 2010; Spriggs and Hansford 2001).
Split decisions often lack clarity and dissents may invite lower courts to not com-
ply because dissents offer an alternative rationale for a lower court to proceed that
is separate from the majority opinion. Unanimous decisions provide the greatest
clarity and constrain judges from maneuvering and legally distinguishing the prece-
dent. Thus, compliance should be highest in unanimous opinions and should require
fewer exposures for positive treatment compared to non-unanimous decisions (i.e.,
any decision with at least one dissent). Conversely, split decisions (i.e., 5-4 decisions)
should take longer for lower courts to comply with and should require a comparatively
higher number of exposures for positive application than a unanimous decisions by
the Supreme Court. As such, I argue that Supreme Court justices implicitly signal
the clarity of a given precedent by the margin with which they adopt a precedent.
The intuition behind this expectation is that a split decision may signal extreme
ideological divisiveness or signify problems with the legal authority on which the
precedent is grounded and, as such, may provide less purchase for judges to rely on
such divided precedents in future decisions. Therefore, there is sufficient reason to
expect that the size of the majority coalition exerts some influence on lower court
utility of the Supreme Court’s precedents. My theory incorporates this argument, in
that I expect Supreme Court decisions issued with a broader coalition of justices to
positively influence lower court adoption of the High Court’s precedents.
Top-down cues also include whether the justices explicitly alter existing precedent,
which provides lower court judges with new guidance on the logic to resolve similar
disputes. Corley (2010) argues that the formal alteration of precedent by the U.S.
Supreme Court, which she refers to as measure of legal salience, sends a strong signal
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to the lower courts that the lower courts should cease to rely on a prior precedent
announced by the Court. An empirical analysis by Wahlbeck (1998) similarly finds
that such an explicit signal is received and promptly followed by the lower courts in
the area of common law doctrines of nuisance, suggesting a strong “norm” of lower
court compliance. Moreover, Benesh and Reddick (2002) provide compelling evidence
that a signal by the justices usually receives clear support from the lower courts and
that once the Supreme Court specifically overrules or alters a precedent, the lower
courts cease to adhere to a given Supreme Court decision. Specifically, these scholars
find that when the Supreme Court overrules an older precedent the circuits quickly
comply compared to when the Court overrules a more recent decision. Nevertheless,
in both instances the lower courts follow the Supreme Court’s lead. The overturning
of a precedent, however, is a relatively rare event. In the vast majority of its cases
the U.S. Supreme Court affirms existing precedent.
Table 2.1: Alteration of Precedent by the U.S. Supreme Court
Court Affirmed Altered Altered %
Vinson Court 799 12 1.48
Warren Court 2151 46 2.09
Burger Court 2711 56 2.02
Rehnquist Court 1983 45 2.22
Roberts Court 780 15 1.89
Total 8424 174 2.02
Note: Data obtained from the U.S. Supreme Court Database (Spaeth et al. 2013). The
Roberts Court data covers all decisions until the 2014 term, which covers the full scope of
the current database.
Table 2.1 presents the frequency of formal alterations to its precedents by U.S.
Supreme Court era. As the data indicate, the justices affirm their precedents in
approximately 98% of their decisions. These trends suggest extensive continuity in
the High Court’s precedents even when the membership of the Court changes. I
21
contend that when the Supreme Court explicitly alters a precedent, such an action
has important implications for motivating lower court decision-making behavior. My
intuition is that when the Supreme Court overturns or formally alters a precedent,
lower court judges should (1) cease relying on the altered Supreme Court precedent,
and (2) strongly adhere to the new precedent in similar cases that come before the U.S.
Courts of Appeals. It is worth noting that lower court application of altered precedent
may not necessarily be immediate due to a learning period. Lower courts take time to
develop initial circuit precedent. Circuits may also employ a ‘wait-and-see’ approach
where judges wait to see how other circuits initially treat a new Court precedent. Such
an approach would favor many judges initially distinguishing or altogether omitting
references to the altered precedent. However, it is reasonable to expect that any
adherence to the altered precedent should cease immediately. Altering a precedent
certainly provides an important cue to judges on the lower courts.
The Supreme Court reversing a lower court decision also conveys potentially im-
portant information to judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Table 2.2 presents the
frequency with which the Supreme Court reverses the total number of decisions it
reviews from the U.S. Courts of Appeals. The data highlight the reality that when
the justices grant certiorari to a decision from the U.S. Courts of Appeals, the most
likely outcome is a reversing, rather than upholding, the lower court decision. Even
though a growing number of studies conclude that a fear of reversal by the U.S.
Supreme Court does not influence lower court decison-making behavior (see Bowie
and Songer 2009; Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek 2006; Klein 2002; Smith 2014;
Songer, Ginn, and Sarver 2003). For instance, (Klein and Hume 2003) find that the
probability a particular dispute is reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court has no mean-
ingful relationship to whether a lower court panel issued a decision in a manner that
is consistent with the ideological preferences of the contemporary Supreme Court.
The notion that the votes of inferior court judges are not swayed by the threat of
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Supreme Court reversal is one that should be distinguished from the argument that
Supreme Court reversals of lower court decisions can influence subsequent decisions
by judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals. When Supreme Court justices review and
explicitly reverse a lower court decision, the justices are communicating to the panel
of lower court judges that their decision is not in-line with the policy preferences of
the principal. When the Supreme Court issues a decision by reversing a lower court,
in addition to establishing broad national policy, the justices simultaneously alter
inter-circuit precedent within the instant court that is reversed. A Supreme Court
reversal is a particularly consequential action by the justices, as it communicates
that not only did the lower court get it wrong, but that reviewing and reversing the
decision was important enough for the Court to expend its limited resources. There-
fore, when Supreme Court justices explicitly reverse a decision by the U.S. Courts
of Appeals, lower court judges should more frequently comply with such a precedent
compared to when the Court affirms an existing precedent.
Table 2.2: Reversal of U.S. Courts of Appeals Decision by the U.S. Supreme Court
Court Decisions Reviewed Reversed Reversal %
Vinson Court 452 260 57.52
Warren Court 1170 780 66.67
Burger Court 1681 1124 66.86
Rehnquist Court 1468 928 63.22
Roberts Court 629 448 71.22
Total 5400 3540 65.56
Note: Data obtained from the U.S. Supreme Court Database (Spaeth et al. 2013). The
Roberts Court data reflects all decisions until the 2014 term, which covers the full scope of
the current database. The reversals figure includes decisions that are vacated and remanded.
As the discussion above indicates, Supreme Court justices are capable of commu-
nicating their preferences regarding their precedents to judges on inferior courts in
a variety of ways. Building on these accounts, I contend that there are other means
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through which the justices can effectively transmit their preferences and increase the
level of compliance with their decisions. As I allude to earlier in this dissertation, one
key mechanism through which the justices can compel lower court judges to rely on
a given precedent is through the Court’s summary decisions. The potential of these
summary decisions to serve as an additional vehicle to convey the legal preferences of
the justices is lacking from the theoretical literature. I argue that an important action
Supreme Court justices can take to enhance the impact of a particular precedent is
to issue one or more summary decisions “in light of” of a formally argued precedent.
I argue that when the Supreme Court issues a summary decision, it serves as a direc-
tive to judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals. The Court’s summary decisions, most
often, vacate a lower court decision and explicitly mandate that lower court judges
reconsider their earlier decision, in light of a new precedent announced by the Court.
By nullifying an earlier lower court decision and referencing a specific precedent that
should be considered, the justices communicate that a given Supreme Court prece-
dent is widely applicable to diverse factual situations in cases that are likely to come
before the federal courts of appeals and should be more broadly applied compared
to precedents with no associated summary decisions. Moreover, the deliberate action
by the Court in granting multiple petitions certiorari to issue each summary decision
signals an increased willingness of the justices to grant review to future petitions that
raise similar legal arguments but lack consideration of the Court’s new precedent.
Thus, when Supreme Court justices grant certiorari to more than one petition, the
judges on the circuit courts should interpret the actions of the Supreme Court as
a stronger likelihood that related decisions by circuit panels will be granted review,
hence offering inferior court judges comparatively less agency to shirk. Table 2.3
presents a comparison of the Supreme Court’ summary and formally argued decision.
These data highlight the reality that in light of a growing docket, the contemporary
Court is increasingly reliant on its summary decisions.
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Table 2.3: Decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court, 1995-2005
Decision Type Count
Summary Decisions 1583
Formally Argued Decisions 865
Total 2448
Note: Original data collected from the volumes of the United States Reports. The 1995-2005
terms reflect the years that are analyzed within the empirical chapters of the dissertation.
An important implication of the Supreme Court issuing one or more summary
decisions is quicker dissemination and diffusion of information regarding the Supreme
Court’s precedents within the lower courts. When the Supreme Court issues a new
precedent following oral arguments, the Court typically reviews a single decision by
one of the circuits below. Thus, in issuing its decision and setting new national
precedent the Court either affirms or alters an earlier decision by one of the twelve
circuits. This has direct implications for circuit law within the circuit in question
and all judges within the affected circuit should be expected to quickly become aware
of the Court’s new precedent and should quickly begin applying the precedent in
relevant, future decisions. By contrast, judges in all other circuits should be expected
to apply the same precedent more slowly as these judges and their clerks become
aware of the new rule and its potential applicability over time. However, when the
Supreme Court issues one or more summary decisions associated with a formally
argued precedent, the Court often issues the summary decision by reviewing a case
from a different circuit. Since most Supreme Court summary decisions involve a
remand back to the circuit, the practical effect of the summary decision is affirmation
or alteration of circuit law for another circuit with an added directive to consider the
authority of a new precedent. Thus, a Supreme Court precedent with one or more
summary decisions directly impacts inter-circuit law within at least two circuits,
which allows for quicker dissemination of information and a greater propensity that a
25
given Supreme Court precedent is adopted compared to when no summary decisions
accompany a precedent. Expanding on this notion, I contend that as the volume
of the Court’s summary decisions increase and as the number of jurisdictions (i.e.,
the number of circuits) from which the Court draws a case, to issue each summary
decision increase, I expect the preferences of the justices vis-á-vis their precedents to
more expeditiously diffuse within the judicial hierarchy.
U.S. Supreme Court
1st Circuit CoA 2nd Circuit CoA
Top-Down Influence Top-DownTo own Information p-Down Information
Figure 2.1: Top-Down Transmission of Information
Yet additional signals from the Supreme offer explicit guidance on how and when
to apply precedents within the content of the majority opinion, and separate opinions
that provide information on conditions where distinguishing or deviating from the
fundamentals of a given precedent may be appropriate (see Benesh and Reddick
2002; Corley 2009). The key notion here is that these explicit and implicit signals
convey information that flows downward to the circuits and influences the decision-
making behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals in subsequent cases. Indeed, a number
of studies demonstrate that the lower federal courts adhere to the legal and policy
preferences of the U.S. Supreme Court (see Clark 2009; Fowler et al. 2007; Haire,
Songer, and Lindquist 2003; Black and Owens 2012; Randazzo 2008; Songer, Segal,
and Cameron 1994). Figure 2.1 graphically presents how information flows top-
26
down within the judiciary hierarchy. As the preceding discussion indicates, the U.S.
Supreme Court, is capable of transmitting various important informational cues via
explicit and implicit signals down the judicial ladder.
Bottom-Up Influences in the Judicial Hierarchy
A second view on how legal doctrine and law evolves is that information flows from
the bottom up. That is, judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals in their collective
application of Supreme Court precedents, the content of their majority opinions, the
content of separate opinions, dissenting votes, decision en banc, and conflict among
the circuits transmit important information to Supreme Court justices on how the
lower courts may apply a given precedent in future cases and the lack of uniformity in
lower court application of the High Court’s precedents. Westerland et al. (2010) find
that it is positive and negative interpretations of Supreme Court precedents at the
circuit level that most strongly influence the manner of future circuit applications
of precedent. Recent work by Corley, Collins, and Calvin (2011) employs a novel
approach by relying on plagiarism software to assess just how much of the lower
court language the Supreme Court borrows in issuing a new precedent. Their analysis
suggests that the content of opinions at the circuit level are often adopted within the
future opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court. This suggests that when Supreme Court
justices make their decisions they are relying at least in part on some of the arguments
from the lower court decision. Thus, it appears the the Supreme Court’s precedents
are often directly influenced by information communicated from below. In addition,
Clark and Kastellec (2013) find that circuit conflict and percolation at lower levels
of the judicial hierarchy provides the justices with vital information on what cases to
ultimately review. Taken together, the argument proffered from this series of studies
is that the causal arrow can point in the other direction and that information is
transmitted up the judicial hierarchy from the lower courts as Figure 2.2 depicts.
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Figure 2.2: Bottom-Up Transmission of Information
Several scholars explore whether a lower court judge’s decision to dissent serves as
a signal to either the circuit, to consider a decision en banc, or for the U.S. Supreme
Court, to review the lower court panel decision. George (1999) finds that dissents as
signals are effective in securing en banc circuit review. In a different study, VanWinkle
(1997) finds that there is strong evidence that appeals court judges use dissent to
signal the need for review by the Supreme Court. Cross and Tiller (1998) suggest
that the potential for the use of dissent as a signal for review is used by minority judges
on a panel who agree with a Supreme Court precedent to prevent their colleagues in
the panel majority from following their ideological preferences that are divergent from
the precedent. A number of other studies find that the presence of panel conflict (i.e.,
dissents) have a statistically significant and positive effect on the increased likelihood
of en banc or Supreme Court review (see Bowie and Songer 2009; Caldeira, Wright,
and Zorn 1999). Kim (2009, 1331-1332) notes that a dissent by an appellate court
judge “requires time and effort” and “has no substantive effect on the outcome of the
case” yet under certain conditions appeals court judge dissent nevertheless. Kim’s
analysis suggests that while dissents by appellate judges are an effective signal for
en banc review such a signal is not credible for an increased likelihood of review by
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the U.S. Supreme Court. Similarly, Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek (2006) find
no evidence that appeals court judges use dissent as a signaling mechanism for the
U.S. Supreme Court to grant certiorari (see also Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek
2004). Recent work by Beim, Hirsch, and Kastellec (2015) suggests that the primary
motivation for a circuit court judge decision in issuing a dissent is to send a signal
to the other judges within the circuit to induce reversal via en banc review (see also
Beim, Hirsch, and Kastellec 2014). Intuitively, a circuit judge may reasonably accept
to notify and even persuade her circuit colleagues that a panel decision is problematic.
It is a considerably steeper challenge to have the Supreme Court review one’s decision
simply based on a dissent given the small number of cases the High Court reviews
each term. Taken together, the evidence on whether lower court judges strategically
employ dissents as a signaling mechanism to Supreme Court justices appears to be
mixed, at best. Nevertheless, when a lower court judge decides to author a dissenting
opinion, such an action has potential to communicate important information to the
justices. For instance, the justices may be be more inclined to review a lower court
decision due to the mere presence of a dissent. Even if the dissent does not factor in
to the justices’ decision to review a case, once accepted, the dissent offers the justices
critical information about the policy position of the lower court decision. As such, the
content of all lower court opinions, both majority and separate, are able to transmit
information up the judicial ladder.
One important mode through which information flows up the judicial system is in
how judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeal apply the precedents of the U.S. Supreme
Court. Policy oriented Supreme Court justices should desire that, ceteris paribus,
their precedents be relied on rather than ignored. Similarly, such policy motivated
justices should want their precedents to be followed rather than negatively applied.
How the lower courts apply the Supreme Court’s precedents can communicate im-
portant information to the justices about the policy scope of their precedents. The-
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oretically, one rationale for lower court judges to positively apply a Supreme Court
precedent is that the precedent is clear, binding, and provides little or no room for
circuit judges to shirk. Alternatively, judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals can choose
to negatively apply or completely ignore the precedent because the the lower court
judges may disagree with the policy preferences of the Supreme Court. Whether lower
court judges positively apply the Court’ precedents, shirk from them, or ignore them,
this information is eventually transmitted up the judicial ladder. Such information
can be communicated from the bottom up in a number of ways. A judge on the
U.S. Courts of Appeals could author a dissent that highlights the panel majority’s
overt defiance of Supreme Court precedent or its failure to consider a binding and
relevant precedent. Supreme Court justices may also receive information regarding
lower court application of its precedents via litigants and interest groups.
As I allude to above, Hansford and Spriggs (2006) make the case that Supreme
Court justices desire to set legal doctrine that will reflect the justices’ preferences.
Hansford and Spriggs see this as a continual process in which the Court is constantly
re-considering the applicability of past precedent to new legal disputes. In the process,
the Court provides either a positive treatment of existing precedent that invigorates
its legal authority or a negative treatment that restricts its reach or calls into question
the continuing importance of the precedent. These signals on increasing or decreasing
vitality of precedent are not contemporaneous with the initial declaration of the
precedent. Instead the signals are often sent over a period of many years as the Court
re-evaluates its prior actions. Using this logic, such information can be communicated
the other way. For instance, lower court judges positively or negatively applying the
Supreme Court’s precedents within their decisions can communicate vital information
about the broader scope of the High Court’s precedents within the federal judiciary. In
a recent analysis, Hansford, Spriggs, and Stenger (2013) find that negative application
of precedent by the lower courts does indeed provide the justices with information
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on the policy content of a precedent as applied to contemporary disputes. While
justices cannot pay attention to each specific positive or negative application of their
precedents in the ten of thousands of lower court decisions, the justices can pay
attention to aggregate patterns of both citations (or lack thereof) as well as aggregate
trends of positive and negative applications. If the justices announce a new decision
for which they desire strong adherence by the lower courts, the justices can simply
monitor how the circuits cumulatively interpret the given precedent. I posit that
in light of severe resource limitations to monitor all the actions of the lower federal
courts, the justices can strategically audit and reverse the circuits that are least
supportive of the Court’s preferences regarding its precedents. Thus, information
flowing from the bottom up can help substantially shape the scope and breadth of
legal precedents.
An important implication of information flowing from the bottom up is that it
can help justices identify the extent to which lower court application of precedents is
influenced by ideological preferences, especially in relation to the preferences of the
principal. A number of studies find that ideological differences between the lower
court agent and the principal are a key driver in influencing compliance with prece-
dents (see Benesh and Reddick 2002; Black and Owens 2012; Cameron, Segal, and
Songer 2000; Clark 2009; Carrubba and Clark 2012; Haire, Songer, and Lindquist
2003; Lindquist, Haire, and Songer 2007; Randazzo 2008). As the preferences of the
lower court agent converge with the preferences of the principal, the agent is more
likely to act in line with the preferences of the principal. Conversely, as the prefer-
ences of the principal and agent diverge the incentive to shirk increases, all else being
equal. I expect that as the distance in ideology between the Court and the lower
court increases, I expect a reduced likelihood of positive treatment and a delay in
lower court compliance.
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In addition to identifying the extent to which the lower courts rely on a given
precedent, through their ability to monitor lower court decisions, the justices can
also locate the ideological position of their precedents within the lower courts based
on the direction of case outcomes. By now it is widely accepted, that ideology impacts
the decision-making behavior of judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, especially in
their decision to adhere or shirk from the Supreme Court’s precedents (Cross 2007;
Kastellec 2007; Posner 2010; Songer and Davis 1990; Songer and Sheehan 1990; West-
erland et al. 2010). Given the presence of ideological influences, lower court judges
can be selective of which Supreme Court precedents to apply to achieve a certain
outcome. When circuit judges repeatedly apply certain Supreme Court precedents
to reach conservative outcomes and other precedents to reach liberal outcomes, the
aggregate application of the High Court’s precedents can communicate the policy
position of a given precedent to the justices. If the application of a precedent and
the final outcome is at odds with the preferences of the median member of the Court,
the justices can audit and sanction such non-compliant lower court applications of
precedent. As such, key information flowing up the judicial ladder is able to influence
the actions of the High Court.
Horizontal Influences in the Judicial Hierarchy
I argue that a critical mechanism through which appeals court judges respond to the
precedents of the Supreme Court is based on norm of horizontal stare decisis. While
the prominence of stare decisis is well established within the theoretical literature,
there are only a handful of studies that address its potential impact on the decision
to follow or shirk from the Supreme Court’s precedents (e.g., Hansford and Spriggs
2006; Westerland et al. 2010). I argue that U.S. Courts of Appeals attentiveness to
the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedents is moderated by important influences at the
circuit-level. More specifically, I contend that judges on the circuit courts reconcile
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legal, ideological, and institutional influences within their own courts with exter-
nal influences from the U.S. Supreme Court. Both empirical analyses (Hettinger,
Lindquist, and Martinek 2006; Klein 2002) and interviews with judges on the U.S.
Courts of Appeals (Bowie, Songer, and Szmer 2014) suggest that circuit-level influ-
ences mediate, in important ways, the impact of the Supreme Court to influence the
decision-making actions of appellate court judges.
I make the case that the prior decision-making behavior of circuit judges serve
as an important influence on the decisions of other appellate judges in how they
respond to the Supreme Court’s precedents. I argue that this effect manifests both
within the judge’s own circuit and across the other circuits. This is because when
a circuit panel makes a decision, that decision becomes binding precedent within
the instant circuit. In subsequent decisions that deal with similar issues and factual
situations, a panel of judges must adhere to existing inter-circuit precedent. Thus,
whenever a circuit panel issues a decision, information of how to resolve similar cases
is transmitted horizontally to the other judges (and their clerks) within the same
circuit. One way information can be communicated horizontally is through prior
applications of a Supreme Court precedent within a circuit. For instance, if judges
within the First Circuit Court of Appeals consistently follow a given Supreme Court
precedent it should positively influence the likelihood that a panel of judges from
the circuit will adhere to the precedent in a future decision. Previous empirical
research indeed suggests that prior applications of precedent at the lower court level
impact the future propensity of lower court to follow or shirk from the Supreme
Court’s precedents. In a recent study, Westerland et al. (2010) find that circuit
vitality has a substantial impact on subsequent positive and negative applications of
Supreme Court precedents within the U.S. Courts of Appeals. That is, when judges
within a given circuit positively apply a precedent it increases subsequent positive
applications of the precedent. On the other hand, when judges in a circuit negatively
33
interpret a precedent it increases the probability of negative application in future
cases. I similarly expect that as the ratio of positive to negative applications of a
Supreme Court’s precedent within a circuit increase, the likelihood that the same
circuit relies on the precedent in future decisions will increase. The intuition behind
this expectation is that when circuit judges positively or negatively apply a Supreme
Court precedent, their action impacts circuit law and circuit judges adhere to circuit
form and follow circuit law.
1st Circuit CoA 2nd Circuit CoA
Horizontal Information
Figure 2.3: Horizontal Transmission of Information
In addition to influencing applications of precedent within the same circuit, prior
application of the Supreme Court’s precedent in any of the circuits can also exert some
influence on the actions of judges across the other circuits. This is because decisions
within the U.S. Courts of Appeals are not made in isolation. Litigants frequently
reference decisions by other circuit judges within their briefs and oral arguments
to achieve a favorable outcome. Similarly, judges frequently cite, not only Supreme
Court precedent and inter-circuit precedent, but all recent decisions by judges in other
circuits within their opinions in justifying an outcome. In this sense, information often
travels horizontally across the jurisdictional lines of the circuits. While a decision by
another circuit is never binding, it is persuasive and circuit judges acknowledge relying
on this information (see Bowie, Songer, and Szmer 2014; Klein 2002). Figure 2.3 offers
an abbreviated depiction of how information can flow horizontally across two circuits.
In this hypothetical scenario, judges in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals can learn
from how a panel of judges in the First Circuit applied a precedent. While there is
little concern about how information might be communicated within the same circuit,
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as judges often circulate drafts of their opinions to other judges, some may question
how information flows across the circuits. One vehicle through which information is
quickly transmitted across the different circuits is through litigants. Litigants and
lawyers will often highlight the decisions of other circuit courts within their written
briefs and oral arguments. Moreover, judges and their clerks, will quickly learn of
recent decisions by other circuit panels in the process of researching and writing their
own opinions. I argue that such a horizontal transmission of information within the
circuits serves a meaningful influence on the extent to which circuit judges comply
with the Supreme Court’s precedents.
Circuit-level factors can facilitate the horizontal flow of information in other ways.
Specifically, when a Supreme Court precedent originates from the review of a par-
ticular circuit, the circuit the Supreme Court ‘takes the case from,’ in issuing the
precedent, might feel especially compelled to address the precedent in future deci-
sions. The intuition behind this expectation is that when the Supreme Court reviews
a lower court’s decision, the Supreme Court decides to either uphold or overturn the
lower court’s decision, which affects not only the instant case but also inter-circuit
law within the circuit that is reviewed. When this happens, even if judges within a
circuit that is reviewed ideologically at odds with the Supreme Court decision, that
circuit will be compelled to address the new precedent because the Supreme Court’s
action altered inter-circuit precedent. Such positive responses to the Supreme Court
should be particularly evident when the Supreme Court issues a decision and remands
the case back to the lower court. Thus, I argue that the flow information with the
‘circuit of origin’ is particularly influential. I expect over time other circuits will learn
about these decisions and apply them within their own decisions. As such, important
informational cues can effectively flow horizontally within and across the circuits in
the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
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Dynamic Influences in the Judicial Hierarchy
I offer a unified framework in which informational cues flow in not one but several
directions: top to bottom, from the bottom up, and horizontally within and across
the circuits in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. I make the case that the U.S. Supreme
Court provides judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals with important signals on its
legal and policy preferences regarding its precedents. Circuit judges process these
informational cues and reconcile them with their own legal and ideological prefer-
ences, which ultimately guide their decision on how to interpret a given precedent of
the U.S. Supreme Court. The lower court application of the Supreme Court’s prece-
dents, in turn, communicate information of the policy space of each precedent within
contemporary disputes. In addition to these conventional channels of information,
I argue that judges on the courts of appeals also convey vital information that is
transmitted horizontally to other judges within the same circuit and to judges across
the various circuits throughout the U.S. Courts of Appeals. I make the case that the
information that flows across these three channels is dynamic. This forms a feedback
loop and that this is how law develops and the scope of precedent ultimately takes
shape. Figure 2.4 depicts this feedback loop. Below, I summarize how signals and
informational cues from both the top and lower levels of the federal judiciary shape
attentiveness to precedents within the judicial hierarchy.
As the extensive discussion above outlines, my theory is premised on the belief
that important informational cues dynamically flow up, down, and horizontally within
the judicial hierarchy. On top-down influences, I contend that a series of signals by
justices of the Supreme Court communicate their preferences, which in turn influence
the propensity of judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals to adhere to the Supreme
Court’s precedents. My key theoretical contention is that the Supreme Court’s use
of summary decisions, which explicitly reference a recent plenary precedent in close
proximity to the time the precedent is issued, signals the import of a precedent to
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judges on the courts of appeals. The intuition here is that when the Supreme Court
is willing to grant certiorari to one or several additional petitions to issue summary
decisions in conjunction with a formally argued decision, the Supreme Court not only
overturns additional appeals court decisions, but demonstrates its willingness to grant
review and overturn similar decisions by the courts of appeals in the future. I also
expect other top-down cues such as Supreme Court precedent vitality, which is the
net difference between positive and negative applications of a precedent by the Court
itself, the size of the majority coalition that issues a precedent, and explicit Supreme
Court reversals of a lower court decision to influence the extent to which judges on
the U.S. Courts of Appeals follow the the precedents of the Supreme Court.
U.S. Supreme Court
1st Circuit CoA 2nd Circuit CoA
Top-Down Information Top-Down Information
Bottom-UpBottom-Up
Horizontal Information
Figure 2.4: The Dynamic Transmission of Information in the American Judiciary
The subsequent decision of circuit judges to positively or negatively apply the
Supreme Court’s precedents will in turn communicate information up the judicial
ladder from the lower courts. Based on aggregate trends of lower court interpretation
of their precedents, the justices can choose to review decisions where they can (1)
alter an existing precedent, (2) clarify the correct application of an existing precedent,
or (3) explicitly sanction non-compliant behavior to induce greater adherence to their
precedent. Moreover, I make the case that differences in ideological preferences at
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the Supreme Court and circuit-level moderate the propensity of a circuit to rely on
a precedent of the Supreme Court. Justices can review this information and reverse
applications of their precedent that are at odds with their preferences.
The third component of my theoretical framework is the horizontal transmission
of information. While various signals by the Supreme Court likely influence circuit
adherence on the Supreme Court’s precedents, I contend that the impact of such
signals is moderated by influences at the circuit-level. My theory is premised on
the belief that rather than a deference to the perceived preferences of the justices,
judges in the Courts of Appeals take their roles as arbiters of law seriously. I argue
that an important mechanism through which appeals court judges respond to the
precedents of the Supreme Court is based on the norm of horizontal stare decisis. I
make the case that a key factor in determining the likelihood that a circuit relies on
a Supreme Court precedent is influenced by how previous panels within the Courts
of Appeals have interpreted a given precedent. Previous research demonstrates that
the ‘vitality’ of a precedent, consistently impacts how the lower courts respond to
the Supreme Court’s precedents in future decisions (see Hansford and Spriggs 2006;
Westerland et al. 2010). I also theorize that circuits responding to a Supreme Court
precedent that emerges from the review of the same circuit increases the probability
of future reliance of a precedent. The intuition behind this expectation is that when
the Supreme Court issues a precedent that is based on a review of an earlier decision
by a circuit, in issuing the new precedent the Supreme Court not only sets broad
national policy but its actions directly impact existing circuit-law within the circuit
in question. Therefore, my expectation is that circuits responding to a precedent that
originates from the same circuit have a greater propensity to rely on the new precedent
compared to the other circuits. The final aspect of my theory is that informational
cues from all directions are dynamic in nature and update continuously. This how
legal doctrine develops. I test these propositions in the empirical chapters that follow.
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Chapter 3
Supreme Court Monitoring, Reversals, and
Compliance in the U.S. Courts of Appeals
Studies on the U.S. Supreme Court generally make the claim that Supreme Court jus-
tices are rational decision-makers who are strongly concerned with the policy impact
of their decisions (Baum 2006; Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 2000; McAtee and
McGuire 2007; Segal and Spaeth 2002; Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994; Spaeth and
Segal 1999; Zorn and Bowie 2010). Such policy oriented Supreme Court justices are
often assumed to be particularly attentive to the impact of their decisions on the lower
courts. Such an assumption is understandable given the large number of legal disputes
that come before the lower courts and the unique position the U.S. Courts of Appeals
occupy within the judiciary as the final arbiter of most judicial outcomes (Cross 2007;
George 1999). As such, the lower federal courts are frequently confronted with the
choice of implementing the policy pronouncements of the High Court (see Hansford
and Spriggs 2006; Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 2000; Westerland et al. 2010).
But in spite of the interest in the overall policy impact of their decisions, Supreme
Court justices face two major constraints in their ability to effectively monitor the
implementation of their policies by the courts below. First, the Supreme Court faces
severe resource limitations in its ability to review the large number of decisions pro-
duced by the lower courts. For instance, in recent years the U.S. Courts of Appeals
adjudicated over 60,000 cases each year, of which the Supreme Court reviews fewer
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than one half of one-percent.1 Given the exceedingly low probability of a Supreme
Court reversal of a decision produced by the intermediate appellate courts combined
with the perception of Courts of Appeals judges that it is very difficult for them to
accurately predict which cases will be reviewed and ultimately reversed by the High
Court, recent research finds that there is little evidence to support the proposition
that the decision-making behavior of lower court judges is motivated, in any mean-
ingful way, by a fear of reversal by the U.S. Supreme Court (Bowie and Songer 2009;
Klein 2002; Klein and Hume 2003; Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek 2006).2
The U.S. Supreme Court can only review a small number of decisions in any given
term. Given significant constraints in the ability to monitor the actions of the lower
courts, can Supreme Court justices, in any meaningful way, increase the policy impact
of their decisions on the U.S. Courts of Appeals? One recent analysis suggests that
in order to increase the impact of their policies on the courts below, the justices take
an institutional approach, monitoring the responses of circuits as key organizational
units rather than attempting to monitor all of the decisions of individual judges
(see Lindquist, Haire, and Songer 2007). These scholars suggest that the Supreme
Court then responds to circuits in the aggregate, allocating its limited institutional
resources to review circuits that are least supportive of the Court’s policy preferences
by frequently reversing their decisions, while affirming or simply not reviewing the
decisions of more ideologically congruent circuits. Missing from existing analyses
is how the individual circuits are likely to respond to such strategic actions by the
Supreme Court. That is, does the prior rate of reversal of each individual circuit by
the U.S. Supreme Court in any meaningful way influence the extent to which judges
within a given circuit adhere to the Supreme Court’s precedents in subsequent terms?
1 Data obtained from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, which is available at:
http://www.uscourts.gov.
2 Further reducing the fear of reversal rationale is the widespread perception among appeals court
judges that even when they are reviewed and reversed by the Supreme Court, the actual cost of
such reversal is very small (see Bowie, Songer, and Szmer 2014).
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I offer a framework in which Supreme Court justices monitor the circuits as orga-
nizational units given the feasibility in monitoring such centralized units instead of
the large number of panels or individual judges within the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
I argue that Supreme Court justices recognize the importance of circuits as units,
understand the role of circuit-level precedents on future decisions within each circuit,
and are familiar with the psychological identity of appeals court judges within each
circuit. As such, I contend that aggregate circuit responses to Supreme Court prece-
dents are influenced by the frequency with which the Supreme Court reviews and
reverses the decision of a circuit in previous terms. Supreme Court reversal of a cir-
cuit is a consequential and highly visible action for all judges within the circuit. This
is because Supreme Court reversals have a direct impact on circuit law and frequently
require the circuit to respond to a new precedent when a case is remanded by the
Supreme Court (Benesh et al. 2014; Pacelle and Baum 1992). I test the predictions
by examining the extent to which the pattern of reversals by the Supreme Court at
the aggregate circuit-level impact the tendency of a given circuit to adhere to the
Supreme Court’s precedents in subsequent terms. I find that the prior rate of rever-
sal serves a positive influence on the future utility of a Supreme Court precedent by
a given circuit. Notably, the empirical results also challenge the efficacy of previous
findings on the import of ideological preferences in driving lower court attentiveness
to the Supreme Court’s precedents. This analysis helps improve our understanding of
the factors that influence judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals in how they respond
to the precedents of the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Importance of Policy Preferences
While debate continues over the extent to which the policy preferences of Supreme
Court justices influence their behavior, even critics of the Attitudinal Model (e.g.,
Kritzer and Richards 2005; Masood and Songer 2013; Richards and Kritzer 2002;
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Songer and Lindquist 1996) agree that such policy preferences exert an important
influence on the votes of the justices in salient cases and that the justices are more
concerned with the broad policy consequences of their decisions than with the out-
come of most cases for the particular litigants in the case. Such a concern for policy
implications suggests that Supreme Court justices can be assumed to be interested
in maximizing the impact of their decisions within the judicial hierarchy. The ability
of the justices to create precedents that reflect their policy preferences would be of
little consequence if the lower courts refused to implement those policies throughout
the judicial system.
Since the justices are assumed to care about the policy impact of their decisions as
reflected in the precedents they create, it is important to understand both the extent
of that impact and the factors that may increase or decrease that policy impact. A
large body of research finds conclusively that the overall level of compliance by lower
courts with Supreme Court precedent is high. Outright rejection of the authority
of a precedent or the overt refusal of a lower court to follow precedent is, in fact,
relatively rare (Benesh 2002; Benesh and Reddick 2002; Corley 2009; Hansford and
Spriggs 2006; Kassow, Songer, and Fix 2012; Klein 2002; Songer and Haire 1992;
Songer and Sheehan 1990; Wahlbeck 1998; Westerland et al. 2010). These empirical
findings are reinforced by the statements of the judges themselves. A series of studies
based on interviews with judges on the courts of appeals have repeatedly found that
the judges are nearly unanimous in their assertions that they and their colleagues
will “of course” follow the precedents announced by the Supreme Court when those
precedents are clear (Bowie, Songer, and Szmer 2014; Howard 1981; Klein 2002). But
precedents are not always clear and when they are not, there are a number of ways
for judges to modify or restrict the practical impact of a broad policy announced
in a precedent without overtly defying the precedent. The primary way in which a
lower court can reduce the policy impact of a precedent is by “distinguishing” the
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precedent in their opinion explaining the way they resolved the legal issues in their
case. When a judge distinguishes a precedent, he or she accepts the general authority
of that precedent but then explains that because of differences in the facts of the case
confronting the judge and the factual context of the precedent, the given precedent is
not the appropriate legal rule to follow in the case. One judge interviewed for a recent
study explained that there is usually a substantial amount of discretion in deciding
which precedent controls a case and that “all of us are pretty good at being able to
distinguish precedent” (Bowie, Songer, and Szmer 2014).
Consequently, Supreme Court justices who are concerned with the policy impact
of their decisions should not worry very much about the possibility that the lower
courts will overtly refuse to abide by the Court’s precedents. Rather, policy oriented
justices need to be concerned with how frequently their precedents will be relied
upon by the lower courts in future decisions. That is, if a justice wants to see a
given precedent have a major impact on the development of law and policy in the
lower courts, the justice should be concerned that their precedent will be used as
the essential basis for lower court opinions in a variety of diverse fact situations
rather being modified or limited in opinions that distinguish the precedent or simply
conclude that the precedent is not applicable, and thus need not be even cited in
the lower court’s opinion. Thus, in order to empirically assess the extent of the
impact of the policies created in Supreme Court precedents on the policy output of
the U.s. Courts of Appeals, one needs a more refined measure of policy impact than
just counting the number of decisions below that were overtly non-compliant with
the precedents. Shepard’s Citations provides a suitable measure by categorizing the
interpretation or “treatment” of every Supreme Court precedent in all subsequent
decisions by the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
43
The Role of Circuits in Theories of Judicial Hierarchy
Theoretical accounts on the interactions between the upper and lower courts, within
the federal judicial hierarchy, typically employ one of two approaches. Some scholars
examine whether individual Supreme Court precedents are followed in individual de-
cisions by the lower courts. The specific focus in these studies is often whether a given
lower court decision is in ‘compliance’ with the Supreme Court precedent (Canon and
Johnson 1998; Cross and Tiller 1998; Johnson 1979). Employing a compliance focus,
these studies examine specific lower court decisions to see if those decisions overtly
refused to accept the legal authority announced by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Quantitative analyses, on the other hand, often assess whether a pattern of lower
court decisions is consistent with the expectations of a principal agent perspective
(Benesh 2002; Hansford and Spriggs 2006; Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994; West-
erland et al. 2010). Principal agent studies typically assume that Supreme Court
precedents are driven by the policy of the justices and then examine whether lower
court outcomes reflect similar patterns of liberal or conservative decisions. In such
principal agent studies it is expected that ideological preferences and rational expec-
tations about the policy responses of other actors drive the behavior of judges at
multiple levels of the judicial hierarchy (see Clark 2009; Kastellec 2011; Randazzo
2008; Zorn and Bowie 2010). While both approaches advance our understanding of
the nature of relationships within the judicial hierarchy, they have several shortcom-
ings which limit their insights into the factors that shape the influence of the policy
preferences of the Supreme Court on the courts below. First, noncompliance is a
small part of the problem. Thus, an exclusive focus on noncompliance does not tell
us very much about the extent of lower court responsiveness to Supreme Court pol-
icy preferences or about the factors that may mitigate or enhance the impact of the
policies announced by the Court.
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Principal agent accounts typically make critical assumptions about the capability
of the Supreme Court to successfully monitor the tens of thousands of decisions below
every year. Moreover, they typically assume that a decision below whose outcome
is coded as different from the ideology of the median member of the Supreme Court
is a decision that does not support the policy preferences of the Court. But such
an assumption is often in error because it does not take into account the extent to
which other actors (e.g., trial court judges, police, and prosecutors) have modified
their behavior to conform to new Supreme Court precedent. For example, although
Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436, 1966) is traditionally considered a liberal decision,
Songer and Sheehan (1990) discover that a large majority of subsequent decisions
by the courts of appeals that interpreted and applied Miranda faithfully supported
the policy announced in Miranda even though they made decisions whose outcomes
were coded as conservative (i.e., pro-prosecution). This counter-intuitive, at least
from a principal agent perspective, finding is perhaps due to the fact that many
prosecutors stopped bringing cases involving confessions obtained under conditions
that were inconsistent with Miranda but when such cases resulted in convictions the
defendants still appealed and lost because the appeals court judges faithfully abided
by the Miranda rules.
The challenge for the the U.S. Supreme Court in attempting to monitor individual
decisions starts with the difficulty in being able to take cues from the judge who
authored the opinion of the court. If the Supreme Court is continually reviewing
decisions from a small number of judges, they might soon identify a group of judges
that they trust as sharing their own policy preferences and another group of judges
who they might assume do not support their preferences. But in fact the Supreme
Court must review decisions from a very large group of judges. At any moment
in time, there are about 160 regular appeals court judges, another 30 to 50 judges
on senior status, and an even larger number of judges from other courts, especially
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federal district court judges, sitting by designation and any of these judges might be
the opinion author whose decision is challenged in a cert petition. Supreme Court
justices will only have an opportunity to gain knowledge about individual judges
whose decisions are given full, formal review. Since the Supreme Court rarely grants
formal review to more than 60 to 70 petitions per year from the courts of appeals,
they will frequently only review a given appeals judge once every three or four years.
Developing knowledge about individual appeals court judges that provides useful
cues, which can be used in monitoring appeals court decisions is made more difficult
by the fact that ideology has a smaller effect on the decisions of appeals court judges
than it does on the decisions of Supreme Court justices (Zorn and Bowie 2010).
The difficulty in monitoring individual decisions is made more difficult by the na-
ture of most decisions that do not fully support the policy preferences of the Supreme
Court. As noted above, the lower courts rarely defy precedent, instead the policy pref-
erences of the Supreme Court are most likely to be limited or modified by a lower
court decision that distinguishes precedent. That is to say, the refusal to support the
core policies of the Supreme Court is usually embedded in an extended discussion of
facts and the Supreme Court is reluctant to review decisions that appear to be fact
driven. As a result, it is difficult for the Supreme Court to effectively monitor cases
that do not support the most important aspects of the Court’s policy. Therefore,
I argue that instead of undertaking the very difficult task of trying to monitor all
individual lower court decisions that might be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s
median policy preferences, the justices are better off in focusing on the overall pat-
terns of response by each circuit, reviewing and reversing circuits that are the least
supportive of the Court’s policy goals. While it is easier for the Court to identify
which circuits are least supportive of the overall preferences of the Court, a circuit
oriented strategy is only be effective if circuits respond to increased monitoring by the
Supreme Court by increasing their support for the policy of the Court. I contend that
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judges within a circuit are likely respond more positively to the Court’s precedents
when the rate of reversal of the circuit is high.
Supreme Court reversal of a circuit is a highly visible action to all judges on the
circuit as such reversals typically produce a change in inter-circuit precedent. It is
reasonable to assume that judges on the courts of appeals monitor all Supreme Court
decisions that either affirm or reverse a decision that emanates from their circuit.
First, all Supreme Court decisions, both formally argued and summary decisions,
that reverse or vacate appeals court decisions are legally consequential (see Masood
and Songer 2013). Even a summary decision (e.g., a GVR that grants certiorari,
vacates the lower court decision and remands the case to the appeals court for fur-
ther action in light of a specified precedent) that overturns the precedent of a given
circuit is an authoritative pronouncement that the previous circuit precedent is no
longer good law. After interviewing 60 judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, Bowie,
Songer, and Szmer (2014) note that the judges unanimously maintain that they take
precedent very seriously when it is clearly relevant to any case before them. All of
the judges indicate that circuit precedent is particularly important to them and that
they routinely read the opinions of other panels in their circuit.3 Given the relative
infrequency that circuit precedent is overturned by the Supreme Court, it is reason-
able to expect that any time one of their own circuit’s precedents is struck down,
even by a summary decision, the judges and their clerks will become aware of it and
will expect to follow it in their own future decisions. A large majority of all Supreme
Court decisions that overturn circuit precedent with either a reversal or vacating a
decision of a lower court also include a remand to the circuit. By definition, a re-
3 It is worth noting that in approximately 50% of the circuits, each panel is expected to send to
all other judges in the circuit all of their tentative opinions and then wait for comments from the
judges for about two weeks before formally releasing their opinion. In this period, circuit judges
not on the panel are asked to comment on any problems Thus, in at least these circuits, it is clear
that any GVR of a circuit precedent would come to the attention of the other judges within the
circuit.
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mand directs the panel of the court of appeals whose decision is disturbed to issue
a new decision where the majority opinion explicitly considers the meaning of the
Supreme Court precedent cited in the remanded case. Thus, at a minimum, each
remand produces one circuit court precedent that explicitly discusses the meaning of
the Supreme Court precedent cited within the Court’s summary decision.
In interviews, appeals court judges indicate that they depend to a substantial
degree on the briefs of opposing counsel to bring to their attention the precedents
that are most relevant for the case under consideration (Bowie, Songer, and Szmer
2014; Klein 2002). Knowing the importance of circuit law to appeals court judges, it
is expected that when the law of the circuit is changed by a reversal from the Supreme
Court, attorneys will be quick to argue that new circuit law in any subsequent case in
which the new precedent might be relevant and such action by attorneys will increase
the awareness of judges on the circuit to the implications of the Supreme Court action.
As a result, one can expect that courts of appeals judges will quickly become aware
of Supreme Court reversals of their own circuit precedent and that such reversals will
then lead to the increased likelihood that judges in the circuit will more positively
treat the new Supreme Court precedent.
Finally, I theorize that Supreme Court reversals of the circuit will lead to an
increase in the positive treatment of the policy of the Supreme Court because judges
tend to strongly identify with their circuit. Recent interviews with appeals court
judges consistently indicated that the judges feel a strong emotional or psychological
tie to their circuit as an institution that is central to their professional lives. When
discussing the differences in procedures and practices across the circuits, almost all
of the judges identified with the practices of their circuit and defended the way their
circuit did things (Bowie, Songer, and Szmer 2014; Klein 2002). Consequently, a
reasonable expectation is that judges are concerned with the standing of their circuit
as an institution and that this institutional loyalty will incline the judges to attempt to
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protect the reputation of their circuit by avoiding frequent reversals by the Supreme
Court. My expectation is that the prior rate of reversal of a given circuit by the
Supreme Court has the potential to influence the future decision-making behavior
of appeals court judges. Specifically, I believe that a higher rate of reversal should
produce more supportive decisions by a given circuit in future decisions. Thus, an
arguably effective strategy for increasing circuit-level utility of Supreme Court policies
is to more frequently reverse decisions by those circuits that least frequently cite and
follow the policy pronouncements of Supreme Court justices. Moreover, I argue,
that since the effects of reversals are related to institutional characteristics of the
circuits, they can be expected to have an effect that is independent of other factors
previously found to influence the response of appeals court judges to Supreme Court
policy. In particular, the concern for circuit law and the reputation of the circuit
appear to be factors that will operate independently of the ideological preferences of
individual judges and thus should affect the tendency of judges in a given circuit to
support Supreme Court policy regardless of how close or distant the preferences of
the median appeals court judge are to the policy preferences of the Supreme Court.
Research Design
I examine the universe of U.S. Courts of Appeals responses to the precedents of the
U.S Supreme Court to the test the propositions. I examine courts of appeals responses
from a stratified random sample of U.S. Supreme Court precedents issued between
1994 and 2005. I stratify the sample of Supreme Court precedents to assess lower court
responses to precedents with and without associated summary decisions. Specifically,
I examine courts of appeals responses to a sample of 150 Supreme Court precedents
with no associated summary decisions and a second sample of 150 Supreme Court
precedents. The data for the formally argued decisions of the Court are obtained from
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the expanded U.S. Supreme Court database (Spaeth et al. 2013).4 The summary
decisions data is original data collected on the universe of Supreme Court summary
decisions issued during the period of the analysis. In collecting this data, I identify
the formally argued precedent each Supreme Court summary decision is issued “in
light of.” I then randomly select 150 formally argued Court precedents, from the same
time period, with at least one associated Supreme Court summary decision. Since
the proportion of Supreme Court decisions with an associated summary decision is
relatively small I over-sample Supreme Court precedents with associated summary
decisions. To account for the oversampling, I assign weights based on the proportion
of cases that are in the dataset compared to the actual proportion of decisions by the
Supreme Court. To create the weights, I calculate the number of observations for the
two samples and then take the inverse (reciprocal) of the proportion.
To examine courts of appeals responses to the Supreme Court’s precedents, I
examine court of appeals citations and positive interpretations from the twelve “reg-
ular” circuits of the U.S. Courts of Appeals courts of appeals responses from 1995 to
2008.5 These years allow me to assess courts of appeals responses to the Supreme
Court’s precedents from the time each Supreme Court decision is issued to a mini-
mum of three years for the latest appearing Supreme Court precedent in the sample.
My unit of analysis is the ‘Supreme Court Precedent-Circuit-Year.’ This means that
there is a single observation for a lower court response from each circuit for every
year a precedent is available for every Supreme Court precedent in the sample.6 The
4 The current version of the U.S. Supreme Court database is maintained by the Center for
Empirical Research in the Law at Washington University in St. Louis and is available at:
http://www.scdb.wustl.edu.
5 Decisions of the Federal Circuit are not included in the analysis, because the Federal Circuit only
hears cases in specific issue areas (i.e., patent and trademarks) and its inclusion would likely bias
the results (c.f., Hansford and Spriggs 2006).
6 For example, there is a single observation for the Courts of Appeals of the First Circuit for 1995 for
Bailey v. United States (516 U.S. 137), which is one of the Supreme Court precedents in my sample.
There is also an observation for the First Circuit for Bailey in 1996 and additional observations for
each year until 2008. Similarly, there is an observation for Bailey for each year between 1995 and
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resulting dataset yields approximately 15,000 observations.
I test my predictions over two outcome variables. The first variable captures the
number of courts of appeals citations of a Supreme Court precedent. The second
outcome variable captures the number of positive interpretations of a Supreme Court
decision by the courts of appeals. I obtain information for the outcome variables from
Shepard’s Citations via Lexis-Nexis for both citations and positive interpretations of
Supreme Court precedents by the courts of appeals.7 Following the conventions in
Shepard’s, I count the designation “Cited,” “Explained,” or “Harmonized,” and any
explicit positive interpretation of the Supreme Court’s majority opinion as an appeals
court citation of a Supreme Court precedent, coded as 1, and 0 otherwise.8 I count
the designation that a circuit “Followed” the Supreme Court’s majority opinion as a
positive interpretation of the precedent, coded as 1, and 0 otherwise.9
My key theoretical expectation is that the individual circuits respond differently
to Supreme Court precedents, in their propensity to reference and follow Supreme
Court precedents, based on the prior rate of reversal of the individual circuit by the
Supreme Court. Therefore, my first explanatory variable captures the rate of the
reversal of each circuit. This variable is based on the total number of reversals for
2008 for each of the remaining eleven circuits.
7 Shepard’s Citations is a service that collects information on all citations and interpretations of U.S.
Supreme Court precedents. Shepard’s includes a typology of interpretations, with specific categories
within each part of the typology. A courts of appeals citation of a Supreme Court’s decision
that does not include any type of substantive interpretation is simply categorized as “Cited.” A
circuit decision that substantially applies a particular Supreme Court decision, is categorized as
“Following” the precedent, in that a lower court decision is relying on the Supreme Court decision
to reach a similar legal conclusion in a subsequent case.
8 I am careful in excluding Supreme Court citations that result from explicit negative interpretation
of a Supreme Court precedent, because such negative citations capture something fundamentally
different from my central theoretical claims. For the sake of robustness, I estimate models with all
citations neutral, positive, and negative. Given the very small number of negative interpretations,
it is not surprising that the results of the full citations model are consistent with estimates of the
empirical model I report.
9 The values of the outcome variables do not include citations from dissenting or concurring opinions,
as these do not directly relate to the Supreme Court’s majority opinion (c.f., Hansford and Spriggs
2006).
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each individual circuit for all cases granted certiorari by the Supreme Court. Thus,
this variable is a count of the number of formally argued and summary reversals
for each circuit for each year.10 To account for the extreme range of this variable,
and because I expect non-linearity in the data, I take the natural logarithm of the
number of Supreme Court reversals.11 In addition, since it is not possible to take
the logarithm of zero, I add one to each value of the number of reversals. Finally, to
prevent any issues of simultaneity I lag this variable by one year.12
The next variable of interest is whether or not the Supreme Court precedent has
any associated summary decisions, which the Supreme Court issues “in light” of a
given Supreme Court precedent. In previous co-authored analyses, I find that when a
Supreme Court precedent is accompanied by at least one summary decision, this is the
strongest predictor of future lower court utility of Supreme Court precedent. Thus, I
include an indicator variable that captures whether or not a Supreme Court precedent
is accompanied by a Supreme Court summary decision. I also include a variable
that captures the vote margin by which justices decide a Supreme Court precedent.
While the preponderance of evidence suggests that the size of the winning coalition
should increase future reliance on a precedent, this finding is not unequivocal, as
some studies find that even upon controlling for precedent vitality Supreme Court
vote margin no longer exerts a substantively meaningful effect (Corley 2009; Johnson
1979; Kassow, Songer, and Fix 2012; but see Hansford and Spriggs 2006; Wedeking
2012).13 The values for the ‘vote margin’ variable are obtained from the U.S. Supreme
10 I count as reversals, any decision of the Supreme Court that “reversed,” “vacated,” “reversed and
remanded,” or “vacated and remanded” the decision of the courts of appeals.
11 I also run models using a non-transformed variable of the raw number of circuit reversals by the
Supreme Court, the results are extremely similar to the models report in the paper.
12 I also run models using three year and five year lags and find very similar results.
13 I estimate models where I alternatively use an indicator variable that captures whether the justices
decide a precedent unanimously rather than the vote margin. The results are similar; I ultimately
settle on ‘vote margin’ rather than the dichotomous indicator variable, because of the added
degrees of freedom the vote margin variable provides.
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Court database.
I include a variable that captures the ‘vitality’ of a Supreme Court precedent.
Previous research on the utility of Supreme Court precedents consistently find that
precedent vitality significantly influences citation and treatment patterns (Hansford
and Spriggs 2006; Wedeking 2012; Westerland et al. 2010). The Supreme Court vital-
ity variable is based on the number of positive Supreme Court treatments of its own
precedents minus the negative treatments by the Court (Hansford and Spriggs 2006).
Positive values of the vitality variable indicate that the Supreme Court has interpreted
a precedent more positively than negatively. Negative values of this variable indicate
that the Supreme Court has interpreted a precedent more negatively than positively.
Data for this variable are obtained via Shepard’s Citations. I follow Spriggs and Hans-
ford (2000) where “Followed” Supreme Court interpretations are coded as positive,
whereas “Criticized,” “Distinguished,” “Limited,” “Overruled,” and “Questioned,”
are coded as negative interpretations. I additionally code “Superseded” designations
as negative interpretations of precedent, because such interpretations are inherently
negative.14 I lag the Supreme Court vitality variable by one year to prevent issues of
simultaneity.
To assess the impact of circuit-level influences and horizontal stare decisis, I in-
clude a variable for circuit vitality that captures the difference between prior positive
and negative Courts of Appeals interpretations of the Supreme Court’s precedents
(Westerland et al. 2010).15 This variable is based on the total number of prior positive
interpretations in a given circuit minus the total number of prior negative interpre-
tations within the same circuit for circuit and year in the sample. This variable is
14 While “Superseded” interpretations are not included in Spriggs and Hansford’s analysis, I con-
struct vitality variables with and without the “Superseded” designation and find that the results do
not change. Additionally, I estimate models using a vitality variable that excludes “Distinguished”
interpretations and again find the results to be highly robust.
15 A potential concern may be that the Supreme Court vitality and circuit vitality Supreme Court
and circuit vitality variables correlate at 0.112.
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constructed the same way as the variable for Supreme Court vitality where “Fol-
lowed” Supreme Court interpretations are coded as positive, whereas “Criticized,”
“Distinguished,” “Limited,” “Overruled,” “Questioned,” and “Superseded” are coded
as negative interpretations.16 I lag this variable by one year to avoid issues of si-
multaneity. The data for the circuit vitality variable are obtained from Shepard’s
Citations. Like Supreme Court vitality, the circuit vitality variable is lagged by one
year to mitigate issues of simultaneity.
My next circuit-level variable is a dichotomous indicator that accounts for whether
the circuit responding to a precedent is the circuit of origin. This variable captures
whether the circuit responding to a Supreme Court precedent is the same circuit which
the Supreme Court reviewed in using its precedent. An as example, if a formally
argued Supreme Court decision is the product of the justices reviewing a decision
from the First Circuit Courts of Appeals and in a future term the responding lower
court is a panel from the same First Circuit then the variable is coded 1. If the circuit
responding to the same precedent that emerged via review of the First Circuit is one
of the eleven circuits, the variable is coded 0. Data for this variable are obtained from
the U.S. Supreme Court database. I also include an indicator variable for whether a
circuit responding to a given Supreme Court precedent is the recipient of Supreme
Court summary decision remand “in light of” of the same Supreme Court precedent.
If the responding circuit receives one or more Supreme Court summary decisions
issued “in light of” the same precedent it is responding to the variable is coded 1,
and 0 otherwise. Data for this variable are obtained via the United States Reports
and the U.S. Supreme Court Database.
I also include a number of control variables. First, I include a variable to account
for the salience of a Supreme Precedent. I obtain data for this variable from Collins
16 Again, I estimate models with and without “Superseded” and “Distinguished” treatments for the
circuit vitality variable and find that the results remain robust.
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and Cooper (2012), which captures whether a Supreme Court decision is cited on the
front page, or any subsequent pages, of one of the four leading newspapers in the
country. This measure expands on the indicator initially developed by Epstein and
Segal (2000) to include whether a Supreme Court decision appears on the front page
of the Chicago Tribune, the Los Angeles Times, or the Washington Post in addition
to the New York Times. Next, I include an indicator variable to account for the
large number of criminal cases in the data. I also control for the caseload of each
circuit by including a variable that accounts for the number of merit terminations
within each circuit by year. Finally, I include a count variable to account for the age
of the Supreme Court precedent. This variable is coded as the number of years a
precedent is in the dataset from the time the Supreme Court establishes a precedent
to correspond with each observation for the full duration of the data.17 The data for
these control variables come from the U.S. Supreme Court database.
Since both dependent variables are count outcomes any linear model specification
is likely to produce inefficient, inconsistent, and biased estimates (King 1988, 1989;
Long and Freese 2006). In addition, a common issue with most count data is that the
conditional variance often exceeds the conditional mean (i.e., over-dispersion), which
violates the assumption of equidispersion of the most parsimonious count model, the
Poisson regression. This concern can be addressed by adding an additional parameter,
α, to the equation which can be modeled through a negative binomial regression
(Cameron and Trivedi 2013; Kennedy 2008). A second issue with count outcomes is
that the number of zero values in the sample often exceeds the number predicted by
a standard count (i.e., Poisson or negative binomial) model. By modeling two latent
groups, one which always takes a zero value and the other that takes on count values
(i.e., 0,1,2,3 and is not in the “always zero” group) from the count density, I can
17 I also run additional models with squared, quadratic, and cubic polynomials of age. Compared
to the linear age variable inclusion of the transformation of these variables do not substantially
improve the model.
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compute the overall probabilities as a mixture of the probabilities of the two groups
to confidently predict the count outcomes Long (1997); Long and Freese (2006). To
account for any potential issues of serial correlation or heteroskedasticity, I cluster
the standard errors on each circuit by each Supreme Court precedent. I cluster
the standard errors on ‘Circuit-Precedent’ because I expect variation between the
individual circuits and between Supreme Court precedents.18
Empirical Results
I begin with a brief discussion of the descriptive statistics. I note here that a large
proportion of the values of both outcome variables take zero values. The excess in
zero values suggests that a zero-inflated model is more appropriate than a standard
negative binomial model. I therefore estimate zero-inflated models. However, as-
sessments of model fit and close inspection of the substantive results indicate that
the standard negative binomial and zero-inflated models, for both outcome variables,
produce very similar results.19 This is not particularly surprising given that several
studies that model either citation or treatment of Supreme Court precedent find that
the more parsimonious negative binomial model produces very similar results to the
zero-inflated model (see Black and Spriggs 2013; Cross and Spriggs 2010; Cross et al.
2010; Fowler et al. 2007; Fowler and Jeon 2008; Hansford and Spriggs 2006). Given
18 A unique aspect of the empirical assessment is that I model the influences on lower court citation
and treatment of Supreme Court precedent at two different levels of analysis. While the primary
unit-of-analysis is the ‘Supreme Court precedent-Circuit-Year,’ that is how a given circuit responds
to a Supreme Court precedent within a given year, I also analyze lower court responsiveness to
Supreme Court precedents by aggregating all the circuits. This approach allows me assess not only
individual circuits respond to Supreme Court precedents, but also how all the circuits cumulatively
respond to the precedents of the Supreme Court. Both sets of results tell a similar story.
19 To determine model fit, I follow Long and Freese (2006) by plotting the mean predicted probability
for each count model, the standard negative binomial and the zero-inflated negative binomial
model against the observed values. The models perform very similarly. An additional instrument
to determine model fit is the Vuong (1989) statistic, but the Vuong statistic is not tractable
when the standard errors are clustered. It is necessary to cluster the errors so as not to not to
underestimate the inherent uncertainty around the quantities of interest.
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the similarity between the models, I report the estimates of the more parsimonious
negative binomial model (see Cameron and Trivedi 2013).
Table 3.1: Negative Binomial Model of Influences on U.S. Courts of Appeals
Citation of U.S. Supreme Court Precedent
Variable Coefficient S.E.
Supreme Court Reversal 0.065* 0.020
Summary Decision 0.802* 0.072
Vote Margin 0.018 0.011
Supreme Court Vitality 0.268* 0.072
Court of Appeals Vitality 0.099* 0.033
Circuit of Origin 0.600* 0.126
Ideological Distance 0.051 0.191
Case Salience 0.164* 0.015
Criminal Case 1.203* 0.085
Merit Terminations 0.068* 0.015
Age of Precedent -0.098* 0.014
Constant -1.513* 0.129
Model Fit Statistics
Observations 15,914
X2 Statistic 603.94
Probability > X2 0.000*
Note: The outcome variable is citations of Supreme Court precedent. The standard errors
are clustered on the Circuit-Supreme Court Precedent combination. All p-values reflect
two-tailed tests unless directionality is hypothesized. *p < 0.05
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Table 3.1 presents the model estimates of the influences on citations to Supreme
Court precedent per circuit-year.20 My primary expectation is that as the number of
Supreme Court reversals increases, the number of lower court citations are expected
to increase per circuit-year. The empirical results support this expectation. The
effect of the logged number of Supreme Court reversals of the circuits is positive and
statistically significant at conventional levels of significance. A number of additional
covariates exert a statistically significant effect; however, the margin by which the
Court decides a precedent and the ideological distance between the lower court panel
and the Supreme Court, notably, does not exert a substantively meaningful effect.
Since the model coefficients are not directly interpretable, I calculate predicted
counts for each of the continuous and interval variable of interest. For the indicator
variables I compute the discrete change in the expected count going from 0 to 1. In
computing the substantive effect for each covariate of interest, I hold all continuous
and interval variables constant at their means and the indicator variables constant
at their modal values. The substantive results demonstrate that the logged number
of Supreme Court reversals of each circuit, going from its minimum to its maximum
value produces approximately .3 additional citations per precedent per circuit per
year. Figure 3.1 illustrates this effect. The figure demonstrates that an increased
in the logged number of Supreme Court reversals positively corresponds with an in-
crease in the number of lower court citations of a Supreme Court precedent. While
the substantive effect seems modest on the surface, recall that the unit-of-analysis
is citations circuit-year-precedent. Since the average of a precedent in the data is
approximately five years and there are twelve circuits below, this means that going
from the minimum to the maximum value of Supreme Court reversals results in ap-
20 I also estimate models where the standard errors are clustered on the Supreme Court majority
opinion writer, on the Supreme Court term, and the circuit. The results are highly robust. The
concern with employing these alternative clusters is the small number of clustering units each of
these variables offers. For instance, the Supreme Court majority opinion writer variable offers
only 9 units, whereas the combination cluster unit I use provides over a thousand units.
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Figure 3.1: Impact of Supreme Court Reversals on Citations of Supreme Court
Note: To plot these effects, I generate the predicted counts based on the average of the
predicted counts across all real values in the data. The solid line represents the predicted
number of citations of Supreme Court precedent per circuit-year. The shaded area repre-
sents the 95% confidence intervals.
proximately 18 additional citations by the lower courts to a Supreme Court precedent
over the average time a precedent is in existence. This finding suggests that the prior
rate of reversal of the individual circuits by the Supreme Court does in fact influence
the circuits to more frequently cite their precedents in subsequent terms.
The results in Table 3.1 also demonstrate that a Supreme Court precedent accom-
panied by a Supreme Court summary decision results in an increase of approximately
.75 citations per circuit-year-precedent. This represents an increase of approximately
45 additional citations to a Supreme Court precedent by all the circuits combined
over the average of a precedent. This represents a very large effect. Supreme Court
vitality also exerts a positive effect. Holding all else constant, going from the mini-
mum to the maximal value represents an increase of approximately .73 citations per
59
.
5
1
1.
5
2
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 N
um
be
r o
f C
ita
tio
ns
-1 0 1 2
Supreme Court Vitality
Figure 3.2: Impact of Supreme Court Vitality on Citations of Supreme Court
Note: To plot these effects, I generate the predicted counts based on the average of the
predicted counts across all real values in the data. The solid line represents the predicted
number of citations of Supreme Court precedent per circuit-year. The shaded area repre-
sents the 95% confidence intervals
circuit-year-precedent. Figure 3.2 illustrates this effect. This represents an increase
of approximately 44 additional citations to a Supreme Court precedent by all the
circuits over the time a precedent is in existence.
Court of appeals vitality also exerts a substantively meaningful effect. The courts
of appeals vitality variable has a very large range from a minimum of .22 to a max-
imum of 102. However, very little of the data are observed at the extreme ranges.
In fact, 99% of the data range between a vitality score of -2 and 6. To interpret the
results for the full range of the Court of Appeals vitality variable would mean to sig-
nificantly overstate is effect. Going from a vitality score of -2 to 6, which represents
99% of the data, results in increase of approximately .75 citations per circuit-year-
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Figure 3.3: Impact of Court of Appeals Vitality on Citations of Supreme Court
Note: To plot these effects, I generate the predicted counts based on the average of the
predicted counts across all real values in the data. The solid line represents the predicted
number of citations of Supreme Court precedent per circuit-year. The shaded area repre-
sents the 95% confidence intervals
precedent. I graph this effect in Figure 3.3. This means that over the average age of a
precedent the combined effect of Court of Appeals vitality, going from a vitality score
of -2 to 6, results in an increase of approximately 45 lower court citations of Supreme
Court precedent. In addition, a circuit that addresses a precedent that originates
from a Supreme Court review of the same circuit results in a discrete change of ap-
proximately .63 additional circuit-year citations or compared with circuits addressing
precedents that originate from a Supreme Court review of a different circuit. That
is, whether or not the originating circuit addresses a precedent results in a difference
of approximately of 38 citations to a given precedent over time. Finally, all of the
control variables also exert a meaningful effect.
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Table 3.2: Negative Binomial Model of Influences on U.S. Courts of Appeals
Positive Interpretation of U.S. Supreme Court Precedent
Variable Coefficient S.E.
Supreme Court Reversal 0.087* 0.032
Summary Decision 0.769* 0.086
Vote Margin 0.002 0.012
Supreme Court Vitality 0.208* 0.104
Court of Appeals Vitality 0.210* 0.041
Circuit of Origin 0.468* 0.121
Ideological Distance -0.170 0.206
Case Salience 0.138* 0.015
Criminal Case 0.764* 0.088
Merit Terminations 0.064* 0.015
Age of Precedent -0.102* 0.019
Constant -3.209* 0.150
Model Fit Statistics
Observations 15,914
X2 Statistic 661.04
Probability > X2 0.000*
Note: The outcome variable is positive interpretation of Supreme Court precedent per
circuit-year. The standard errors are clustered on the Circuit-Supreme Court Precedent
combination. All p-values reflect two-tailed tests unless directionality is hypothesized. *p
< 0.05
Table 3.2 presents the results of positive treatment model of Supreme Court prece-
dent per circuit-year. The model results are similar to the citation model. The same
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Figure 3.4: Impact of Supreme Court Reversals on Positive Treatment of Supreme
Court
Note: To plot these effects, I generate the predicted counts based on the average of the
predicted counts across all real values in the data. The solid line represents the predicted
number of positive interpretations of Supreme Court precedent per circuit-year. The shaded
area represents the 95% confidence intervals
covariates, as in the citation model, are statistically significant and in the same di-
rection. Supreme Court vote margin and ideological distance again do not exert a
statistically significant or substantively meaningful effect. Going from the minimum
to the maximal value of the logged number of Supreme Court reversals, results in
an increase of .06 additional positive treatments to Supreme Court precedent per
circuit-year. Figure 3.4 presents this effect. This represents an effective increase of
approximately 4 additional positive treatments of Supreme Court precedent for the
lower courts over time. This result suggests that the prior rate of reversal of the indi-
vidual circuits by the Supreme Court influences the lower courts to more frequently
follow Supreme Court precedents in subsequent terms.
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Figure 3.5: Impact of Supreme Court Vitality on Positive Treatment of Supreme
Court
Note: To plot these effects, I generate the predicted counts based on the average of the
predicted counts across all real values in the data. The solid line represents the predicted
number of positive interpretations of Supreme Court precedent per circuit-year. The shaded
area represents the 95% confidence intervals
A Supreme Court precedent with at least one summary decision increases positive
treatment of the precedent by approximately .11 per circuit-year-precedent compared
to precedents that have no associated summary decisions. Effectively, this represents
an increase of approximately 7 additional positive treatments of a Supreme Court
precedent by the lower courts over the average age of a precedent. Similarly, Supreme
Court vitality exerts a positive influence on the propensity of a lower court to follow
a Supreme Court precedent. I graph this effect in Figure 3.5. Going from a vitality
score of -1 to 2 increases positive treatment of precedent by .07 per circuit-year. This
represents an increase of approximately 4 positive treatments by the circuits over
the age of a precedent. Court of Appeals vitality also exerts an important effect.
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Figure 3.6: Impact of Court of Appeals Vitality on Positive Treatment of Supreme
Court
Note: To plot these effects, I generate the predicted counts based on the average of the
predicted counts across all real values in the data. The solid line represents the predicted
number of positive interpretations of Supreme Court precedent per circuit-year. The shaded
area represents the 95% confidence intervals
This effect is illustrated in Figure 3.6. Going from a vitality score of -2 to 6 results
in an increase of approximately .28 positive treatments; this represents an effective
increase of 16 additional positive treatments of Supreme Court precedent by the
circuits over the average time a precedent is in existence. The impact of the circuit of
origin responding to a Supreme Court precedent increases positive treatment by .06
per circuit-year. This represents an increase of approximately 4 additional positive
treatments of Supreme Court precedent by the circuits combined over time. Similar
to the citation model, all of the control variables also reach conventional levels of
statistical significance.
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Discussion and Implications
I began this paper with a seemingly straightforward question. Does the rate of reversal
of each individual circuit by the U.S. Supreme Court influence the extent to which
judges within a circuit adhere to the Supreme Court’s precedents in subsequent terms?
The short answer is yes. Previous examinations of the Court suggest that a variety
of Supreme Court and circuit attributes affect the number of exposures it takes for
lower courts to comply (Hansford and Spriggs 2006; Westerland et al. 2010). Despite
substantial theoretical and empirical progress previous studies largely focus on the
impact of the Supreme Court’s overruled decisions on how lower courts may alter
their responses to High Court’s precedents (Benesh and Reddick 2002). Decisions
that overrule precedent are not representative of the majority of the Court’s decisions.
Moreover, we should expect to see different lower court reactions to alterations and
affirmations of precedent. What the Supreme Court does most often when it grants a
petition certiorari is to reverse a decision by the lower court. When the justices reverse
a lower court decision, the action is not only consequential for the parties involved,
in terms of who wins and who loses, but it is also significant for the circuit from
which the justices draw the case. This is because when the Supreme Court affirms
or reverses an appeals court decision, the justices are also affirming or overturning
inter-circuit precedent in the lower court.
I offer a new, more refined, framework for circuit-level responses to Supreme Court
precedent. I argue that given the finite ability of the Supreme Court to review the
large number of lower court decisions, justices should primarily be interested in ag-
gregate patterns of compliance in the form of citations and positive interpretations
to their precedents by the individual circuits, rather than individual panels or in-
dividual judges. I make the case that Supreme Court justices can influence circuit
responses to their precedents in a number of ways including positively interpreting
their own precedents and by issuing summary decisions that explicitly reference a
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given formally argued precedent of the Court. I also theorize that given the inability
of the Court to monitor, much less correct all instances of negative interpretations of
their precedents, the justices can selectively review and reverse the least supportive
circuits. By doing so the Supreme Court can effectively increase reliance on its prece-
dents by both ideologically proximate and ideologically distant circuits. While such a
strategy by the Supreme Court is likely to be ineffective at the individual judge level
given the low prospect of review and reversal, a series of reversals for a given circuit
are likely to be noticed by the judges that reside within the circuit and likely alter
the extent to which they overtly the Court.
My central claim is that circuits that are more frequently reversed by the Supreme
Court, compared to circuits that are less frequently reversed, are likely to more fre-
quently rely on vital precedents of the Court in the following year. I contend that
such a ‘reversal’ effect is not conditioned by the ideological disposition of the circuit
relative to the policy preferences of the median member of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Using data on Supreme Court reversals and data on the application of Supreme Court
precedent by the U.S. Courts of Appeals, my analysis demonstrates that the prior
rate of reversal serves a positive and substantively meaningful influence on the ex-
tent to which a given circuit within the U.S. Courts of Appeals relies on a Supreme
Court precedent. My results empirically corroborate prior interviews with judges
on the U.S. Courts of Appeals where circuit judges collectively claim to faithfully
implement the High Court’s precedents (see Bowie, Songer, and Szmer 2014; Klein
2002). Finally, my analysis challenges previous findings on the prominence of ideo-
logical preferences in driving future lower court compliance to the Supreme Court’s
precedents. The implication of this important (lack of) finding on the influence of
ideology merits further exploration to disentangle the conditions under which judges
on inferior courts, both federal and state, are most likely to comply with the decisions
of the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Chapter 4
The Impact of Supreme Court Precedent on the
U.S. Courts of Appeals
The policy implications of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of
Education and more recently in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission are
difficult to ignore. In Brown and Citizens United, the justices, respectively, ordered
the desegregation of public schools and removed restrictions on corporate contribu-
tions to independent political expenditures that play a major role in both state and
federal elections. These decisions highlight the critical role the U.S. Supreme Court
often plays within the American political landscape. The empirical literature cor-
roborates this view and suggests that Supreme Court justices are policy oriented
individuals who are strongly concerned with the broader impact of their decisions
(Caldeira, Wright, and Zorn 1999; Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 2000; Segal
and Spaeth 2002; Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994; Spaeth and Segal 1999; Zorn
and Bowie 2010). An important assumption within previous research is that such
policy-seeking justices pay particular attention to the impact of their decisions within
the judiciary (Cameron, Segal, and Songer 2000; Corley 2008; Hansford and Spriggs
2006). This proposition is understandable given that if the lower courts regularly
defy the pronouncements of the justices, such actions would significantly undermine
the legitimacy of the Supreme Court. As a practical matter, the ability of the jus-
tices to establish precedents that reflect their policy preferences would be of little
consequence if the lower courts refused to implement those policies throughout the
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judicial system. This concern is particularly germane given that the vast majority of
legal disputes, ultimately, never reach the U.S. Supreme Court. It is, thus, within the
lower courts, where the Supreme Court’s decisions matter most and legal doctrine
most substantially takes shape.
If Supreme Court justices are policy oriented individuals, then within the judiciary,
such policy seeking justices should desire that lower court judges largely adhere to
their precedents and policy pronouncements. Yet, the legal and policy preferences
of Supreme Court justices and judges on the lower courts do not always converge.
For instance, a panel of judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals that is ideologically
distant from the Supreme Court’s median member is likely to prefer not following
a precedent of the contemporary Supreme Court. Since the Supreme Court exerts
no influence on the ideological composition of the lower courts, the main recourse
available to the justices to ensure that the lower courts follow their preferences is
to strategically audit lower court decisions that shirk from the preferences of the
justices on the Supreme Court. Supreme Court justices cannot, however, conceivably
monitor all the decisions of the judges on the lower courts. In recent years, the federal
circuits adjudicate over 60,000 cases each term, of which the Supreme Court reviews
fewer than one half of one-percent. The inability of the justices to review the large
number of lower court decisions provides these lower courts with agency to shirk
from the policy preferences of the Supreme Court. As with many other hierarchical
organizations, the U.S. Supreme Court faces a significant moral hazard dilemma.
Given significant resource constraints in the ability to review the large number of
lower court decisions, I make the case that policy oriented Supreme Court justices
should principally be concerned with the aggregate impact of their precedents within
the judicial hierarchy.
Previous work on lower court interactions with the U.S. Supreme Court almost
exclusively rely on principal-agent approaches to explain the behavior of lower court
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judges to follow or shirk from the preferences of the Supreme Court. While existing
accounts are important and informative, in that they convey important information
about the frequency with which judges on the lower courts adhere to the policy pro-
nouncements of the U.S. Supreme Court, by comparison, relatively little is known
about the conditions under which lower court judges are more (or less) likely to rely
on the precedents of the U.S. Supreme Court. Since all Supreme Court decisions
are binding on the lower courts, why do lower court judges rely on Supreme Court
decisions but not others? Related to this query is perhaps a more intriguing puzzle,
can Supreme Court justices in any meaningful way influence lower court utility of
its precedents? Studies on lower court interactions with the U.S. Supreme Court, in
fact, demonstrate that lower court judges largely adhere to the legal and policy pref-
erences of Supreme Court justices (Benesh and Reddick 2002; Hansford and Spriggs
2006; Songer and Sheehan 1990; Wahlbeck 1998). Often the theoretical account as-
sociated with such empirical examinations is some variant of a principal-agent model
or more broadly a strategic action framework. The central challenge in maintaining
the efficacy of the principal-agent approach within the American judiciary is that
the rate of review and reversal of lower court decisions by the Supreme Court is
consistently lower than 1% of all decisions issued by the lower courts in any given
term. How do we reconcile this discrepancy? Herein lies the purpose of this paper,
which is two-fold. First, I offer a new theory on hierarchical interactions between
the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Courts of Appeals that provides new insights
not available from principal-agent theory. Second, I evaluate empirically whether it
is top-down or horizontal (lower court-level) factors that most meaningfully influ-
ence the actions of judges on the lower courts vis-á-vis their decision to rely on the
Supreme Court’s precedents.
I offer a framework in which both Supreme Court and circuit-level influences drive
lower court attentiveness to the Supreme Court’s precedents. I make the case that
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in addition to the conventional findings on the importance of ideological preferences
and the strength of a precedent, other, previously overlooked, Supreme Court and
circuit-level influences affect courts of appeal responsiveness to precedents of the U.S.
Supreme Court. Using original data with over 29,000 observations, my analysis sheds
new light on the decision-making relationship between the U.S. Supreme Court and
the U.S. Courts of Appeals. I find that Supreme Court’s use of its summary decision
that explicitly reference its formally argued precedents, the prior history of positive
interpretations of a precedent by appeals court judges within each circuit, and the
circuit from which a Supreme Court case originates are the strongest predictors of
the courts of appeals relying on the Supreme Court’s precedents. My results notably
depart from previous findings in that they demonstrate that the vitality of a precedent
does not substantially influence lower court citations nor positive interpretations of
Supreme Court precedent. I also find that ideological differences between the different
levels of the judicial hierarchy to have a more nuanced effect on the adoption of the
Supreme Court’s precedents. The theoretical implications of my analysis offer an
important way forward for empirical inquiries modeling the impact of Supreme Court
precedent and future examinations that explore hierarchical interactions within the
American judiciary.
Theoretical Framework
Central to the study of judicial politics is analysis of judicial decision-making behav-
ior. Most frequently the focus of such analyses are decisions by the U.S. Supreme
Court (e.g., Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 2000; Pacelle, Curry, and Marshall
2011; Pritchett 1948; Schubert 1965, 1974). An extensive literature examines the
factors that influence the behavior of the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court. These
studies find that several factors influence the decisions of Supreme Court justices,
which include ideological preferences, legal and precedential stimuli, institutional con-
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straints, and strategic considerations. A large number of studies suggest that ideo-
logically driven, policy-oriented preferences strongly influence on the decision-making
behavior of Supreme Court justices (see Rohde and Spaeth 1976; Segal 1997; Segal
and Spaeth 1993, 1996, 2002; Spaeth 1979; Spaeth and Segal 1999). More recent work
demonstrates that law and precedent exert an important influence on the decisions of
the justices (see Bailey and Maltzman 2008; Bartels 2009; Hansford and Spriggs 2006;
Richards and Kritzer 2002; Wedeking 2012). Yet other studies suggest that strategic
and institutional influences drive the behavior of Supreme Court justices (see Epstein
and Knight 1998; Hammond, Bonneau, and Sheehan 2005; Maltzman, Spriggs, and
Wahlbeck 2000; Murphy 1964; Randazzo and Waterman 2011; Wahlbeck, Spriggs,
and Maltzman 1998).
Even though the U.S. Supreme Court receives the preponderance of attention
within the literature, the vast majority of federal case law is adjudicated by the inter-
mediate courts below (Cross 2007; George 1999; Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek
2006; Klein 2002; Howard 1981). The past two decades represent a paradigmatic shift
in the scholarship through a rising and equally rigorous attentiveness to the decision
making process of other courts within the judicial hierarchy. Of particular note is
the growing body of work on the nature of decision making within the U.S. Courts of
Appeals. Empirical assessments of decision-making behavior within the U.S. Courts
of Appeals indicate that ideological preferences have some effect on the behavior of
appeals court judges (Boyd, Epstein, and Martin 2010; Songer 1982; Songer and Haire
1992). Other studies find that circuit judges face a greater number of institutional
constraints, which includes an adherence to collegial norms (Hettinger, Lindquist,
and Martinek 2006; Kastellec 2011), large caseloads (Bowie, Songer, and Szmer 2014;
Klein 2002; Songer, Sheehan, and Haire 2000) and, albeit a very low probability, some
likelihood of review, either en banc (Clark 2009; Giles et al. 2007; Giles, Walker, and
Zorn 2006) or by the U.S. Supreme Court (Black and Owens 2012; Haire, Songer, and
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Lindquist 2003; Lindquist, Haire, and Songer 2007; Songer, Ginn, and Sarver 2003;
Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994).
While scholars regularly examine decision-making behavior within the U.S. Supreme
Court and the U.S. Courts of Appeals, independently, recent research sheds new light
on the interactions among these courts. Studies of lower court interactions with the
U.S. Supreme Court suggest that the lower federal appellate courts are highly respon-
sive to the policy pronouncements of the U.S. Supreme Court (Clark 2009; Fowler
et al. 2007; Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994; Westerland et al. 2010). Hansford and
Spriggs (2006) notably find that the U.S. Supreme Court’s preferred policy positions
and treatment of its own precedents largely influence future lower court responses to
precedent. Other empirical work on judicial impact also demonstrates that the lower
federal courts frequently follow, and rarely defy the Supreme Court in terms of explic-
itly challenging the broader authority and legitimacy of a Supreme Court precedent
(Benesh and Reddick 2002; Johnson 1979; Canon and Johnson 1998; Songer 1988;
Songer and Haire 1992; Songer and Sheehan 1992; Wahlbeck 1998). Thus, the general
conclusion derived from these studies, collectively, is that a principal-agent relation-
ship is in effect within the American judiciary. These studies are important and
informative, but how do Supreme Court justices communicate their preferences to
judges on the lower courts? Additionally, are potential signals by the justices capable
of increasing lower court compliance with the Supreme Court’s decisions?
The Policy Preferences of Supreme Court Justices
Although there are disagreements among scholars on the extent to which the policy
preferences of Supreme Court justices influence their behavior, by now, there is ample
empirical evidence that such policy preferences exert an important influence on the
votes of the justices in salient cases and that the justices are more concerned with
the broad policy consequences of their decisions than with the outcome of most cases
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for the particular litigants in the case Rohde and Spaeth (1976); Segal and Spaeth
(2002) (but see Kritzer and Richards 2005; Masood and Songer 2013; Richards and
Kritzer 2002; Songer and Lindquist 1996). Such a concern for policy implications
suggests that Supreme Court justices can be assumed to be interested in maximizing
the impact of their decisions particularly within the judicial hierarchy. The ability
of the justices to create precedents that reflect their policy preferences would be of
little consequence if the lower courts refused to implement those policies throughout
the judicial system.
An extensive literature provides compelling empirical evidence lower court adher-
ence to the Supreme Court’s decisions is high. Outright rejection of the authority of a
precedent or the overt refusal of a lower court to follow precedent is, in fact, relatively
rare (see Benesh and Reddick 2002; Hansford and Spriggs 2006; Kassow, Songer, and
Fix 2012; Klein 2002; Songer 1988; Songer and Haire 1992; Songer and Sheehan 1990;
Wahlbeck 1998; Westerland et al. 2010). The empirical findings in these important
studies are reinforced by the statements of the judges themselves. A series of studies
based on interviews with judges on the courts of appeals repeatedly find that the
judges are nearly unanimous in their assertions that they and their colleagues will “of
course” follow the precedents announced by the Supreme Court when those prece-
dents are clear (Howard 1981; Klein 2002). But precedents are not always clear and
when they are not, there are a number of ways for judges to modify or restrict the
practical impact of a broad policy announced in a precedent without overtly defying
the precedent. The primary way in which a lower court can reduce the policy impact
of a precedent is by “distinguishing” the precedent in their opinion explaining the way
they resolved the legal issues in their case. When a judge distinguishes a precedent, he
or she accepts the general authority of that precedent but then explains that because
of differences in the facts of the case confronting the judge and the factual context
of the precedent, the given precedent is not the appropriate legal rule to follow in
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the case. One judge interviewed for a recent study explained that there is usually a
substantial amount of discretion in deciding which precedent controls a case and that
“all of us are pretty good at being able to distinguish precedent” (Bowie, Songer, and
Szmer 2014).
A key problem the justices face is their inability to monitor the actions of all of its
subordinates. How then can policy oriented justices ensure that their preferences are
adhered to by the courts below? My theoretical starting point is the assumption that
policy maximizing justices should be particularly interested in having their precedents
frequently cited and followed by the courts directly below. Given the very large
number of decisions produced by the lower courts and finite resources to monitor these
decisions, I argue that Supreme Court justices are interested in aggregate responses
to their precedents. That is, the justices should be attentive to the fact that any
given decision of the Court is frequently relied on by the lower courts collectively.
I offer a framework in which Supreme Court signals are able to influence aggregate
lower court responses to its precedents. In the sub-sections that follow I first highlight
the importance of the Supreme Court’s summary decisions, which I contend provide
the Court an important utility in signaling its preferences regarding its precedents to
the lower federal courts. I then provide a broader framework in which I argue that
information regarding legal precedents flows both top-down, from the U.S. Supreme
Court to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, and horizontally both within and across the
circuits, which together influences the propensity of lower court judges to rely or
ignore Supreme Court precedent.
I argue that a series of signals by justices of the Supreme Court provide important
informational cues that influence the propensity of judges on the U.S. Courts of
Appeals to rely on a given precedent of the High Court. Specifically, I theorize that
the Supreme Court’s use of summary decisions, which explicitly reference a recent
plenary precedent in close proximity to the time the precedent is issued signals the
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import of a precedent to judges on the courts of appeals. The intuition behind this
expectation is that when the Supreme Court is willing to grant certiorari to one or
several additional petitions to issue summary decisions in conjunction with a plenary
ruling, the Supreme Court not only overturns additional appeals court decisions, but
demonstrates its willingness to grant review and overturn similar decisions by the
courts of appeals in the future.
Given the nature of the Supreme Court’s summary decisions, I argue that these
decisions by the Court communicate to the lower courts that a formally argued prece-
dent of the Supreme Court is applicable to a diverse fact patterns and issue areas.
When the Supreme Court receives multiple certiorari petitions that raise similar is-
sues, the Court can resolve these appeals a few different ways. The most common
way of handling similar, multiple petitions is to grant certiorari to one and schedule
it for oral argument and then deny certiorari to the other petitions (Perry 1991).
Alternatively, the Court may consolidate several of the petitions and schedule an oral
argument for the combined cases (e.g., as it did in Brown v. Board of Education).
But on occasion, the Court will grant certiorari to several of the petitions but only
schedule one of the cases for oral argument. In such an instance, when the Supreme
Court issues a decision and a formally argued opinion, the justices then issue orders
to “Grant, Vacate, and Remand” (GVR) the other cases. Since the cases receiving
a GVR typically have different fact patterns than the case that receive oral argu-
ments, I contend that by issuing summary decisions rather than denying certiorari
the Supreme Court intends to communicate that a given precedent should be con-
sidered and applied to many disputes involving diverse factual patterns in cases that
come before the lower courts. Therefore I expect that as the number of Supreme Court
summary decisions associated with a formally argued precedent increases, there is a
greater probability the lower courts will rely on the given Supreme Court precedent.
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Vertical Hypothesis 1: As the number of summary decisions issued
“in light of” a formally argued Supreme Court decision increases, the
propensity with which the courts of appeals cite and follow a Supreme
Court precedent increases.
Previous research on the utility of Supreme Court precedents consistently find that
prior Supreme Court interpretations influences future citation and interpretations in
both the Supreme Court and the lower courts (Corley and Wedeking 2014; Hansford
and Spriggs 2006; Wedeking 2012; Westerland et al. 2010). Hansford and Spriggs find
that positive Supreme Court interpretations of a precedent increases the likelihood
that a precedent is cited and followed in subsequent decisions by both the Supreme
Court and the lower courts (Hansford and Spriggs 2006). These scholars argue that
the Court enhances the strength, or ‘vitality,’ of a precedent by explicitly reaffirming
the precedent in subsequent decisions (see also Corley 2009; Westerland et al. 2010;
Wedeking 2012). An important indication of the policy preferences of the Supreme
Court is how the justices themselves interpret their precedents within their subsequent
decisions. Thus, positive application of a given precedent by the justices may serve
as an important signal to lower court judges that a given precedent is still relevant,
important, and good law.
Vertical Hypothesis 2: As the vitality of a Supreme Court decision
increases, the propensity of the courts of appeals to cite and follow a
Supreme Court precedent increases.
Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck (2000) find that as the size of the Supreme
Court’s majority coalition decreases, the majority opinion writer is more likely to
accommodate requests by wavering justices to alter the content of the majority opin-
ion to minimize dissent. In addition, recent work by Corley, Steigerwalt, and Ward
(2013) demonstrates that cases with a high degree of legal certainty are most likely
to exhibit a high degree of consensus or unanimity. An expectation that flows from
these insightful findings is that Supreme Court decisions with larger winning coali-
tions accommodate a broader spectrum of legal and ideological perspectives. The
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incorporation of such broad perspectives in Supreme Court decisions with larger win-
ning coalitions arguably provide lower court judges with opportunities that are more
malleable to apply the Court’s precedent in future decisions. Cases with smaller win-
ning coalitions may be seen by lower court judges as more controversial, unsound, or
divisive decisions compared to decisions that are unanimous, which may reduce lower
court reliance on such divided precedents. Indeed, previous work by Benesh and Red-
dick (2002) provides empirical evidence that consensus among the voting behavior of
justices is related to higher levels of lower court compliance with precedent, whereas
precedents decided by a minimum winning coalition does not induce higher levels
of lower court adherence. While most studies suggest that the size of the winning
coalition that issues a precedent should increase future reliance of a precedent, this
finding is not unequivocal, as some studies find that upon accounting for the vital-
ity of a precedent, the margin by which justices issue a precedent no longer exerts
a substantively meaningful effect (Corley 2009; Johnson 1979; Kassow, Songer, and
Fix 2012) (but see Corley and Wedeking 2014; Hansford and Spriggs 2006; Wedek-
ing 2012). Given the belief that strategic lower court decision-makers may be more
inclined to rely on Supreme Court precedents issued by a wider margin, I assess the
potential influence of the size of the majority coalition that issues a formally argued
precedent. Thus, I test the theoretical expectation that a Supreme Court precedent
issued with a larger winning coalition is likely to induce greater levels of reliance by
judges on the courts of appeals compared to precedents that result from a decision
in which the justices are divided.
Vertical Hypothesis 3: As the size of the majority coalition that issues
a Supreme Court decision increases, the propensity of the courts of appeals
to cite and follow Supreme Court precedent increases.
A cornerstone of the principal-agent framework in studies of the American courts
centers around the belief that judges on the lower courts are attentive to the policy
preferences of the contemporary Supreme Court that may review their decision. As
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such, previous work demonstrates that the ideological distance between the enacting
and contemporary Supreme Court is an important factor that conditions the behavior
of lower court judges. Westerland et al. argue that such a distance is an important
consideration for lower court judges, and ultimately guides their behavior (Westerland
et al. 2010). These scholars conclude that lower court judges respond to Supreme
Court precedents in accordance with the preferences of the contemporary court. Thus,
I test the expectation that the courts of appeals should be less likely to rely on a
Supreme precedent when the Supreme Court is ideologically distant from the lower
court.
Vertical Hypothesis 4: As the ideological distance between the courts
of appeals and the median Supreme Court justice increases, the probabil-
ity of the courts of appeals to cite and follow Supreme Court precedent
decreases.
Impact of Circuit-Level Influences on Responses to Precedent
While the various signals by the Supreme Court likely influence circuit reliance on the
Supreme Court’s precedents, I argue that the impact of such signals is moderated, to
some extent, by influences at the circuit-level. My theory is premised on the belief
that rather than a deference to the perceived preferences of the justices, judges in
the Courts of Appeals take their roles as arbiters of law seriously. I argue that an
important mechanism through which appeals court judges respond to the precedents
of the Supreme Court is based on norm of horizontal stare decisis. That is, a seemingly
important factor in determining the likelihood that a circuit relies on a Supreme Court
precedent is influenced by how previous panels within the Courts of Appeals have
interpreted a given precedent. Previous research demonstrates that the ‘vitality,’ or
strength of a precedent, consistently impacts how the lower federal appellate courts
respond to the Supreme Court’s precedents in future decisions (see Hansford and
Spriggs 2006; Westerland et al. 2010).
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Precedents that have been interpreted positively compared to the frequency of
negative treatments impact the ‘legal strength’ of a precedent. I similarly hypothesize
that as the ratio of previous positive to negative interpretations of a Supreme Court’s
precedent by the circuits increase, the likelihood that a circuit will rely on a precedent
increases. I believe that such ‘vital’ precedents are more likely to be cited and followed
by subsequent panels of judges in cases that come before the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
The intuition behind this expectation is based on the fact that when appeals court
judges either positively or negatively apply a Supreme Court precedent, their action
impacts circuit law.
Horizontal Hypothesis 1: As the circuit vitality of a Supreme Court
decision increases, the propensity with which the courts of appeals cite
and follow a Supreme Court precedent increases.
A further implication of the importance of circuit law is that circuits responding
to a Supreme Court precedent that emerges from the review of the same circuit
should increase the probability of relying on a given precedent. The intuition behind
this expectation is that when the Supreme Court issues a precedent that is based
on a review of an earlier decision by a circuit, in issuing the new precedent the
Supreme Court not only sets broad national policy but its actions directly impact
existing circuit-law within the circuit in question. For instance, if the Supreme Court
announces a new precedent by reviewing an earlier decision of the Fifth Circuit, then
the Supreme Court not only sets a new national precedent for all circuits, but directly
alters the existing law within the Fifth Circuit. A precedent established from a case
originating from a given circuit thus simultaneously carries the weight of new circuit
law as well as national law. Moreover, judges on the circuit of origin, even those that
were not on the original panel whose decision the Court reviewed, are likely to pay
particular attention to the new Court precedent given that the Supreme Court made
a decision that directly affected their circuit precedent. Moreover, these judges may
conclude that the Supreme Court is specifically sending a message to their circuit that
80
such non-compliant application of Court precedent is subject to review and reversal
– in the form of additional summary or formally argued decisions of the Court. As
such, I expect that circuits responding a Supreme Court precedent that originates
from the same circuit to have a higher likelihood to rely on a new precedent compared
to the other circuits.
Horizontal Hypothesis 2: A circuit is more likely to cite and follow
a Supreme Court precedent if the precedent originates from the Supreme
Court’s review of a decision from the same circuit.
In addition, I expect that a circuit that directly receives a Supreme Court’s sum-
mary decision is likely to increase the propensity of the judges within the circuit to
rely on a given Supreme Court precedent. When the Supreme Court issues a formally
argued precedent it draws a case from a lower court. The lower court from which
the Supreme Court takes has direct implications as the Supreme Court’s decision
impacts both national and circuit law. However, the other circuits may not feel as
compelled to rely on the precedent especially if it conflicts with their existing circuit
law. However, if the Supreme Court issues a summary decision referencing a new
formally argued precedent to a different circuit, the Court instantaneously alters the
law within the circuit that receives the summary decision. Thus, I expect such an
action to increase the likelihood that circuit judges will rely on the Supreme Court’s
precedents.
Horizontal Hypothesis 3: A circuit is more likely to cite and follow a
Supreme Court precedent if the Supreme Court directs a summary deci-
sion associated with the precedent to a circuit.
Thus far, I have made the case that policy oriented justices are able to communi-
cate the applicability of their precedents towards future decisions in cases that come
before the courts of appeals through both explicit and implicit signals. In addition, I
argue that certain important factors at the circuit-level condition the actions of judges
on the courts of appeals in their decision to rely on a given precedent of the Supreme
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Court. With respect to signaling by the Supreme Court, my principal argument is
that the Supreme Court’s use of its summary decisions, which explicitly reference a
recent formally precedent signals the import of the precedent to judges on the courts
of appeals. That is, all else being equal, my theoretical expectation is that when
the Supreme Court issues one or more summary decisions “in light of” of a given
formally argued precedent, the likelihood that the circuits will rely on the formally
argued precedent will be greater compared to a precedent with which such a summary
decision signal is absent. One may, however, take issue with such an expectation in
that any increase in lower court adoption of a formally argued precedent may be
attributed to a direct order by the justices to the judges on the courts of appeals.
That is, when Supreme Court justices issue a summary decision, they vacate the
previous circuit decision and order the lower court judges to issue a new decision “in
light of” of a specific formally argument precedent. As such, there is little discretion
available to the judges on the courts of appeal panel in that they must issue a new
decision and do so only upon thoroughly considering the referenced Supreme Court
precedent. In order for the Supreme Court’s summary decision(s) to be an effective
signal it is essential that there is an increase in the probability of adoption of the
precedent beyond the panel of judges that directly receives the summary decision.
This means that in order for the Supreme Court’s action to be an effective signal not
only must there be a higher likelihood of reliance on the formally argued precedent
by the judges that directly receives the summary decision but there must also be an
increase in the probability to rely on the precedent by the other judges within the
courts of appeals.
Following the argument outlined in the theory above, I argue that when Supreme
Court justices issue one or more summary decisions “in light of” of one of its formally
argued precedents the Court is able to effectively communicate the added import
and broad applicability of its precedent to all judges on the courts of appeals. For
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judges that directly receive the summary decision the directive by the Supreme Court
is clear. The previous decision by the courts of appeal panel is nullified, and these
judge must issue a new ruling upon considering the merits of the formally argued
precedent referenced in the summary decision. As such, the action of the justices to
directly issue a summary decision to a panel of judges produces a direct effect. I posit
that when the justices issue a summary decision the impact of this action also has
an indirect effect on the remaining judges within the courts of appeal. That is, even
if a panel of judges do not directly receive a Supreme Court remand via a summary
decision, judges on the courts of appeal take notice of the fact that the Supreme Court
has issued a summary decision that directs other circuit judges to consider a specific
formally argued precedent of the Court. The intuition behind this expectation is
that even if a judge on the courts of appeals does not directly receive a summary
decision, the action by the justices to grant an additional petition certiorari, vacate
the ruling, and issue a remand is consequential. I argue that at the very least this
conveys to circuit judges that similar cases that are petitioned to the Supreme Court
have a higher likelihood to receive certiorari and that this can be done at a relatively
low cost to the justices. The decision by the Supreme Court to issue a summary
decision “in light of” a formally argued precedent also sends a signal to lower court
judges that the justices believe that certain precedents may be particularly relevant
to certain to certain issues and factual situations. Thus, even if circuit judges are not
motivated by a fear of reversal by the Court, circuit judges may interpret the action
of the justices to highlight the potential applicability of a given precedent within a
summary decision as an important cue to consider the precedent in future cases with
similar factual situations. Moreover, since the decision of each courts of appeal panel
is binding within its circuit, one may reasonably expect other panels within the same
circuit that receives a summary decision by the Supreme Court to rely on a formally
argued precedent with greater propensity. However, since my expectation is that
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judges within all circuits are attentive to the Supreme Court’s summary decision,
I expect that even circuits that do not directly receive a summary decision will be
more likely to rely on a Supreme Court precedent when the justices issue a summary
decision “in light of” its formally argued precedent.
Horizontal Hypothesis 4: A sister circuit that does not directly receive
a summary decision is more likely to cite and follow a Supreme Court
precedent with one or more associated summary decisions compared to a
precedent with no associated summary decisions.
Research Design
I analyze the universe of U.S. Courts of Appeals responses to a sample of precedents
from the U.S. Supreme Court to test my predictions. I examine courts of appeals
responses to a stratified random sample of Supreme Court decisions issued between
the 1994 to 2005 terms. I draw these cases from the longest natural Court in the
modern history of the U.S. Supreme Court. Since a key aspect of my theory is that the
courts of appeals respond differently to Supreme Court precedents with and without
associated summary decisions, I take two samples of Supreme Court decisions.1 I
analyze courts of appeals responses to a sample of 150 formally argued Supreme Court
decisions with no associated summary decisions and a second sample of 150 Supreme
Court precedents with at least one associated summary decision. The data for the
Supreme Court’s formally argued decisions are obtained from the U.S. Supreme Court
database (Spaeth et al. 2013).2 The summary decisions data are original data I collect
on the universe of the Supreme Court’s summary decisions issued between 1994 and
1 The concern with taking a purely random sample of all Supreme Court cases is whether enough
precedents with summary decisions are included in the analysis to be confident in the inferences from
the empirical estimation (see Campbell, Julious, and Altman 1995). Such a concern is especially
germane as cases with summary decisions comprise a smaller portion of the Supreme Court’s overall
docket. Ultimately, the two seed sample allows me to obtain reduced sampling errors compared
with a truly random sample.
2 The U.S. Supreme Court Database is maintained by the Center for Empirical Research in the Law
at the Washington University in St. Louis and is available at: http://www.scdb.wustl.edu.
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2005 from the United States Reports.3 In assembling the summary decisions dataset,
I identify the formally argued precedent each Supreme Court summary decision is
issued “in light of,” the Supreme Court term in which the summary decision is issued,
and the identify of the circuit to which each summary decision is directed. I then
randomly select 150 Supreme Court precedents with at least one summary decision
directed to the courts of appeals from the full population of cases between 1994 and
2005. Since the proportion of Supreme Court decisions with an associated summary
decision is relatively small, I over-sample Supreme Court precedents with summary
decisions. To account for the oversampling, I assign sampling weights to account for
the true frequency with which these cases occur in the Supreme Court.4
To examine courts of appeals responses to the Supreme Court’s precedents, I
examine court of appeals citations and positive interpretations from the twelve “reg-
ular” circuits of the U.S. Courts of Appeals courts of appeals responses from 1995 to
2008.5 These years allow me to assess courts of appeals responses to the Supreme
Court’s precedents from the time each Supreme Court decision is issued to a mini-
mum of three years for the latest appearing Supreme Court precedent in the sample.
My unit of analysis is the ‘Supreme Court Precedent-Circuit-Year.’ This means that
there is a single observation for a lower court response from each circuit for every
year a precedent is available for every Supreme Court precedent in the sample.6 The
3 A very small number of summary decisions direct the lower courts to rely on precedents announced
before the 1995 term and some were based on other authority (e.g., Solicitor General). These
decisions are not included in the analysis as they may potentially bias the results.
4 In generating the sampling weights, I calculate the number of observations for the two samples
and then take the multiplicative inverse (reciprocal) of the proportion.
5 Decisions of the Federal Circuit are not included in the analysis, because the Federal Circuit only
hears cases in specific issue areas (i.e., patent and trademarks) and its inclusion would likely bias
the results (c.f., Hansford and Spriggs 2006).
6 For example, there is a single observation for the Courts of Appeals of the First Circuit for 1995 for
Bailey v. United States (516 U.S. 137), which is one of the Supreme Court precedents in my sample.
There is also an observation for the First Circuit for Bailey in 1996 and additional observations for
each year until 2008. Similarly, there is an observation for Bailey for each year between 1995 and
2008 for each of the remaining eleven circuits.
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resulting dataset yields approximately 32,000 observations.
I test my predictions over two outcome variables. The first variable captures the
likelihood of a courts of appeals citation of a Supreme Court precedent. The sec-
ond outcome variable captures the probability of a positive interpretation a Supreme
Court decision by the courts of appeals. I obtain information for the outcome variables
from Shepard’s Citations via Lexis-Nexis for both citations and positive interpreta-
tions of Supreme Court precedents by the courts of appeals.7 Following the conven-
tions in Shepard’s, I count the designation “Cited,” “Explained,” or “Harmonized,”
and any explicit positive interpretation of the Supreme Court’s majority opinion as an
appeals court citation of a Supreme Court precedent, coded as 1, and 0 otherwise.8 I
count the designation that a circuit “Followed” the Supreme Court’s majority opinion
as a positive interpretation of the precedent, coded as 1, and 0 otherwise.9
My key theoretical expectation is that the courts of appeals respond differently
to a Supreme Court precedent when a formally argued precedent is accompanied
by one more Supreme Court summary decisions compared to a precedent with no
associated summary decisions. There are several ways to appropriately operationalize
the summary decisions variable. For instance, I can construct an indicator variable
denoting the presence or absence of a summary decision. Even though an indicator
7 Shepard’s Citations is a service that collects information on all citations and interpretations of
U.S. Supreme Court precedents. Shepard’s includes a typology of interpretations, with specific
categories within each part of the typology. A lower court citation of a Supreme Court’s decision
that does not include any type of substantive interpretation is simply categorized as “Cited.” A
lower court decision that substantially applies a particular Supreme Court decision, is categorized
as “Following” the precedent, in that a lower court decision is relying on the Supreme Court decision
to reach a similar legal conclusion in a subsequent case.
8 I am careful in excluding Supreme Court citations that result from explicit negative interpretation
of a Supreme Court precedent, because such negative citations capture something fundamentally
different from my central theoretical claims. For the sake of robustness, I estimate models with all
citations neutral, positive, and negative. Given the very small number of negative interpretations,
it is not surprising that the results of the full citations model are consistent with estimates of the
empirical model I report.
9 The values of the outcome variables do not include citations from dissenting or concurring opinions,
as these do not directly relate to the Supreme Court’s majority opinion (c.f., Hansford and Spriggs
2006).
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variable allows me assess my prediction on the influence of summary decisions, it
does not allow me to leverage the data to delineate the impact between a single
summary decision versus multiple summary decisions on the propensity of the courts
of appeals to rely on a Supreme Court precedent. A binary variable is also less
fine-grained than a measure that is not dichotomously collapsed. Therefore, my first
explanatory variable captures the number of summary decisions issued “in light of”
each formally argued precedent of the Supreme Court. The values of this variable
are a count of the raw number of summary decisions associated with each formally
argued Supreme Court precedent.
My second explanatory variable is a variable for Supreme Court vitality that
captures the effect of prior Supreme Court interpretations of a given precedent on
future court of appeals interpretations of the same precedent. This variable is based
on the difference between the number of positive Supreme Court interpretations of
its own precedents minus the negative interpretations by the Court (Hansford and
Spriggs 2006). Positive values of the vitality variable indicate that the Supreme Court
has interpreted a precedent more positively than negatively. Negative values of this
variable indicate that the Supreme Court has interpreted a precedent more negatively
than positively. Data for this variable are obtained via Shepard’s Citations. I follow
Spriggs and Hansford (2000) where “Followed” Supreme Court interpretations are
coded as positive, whereas “Criticized,” “Distinguished,” “Limited,” “Overruled,” and
“Questioned,” are coded as negative interpretations. I additionally code “Superseded”
designations as negative interpretations of precedent, because such interpretations are
inherently negative.10 I lag the Supreme Court vitality variable by one year to prevent
issues of simultaneity.
10 While “Superseded” interpretations are not included in Spriggs and Hansford’s analysis, I con-
struct vitality variables with and without the “Superseded” designation and find that the results do
not change. Additionally, I estimate models using a vitality variable that excludes “Distinguished”
interpretations and again find the results to be highly robust.
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A number of studies suggest that the size of the Supreme Court’s majority coali-
tion may influence the propensity of lower court judges or the Supreme Court, itself,
to rely on a given precedent in future cases (see Corley 2009; Corley, Steigerwalt, and
Ward 2013; Corley and Wedeking 2014; Hansford and Spriggs 2006; Kassow, Songer,
and Fix 2012; Wedeking 2012). To test this expectation, I include a variable that
captures the size of the majority coalition that issues a formally argued precedent.
This variable is computed by subtracting the number of dissents from the number of
majority votes.11 I obtain data for this variable via the U.S. Supreme Court database.
Additionally, to account for the case salience of a precedent, I include a variable using
data from Collins and Cooper (2012) to gauge whether a Supreme Court decision is
cited on the front page, or any subsequent pages, of one of the four leading news-
papers in the country. This measure expands the binary measure initially developed
by Epstein and Segal (2000) to include whether a Supreme Court decision appears
on the front page of the Chicago Tribune, the Los Angeles Times, or the Washington
Post in addition to the New York Times. I obtain data for this variable from Collins
and Cooper.
I include two variables to capture the impact of ideology on the propensity of
the courts of appeals to cite and follow Supreme Court precedent. The first variable
accounts for the ideological distance between the Supreme Court’s majority opinion
author and the median member of the Court. The underlying ideology measure for
each judges ranges from -1 (liberal) to 1 (conservative) and is based on the Judicial
Common Space (JCS) (Epstein et al. 2007).12 In order to calculate the distance
11 I also estimate models where I alternatively include a dichotomous variable that captures whether
a Supreme Court precedent is issued by a unanimous or non-unanimous vote. The results remain
highly robust. Therefore, I report the model estimates with the vote margin variable as it provides
additional degrees of freedom compared to the indicator variable.
12 It is worth noting that while the Judicial Common Space (JCS) is frequently employed in hier-
archical assessments of judicial decision-making behavior, the measure assumes that presidents
have no influence on the selection of courts of appeals judges when there is a home senator from
the same party as the president. In reality, when a home senator and the president are from the
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between the majority opinon writer and the median member I take the absolute
value of the difference in JCS scores. This variable is, therefore, negatively bounded
at zero with higher values denoting greater levels of ideological incongruity. I include
a second variable to capture the difference between ideological preferences at the
Supreme Court and the circuit-level. More specifically, this variable accounts for
the ideological distance between the median member of the enacting Supreme Court
and the median of the responding circuit panel. The variable for the ideological
distance between the Supreme Court median and responding circuit panel median is
the absolute value of the difference in JCS scores between the Supreme Court and
panel medians.13
To assess the impact of circuit-level influences and horizontal stare decisis, I in-
clude a variable for circuit vitality that captures the difference between prior positive
and negative Courts of Appeals interpretations of the Supreme Court’s precedents
same political party both are involved in the selection of the judicial nominee. To account for
this reality, it is necessary to take the median of the original JCS score along with the president’s
DW-NOMINATE score. I employ this strategy but find no substantial differences in the impact
of ideological distance when comparing the original JCS score to the modified score. Therefore, I
use the original JCS score to gauge the impact of ideological preferences to make the results more
directly comparable to previous assessments on judicial impact.
13 Recent studies provide strong evidence that appeals court judges do not respond strategically to
the possibility of threat of reversal by the Supreme Court. The judges also consistently report in
interviews that they do not possess the information needed to determine the likelihood of review in
a large majority of their cases and that there are few costs associated with reversal. Additionally,
game-theoretic analyses indicate that a rational judge concerned with the policy consequences of
their decisions will consistently vote sincerely rather than strategically, and statistical analyses of
voting patterns indicate that court of appeals judges frequently vote their sincere policy preferences
in cases most likely to be reviewed by the Court (see Bowie and Songer 2009; Hettinger, Lindquist,
and Martinek 2006). There is, therefore, no compelling theoretical reason to include a variable
to account for the distance between the enacting Supreme Court and the contemporary Supreme
Court in a model for aggregate citation and treatment patterns. Nevertheless, given the findings
reported by Westerland et al. (2010) that the distance between the enacting Supreme Court and
the contemporary Supreme Court is related to individual judge decisions to cite or positively treat
precedents, we ran additional models that include the ideological distance between the enacting
and contemporary Supreme Court (lagged one year). Consistent with my expectations, I find no
evidence that increasing ideological distance impacts the propensity of the circuits to rely on the
Supreme Court’s precedents. Yet further, I also consider models that account for the ideological
distance between the contemporary Supreme Court and contemporary responding court of appeal,
and find very similar results to the included measure of ideological distance. I cannot include both
of these distance variables in the same model due to concerns of multicollinearity as they correlate
at over 90%.
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(Westerland et al. 2010).14 This variable is based on the total number of prior positive
interpretations in a given circuit minus the total number of prior negative interpre-
tations within the same circuit for circuit and year in the sample. This variable is
constructed the same way as the variable for Supreme Court vitality where “Fol-
lowed” Supreme Court interpretations are coded as positive, whereas “Criticized,”
“Distinguished,” “Limited,” “Overruled,” “Questioned,” and “Superseded” are coded
as negative interpretations.15 I lag this variable by one year to avoid issues of si-
multaneity. The data for the circuit vitality variable are obtained from Shepard’s
Citations. Like Supreme Court vitality, the circuit vitality variable is lagged by one
year to mitigate issues of simultaneity.
My next circuit-level variable is a dichotomous indicator that accounts for whether
the circuit responding to a precedent is the circuit of origin. This variable captures
whether the circuit responding to a Supreme Court precedent is the same circuit which
the Supreme Court reviewed in using its precedent. An as example, if a formally
argued Supreme Court decision is the product of the justices reviewing a decision
from the First Circuit Courts of Appeals and in a future term the responding lower
court is a panel from the same First Circuit then the variable is coded 1. If the circuit
responding to the same precedent that emerged via review of the First Circuit is one
of the eleven circuits, the variable is coded 0. Data for this variable are obtained from
the U.S. Supreme Court database. I also include an indicator variable for whether a
circuit responding to a given Supreme Court precedent is the recipient of Supreme
Court summary decision remand “in light of” of the same Supreme Court precedent.
If the responding circuit receives one or more Supreme Court summary decisions
issued “in light of” the same precedent it is responding to the variable is coded 1,
14 A potential concern may be that the Supreme Court vitality and circuit vitality Supreme Court
and circuit vitality variables correlate at 0.112.
15 Again, I estimate models with and without “Superseded” and “Distinguished” treatments for the
circuit vitality variable and find that the results remain robust.
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and 0 otherwise. Data for this variable are obtained via the United States Reports
and the U.S. Supreme Court Database.
In addition to the variables of interest, I include several controls to account for
any potential confounding effects. To control for the case complexity or the breadth
of a precedent, I include a variable that captures the number of legal provisions raised
in a case. Next, I include a variable to control for per curium formally argued deci-
sions. This control variable is necessary to account for the fact that not all formally
argued Supreme Court decisions are signed by a particular justice. The variable for
ideological distance between the Supreme Court’s majority opinion writer and the
Court’s median includes a small number of majority opinions that are per curium.
This control variable allows me to adequately account for per curium decisions with-
out dropping them from the empirical models lowering the total observations.16 To
mitigate any bias from the relatively large number of criminal cases that are litigated
in the courts, I include a control variable for Supreme Court precedents that address
a criminal issue. I also control for the caseload of each circuit by including a variable
that accounts for the number of merit terminations within each circuit by year. Due
to the extreme range of the ‘Circuit Caseload’ variable, I divide the values of the
variable by 1000. Finally, I include a variable to account for the age of the Supreme
Court precedent (Black and Spriggs 2013; Hansford and Spriggs 2006; Reddick and
Benesh 1999). This variable is count of the number of years a precedent is in the
dataset from the time the Supreme Court establishes a precedent to correspond with
each observation for the full duration of the circuit response data.17
Given that both outcome variables, the likelihood of lower court citation and
16 I note here that models excluding the per curium opinions from the distance variable does not
alter the results. This is not surprising given that per curium opinions account for a very small
number of the overall sample.
17 I estimate additional models with squared, cubic polynomials, and quadratic functions of age.
Compared to the linear age variable, the inclusion of these transformations of age of precedent
variable do not substantially improve the model.
91
positive interpretation of Supreme Court precedent, are dichotomous in nature, I
estimate probit regression models. The structure of these data are such that the
observations are nested – in fact, Supreme Court citation and interpretation data
almost always have a clustered or hierarchical structure. In order to make sound
inferences, it is necessary for me to account for the clustered nature of these data (Zorn
2006). Not accounting for the hierarchical structure is likely to result in overstating
the precision and understating the uncertainty around the quantities of interest. One
consequence of underestimating the degree of uncertainty around the estimates is an
increased probability of committing a Type I error (Arceneaux and Nickerson 2009).
Recall, that my unit of analysis is the ‘Supreme Court Precedent-Circuit-Year’ triad.
This means that each courts of appeals response to a Supreme Court precedent is
nested within each circuit for each response year.18 One potential approach to account
for the hierarchical structure of the data is to cluster the standard errors on each
Supreme Court precedent by each circuit using the ’Supreme Court precedent-Circuit’
combination cluster. However, a multilevel model is likely to result in slightly more
precise estimates.19 Therefore, I estimate the influences on the outcome variables
by estimating multilevel probit regression models where lower citations and positive
interpretations (level 1) are nested within each ’Supreme Court precedent-Circuit’
combination (level 2).20 I estimate the multilevel models with random intercepts.
18 Not accounting for the nested structure of the data requires making the assumption that there
are no differences across circuits for every lower court response to a Supreme Court precedent.
Such an assumption is untenable.
19 Either clustering the standard errors or estimating a multilevel model mitigates potential con-
cerns of serial autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (see Arellano 2003; Stock and Watson 2008;
Wooldridge 2012).
20 I can, in theory, estimate three-level models where lower court responses to the Supreme Court
(level 1) are nested within each circuit (level 2) for each Supreme Court precedent (level 3). I
do not report three-level model estimates for three practical reasons. First, models beyond two-
levels provide little gains in precision at the cost of significantly higher computational complexity.
Second, the level-two (circuits) units, individually, do not have a sufficiently large number of
clusters (12), to be confident in the estimates (see Arceneaux and Nickerson 2009). Finally, the
results of the two-level models are nearly identical to three-level models, therefore, I side with
convention and employ the more parsimonious approach.
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This decision is theoretically premised in that I expect that the initial probability of
citation and positive interpretation to vary between the circuits and Supreme Court
precedents, however, I have no theoretical expectation, a priori, that the explanatory
variables will produce differences in coefficients across the units.
Empirical Results
Does the U.S. Supreme Court influence the likelihood that judges on the U.S. Courts
of Appeals rely on the Supreme Court’s precedents? The short answer is yes. Table
4.1 presents the coefficient estimates on the influences on the likelihood of courts
of appeals citation of Supreme Court precedent. Three sets of models are reported
within Table 4.1, the ‘Principal Circuit’ model provides estimates for the circuit that
directly receives a Supreme Court summary decision “in light of” of each Supreme
Court precedent within the sample. The ‘Sister Circuits’ model reports estimates
for all other circuits that do not receive a summary decision by the Supreme Court.
The ‘All Circuits’ model provides estimates on the influences on citation to Supreme
Court precedent for the entire courts of appeals. The primary discussion of results
is based on the ‘All Circuits’ model because the predictions are for entire full courts
of appeals. The purpose of the ‘Principal Circuit’ and ‘Sister Circuits’ models is to
shed light on the direct and indirect impact of the Court’s summary decisions, which
I discuss later in this section. My main expectation is that as the number of Supreme
Court summary decisions issued relating to a formally argued precedent increase,
I expect a higher probability of a court of appeals citation to a Supreme Court
precedent. The empirical results strongly support this expectation. The variable
that captures the effect of the number of summary decisions associated with each
Supreme Court precedent on the likelihood of citation is positive and statistically
significant at conventional levels of significance. In fact, most of the covariates in the
model exert a statistically significant effect on the probability of citation to a Supreme
93
Court precedent. The notable exception is the covariate that captures the impact
of Supreme Court vitality, which does not reach conventional levels of statistical
significance. I discuss the implications of this new finding in the conclusion.
Since maximum likelihood estimates are not directly interpretable, I estimate
predicted probabilities for each variable of the continuous and interval variables of
interest. I compute the discrete change change in the outcome probability going
from 0 to 1 for all indicator variables.21 The substantive results demonstrate that
as the count of summary decisions goes from a minimum of 0 to a maximum value
of 13, the probability of citation increases from approximately 0.20 to approximately
0.90. This change represents a substantial increase in the likelihood of a Supreme
Court citation by the courts of appeals. However, such an interpretation may slightly
exaggerate the true substantive effect as less than one percent of the observations
occur at the maximum value of the summary decisions variable. Since 99% of the
observations occur at or below eleven summary decisions, the impact of the absence of
a summary decisions versus the true maximum value (11 summary decisions) results in
an increase from a 0.20 probability to approximately 0.85 probability of citation. This
approximates to an improvement of 325%, which represents a very large substantive
effect. I plot this effect in Figure 4.1. From a practical perspective, this result
demonstrates that in the absence of a Supreme Court summary decision, ceteris
paribus, judges on the courts of appeals are unlikely to cite a Supreme Court precedent
within a given circuit in any given year. However, as the justices issue one or more
summary decisions associated with their formally argued decisions, the probability of
citation by the courts of appeals increases substantially. The key result here is that
when the Supreme Court issues multiple summary decisions, the probability of lower
court citation to a Supreme Court precedent changes from a statistical improbability
21 In computing the substantive effects, I hold all continuous and interval variables constant at their
mean, while all indicator variables are held constant at their modal values.
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Table 4.1: Multilevel Probit Regression of U.S. Courts of Appeals Citation of U.S.
Supreme Court Precedent
All Principal Sister
Variable Circuits Circuit Circuits
Summary Decision 0.164* (0.011) 0.080* (0.021) 0.167* (0.012)
Supreme Court Vitality -0.010 (0.031) 0.147 (0.101) -0.017 (0.032)
Supreme Court Vote Margin 0.012 (0.006) 0.046 (0.023) 0.011 (0.007)
Ideol Dist - SC Author to SC Median -0.060* (0.017) -0.041 (0.061) -0.060* (0.017)
Ideol Dist - CoA Panel to SC Median -0.332* (0.120) -0.691 (0.503) -0.327* (0.122)
Circuit Vitality 0.111* (0.013) 0.117* (0.022) 0.113* (0.014)
Circuit of Origin 0.690* (0.081) 0.473* (0.181) 0.680* (0.086)
Case Salience Index 0.113* (0.009) 0.081* (0.031) 0.114* (0.009)
Case Complexity -0.263* (0.056) -0.007 (0.257) -0.270* (0.057)
Per Curium Decision -0.712* (0.102) 0.985* (0.453) -0.718* (0.103)
Criminal Decision 0.613* (0.048) 0.505* (0.170) 0.609* (0.049)
Circuit Caseload 0.043* (0.006) 0.019 (0.021) 0.042* (0.007)
Age of Precedent -0.040* (0.004) -0.101* (0.016) -0.039* (0.004)
Constant -0.958* (0.076) -0.047 (0.336) -0.962* (0.077)
Model Fit Statistics
Observations 29,055 1,495 27,560
Cluster Units 3,589 181 3,408
χ2 Statistic 1273.74 127.25 1100.82
Probability > χ2 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
Note: The outcome variable is the probability of U.S. Courts of Appeals citation of Supreme
Court precedent per circuit-year. The ‘All Circuits’ model includes all circuits of the U.S.
Courts of Appeals. The ‘Principal Circuit’ model presents results for the circuit that directly
receives a Supreme Court summary decision, whereas, the ‘Sister Circuits’ model presents
the results for all circuits that do not receive an explicit summary decision by the U.S.
Supreme Court. The estimates of the multilevel models are based on random intercepts
for each circuit and each Supreme Court precedent with the standard errors reported in
parentheses. *p < 0.05
(0.20) to a near statistical certainty (0.85). Yet further, recall that the unit of analysis
is the ‘Supreme Court Precedent-Circuit-Year’ triad. This means that rather than an
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aggregate increase in the probability of citation to the Supreme Court’s precedents
by the courts of appeals collectively, the substantive results represent an increase in
the probability for an individual circuit to cite a Supreme Court precedent within a
given year. This finding has important implications for the empirical literature given
the sheer size of the effect of the covariate in increasing the likelihood of citation to
the Supreme Court’s precedents.
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Figure 4.1: Impact of Summary Decision on U.S. Courts of Appeals Citation to
Precedent
Note: To plot this effect, I generate the predicted probabilities. Continuous and indicator
variables are held constant at their mean and modal values, respectively. The solid line
represents the likelihood of citation to a Supreme Court Precedent in each circuit within
each year. The shaded area represent the 95% confidence intervals.
The estimates of the citation model notably demonstrate that the variable for
Supreme Court vitality does not exert exert a statistically meaningful effect (P =
.74) on the probability of the courts of appeals to cite a Supreme Court precedent.
The variable for vote margin or the size of the Supreme Court’s majority coalition
that issues a decision also does not exert a statistically meaningful effect on the
propensity of the courts of appeals to cite the Supreme Court’s precedents. While
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the result for the vote margin variable is not overly surprising given mixed support in
previous studies, the statistical and substantive results for the Supreme Court vitality
variable conflict with many previous empirical studies that consistently demonstrate
that the Supreme Court’s own patterns of positive versus negative interpretations of
its precedents strongly influence the propensity of the lower courts to rely on the High
Court’s precedents (see Black and Spriggs 2013; Corley 2009; Corley and Wedeking
2014; Cross and Spriggs 2010; Fowler et al. 2007; Fowler and Jeon 2008; Hansford
and Spriggs 2006). The results here suggest that judges on the courts of appeals
either pay little attention or are not substantially moved by the Supreme Court’s
own repeated positive or negative interpretations of its decisions. I discuss both the
theoretical implications of this important new finding in the conclusion.
Both ideological distance variables exert a statistically meaningful effect on the
probability of lower court citation of the Supreme Court’s precedents and as expected
are negatively signed. Substantively, the first variable that is the distance between
the Supreme Court’s majority opinion author and the median member of the Court
results in a decrease in the probability of citation from approximately .34 to .33.
This result suggests that as the distance between the majority opinion writer and the
median member increases there is an extremely modest decrease in the likelihood of
lower court citation. Of greater interest is the distance between the median member
of the responding lower court panel and the median member of the Supreme Court.
As Figure 4.2 demonstrates, that as the distance between the panel and Supreme
Court medians increase there is a lower probability of citation to a precedent by
the circuits. Going from the maximum to the minimum value results in a change
of probability from .34 to .28. In context to the influence of the Supreme Court’s
summary decisions and previous analyses of lower and higher court distance, this is
a very modest effect. While an increase in ideological distance between the circuit
panel and the Supreme Court correspond with a lower probability of citation, the raw
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change in probability is only .06. This result suggests that the impact of ideological
differences on the propensity of the circuits to cite the Supreme Court’s precedent is
perhaps more nuanced than previously understood.
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Figure 4.2: Impact of Ideological Distance on U.S. Courts of Appeals Citation to
Precedent
Note: The solid line represents the likelihood of citation to a Supreme Court Precedent in
each circuit within each year. The shaded area represent the 95% confidence intervals.
Next, I turn to the to the predictions on the impact of horizontal stare decisis and
circuit-level factors on the probability of citation to the Supreme Court’s precedents.
As hypothesized, the variable for circuit vitality exerts a statistically significant and
positive effect on the propensity of the courts of appeals to cite the Supreme Court’s
precedents. The circuit vitality variable has a very large range from a minimum of
-22 to a maximum of 102. However, very little of the data are observed at the ex-
treme ranges. In fact, 99% of the data range between a vitality score of -2 and 8. To
interpret the results for the full range of the Court of Appeals vitality variable would
mean to significantly overstate is effect. Substantively, going from a circuit vitality
score of -2 to 8, which represents 99% of the data, results in a positive change in prob-
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Figure 4.3: Impact of Circuit Vitality on U.S. Courts of Appeals Citation to
Precedent
Note: The solid line represents the likelihood of citation to a Supreme Court Precedent in
each circuit within each year. The shaded area represent the 95% confidence intervals.
ability from approximately .20 to .61. This result corroborates, in principal, previous
work by (Westerland et al. 2010) on the importance of prior circuit interpretations in
influencing future responses to precedent. The results in my analysis add to Wester-
land et al.’s work in two ways. First, Westerland et al. do not analyze the impact of
prior lower court interpretations on the probability of lower court citation, instead,
their analysis models the probability of explicit positive, neutral, or negative inter-
pretation by the lower courts. Second, Westerland et al. do not assess the impact of
the difference between positive and negative circuit interpretations of Supreme Court
precedents. Instead, these scholars include separate count variables for the number
of positive and negative interpretations and find that higher values of positive lower
court interpretations correspond with a higher probability of positive interpretation,
whereas higher negative values of prior negative interpretations increase the prospect
of future negative interpretation by the lower courts. My results demonstrate that
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the net difference between prior positive and negative interpretations also impacts
the probability of citation to the Supreme Court’s precedents and that the force of
prior circuit interpretations is such that they substantively alter the probability of
citation even when the analysis is dis-aggregated by circuit and year, as Figure 4.3
illustrates.
The variable for a circuit addressing a precedent that originates from the Supreme
Court’s review of the same circuit exerts a significant and positive effect on the like-
lihood of citation precedent. Put differently, the likelihood of citation to a Supreme
Court precedent is greater for the circuit of origin than a circuit addressing a prece-
dent that emerges from the review of a different circuit. The probability of citation
originating from the review of a different circuit is approximately .31, whereas, the
probability of citation increases to .58 if a precedent originates from the same circuit.
This represents a discrete change of a .27 higher probability in citation of Supreme
Court precedent, which represents a large effect. This result provides support to the
notion that horizontal stare decisis, and, more specifically, the law within each circuit
strongly influences the decision-making behavior of circuit judges (see Bowie, Songer,
and Szmer 2014; Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek 2003a,b, 2006; Klein 2002). The
new, but intuitive, finding here is that judges within each circuit are significantly
more likely to consider a formally argued Supreme Court precedent if the precedent
emerges from the review of panel’s own circuit than a precedent emerging from the
review of another circuit within the courts of appeals. This result is easy to reconcile
from a practical standpoint given that when the Supreme Court affirms or reverses
a lower court decision, the Supreme Court is simultaneously affirming or overturning
circuit law within the circuit whose decision is reviewed.
The citation model includes a series of control variables all of which are statistically
significant. Most notably, the variable for case salience is positively signed. Supreme
Court decisions with higher levels of salience correspond with a higher probability of
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citation by the courts of appeals. Going from the minimum to the maximum value of
the salience variable results in an increase in probability from approximately .20 to .55.
This results suggest that Supreme Court precedents that are not salient are unlikely
to be cited per circuit-year, while precedents that are highly salient are significantly
more likely to be cited. The variables for case complexity and per curium decisions
are both negatively signed, meaning that complex cases and Supreme Court decisions
without an identified majority opinion writer are less likely to be cited when the
analysis is dis-aggregated by circuit and year. Supreme Court precedents that relate
to criminal cases are significantly more likely to be cited than non-criminal precedents.
The control for circuit caseload is significant and positive, which indicates that as
the caseload in each circuit and each year increases, the likelihood of citation also
increases. Finally, the variable for the age of precedent is significant and negatively
signed as one would expect, because as Supreme Court decisions age over time, they
are often replaced with new and more prevalent Supreme Court decisions.
Table 4.2 presents the coefficient estimates of the positive interpretation model.
The results for the positive interpretation model are very similar to the citation
model. The variable for the Supreme Court’s summary decisions is again significant
and positive. As Figure 4.4 illustrates, the probability that the courts of appeals
will positively interpret a Supreme Court precedent is .04 if no summary decision is
associated with a precedent. Going to the maximum value of the summary decisions
variable for 99% of the observations increases the probability of positive interpretation
to .40. A number of studies elucidate the reality that explicit positive interpretation
of precedent is relatively infrequent. For instance, Fowler et al. (2007, 328) note that,
"positive or negative interpretation of precedent is a rare event as compared to the
string citation of precedent. Given that positive interpretations of Supreme Court
precedents by the lower courts are a rare event, the net increase in probability of .36
represents a very large effect, as Figure 4.4 illustrates.
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Table 4.2: Multilevel Probit Regression of U.S. Courts of Appeals Positive
Interpretation of U.S. Supreme Court Precedent
All Principal Sister
Variable Circuits Circuit Circuits
Summary Decision 0.140* (0.009) 0.043* (0.015) 0.144* (0.010)
Supreme Court Vitality -0.014 (0.034) 0.021 (0.077) -0.012 (0.036)
Supreme Court Vote Margin 0.006 (0.007) 0.032 (0.017) 0.005 (0.007)
Ideol Dist - SC Author to SC Median -0.044* (0.017) -0.000 (0.043) -0.046* (0.018)
Ideol Dist - CoA Panel to SC Median -0.435* (0.138) -0.209 (0.355) -0.432* (0.143)
Circuit Vitality 0.038* (0.008) 0.063* (0.012) 0.043* (0.010)
Circuit of Origin 0.491* (0.085) 0.135 (0.137) 0.487* (0.092)
Case Salience Index 0.077* (0.009) 0.093* (0.027) 0.075* (0.010)
Case Complexity -0.197* (0.056) 0.160 (0.196) -0.210* (0.058)
Per Curium Decision -0.300* (0.102) -0.998* (0.462) -0.321* (0.104)
Criminal Decision 0.367* (0.048) 0.178 (0.137) 0.371* (0.049)
Circuit Caseload 0.046* (0.007) 0.027 (0.015) 0.045* (0.007)
Age of Precedent -0.008* (0.005) -0.103* (0.017) -0.004* (0.006)
Constant -2.067* (0.088) -1.115* (0.267) -2.076* (0.091)
Model Fit Statistics
Observations 29,055 1,495 27,560
Cluster Units 3,589 181 3,408
χ2 Statistic 760.53 112.00 648.66
Probability > χ2 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
Note: The outcome variable is the probability of U.S. Courts of Appeals citation of Supreme
Court precedent per circuit-year. The ‘All Circuits’ model includes all circuits of the U.S.
Courts of Appeals. The ‘Principal Circuit’ model presents results for the circuit that directly
receives a Supreme Court summary decision, whereas, the ‘Sister Circuits’ model presents
the results for all circuits that do not receive an explicit summary decision by the U.S.
Supreme Court. The estimates of the multilevel models are based on random intercepts
for each circuit and each Supreme Court precedent with the standard errors reported in
parentheses. *p < 0.05
The variables for Supreme Court vitality and vote margin are again not sta-
tistically significant in the positive interpretation model. The finding that Supreme
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Figure 4.4: Impact of Summary Decisions on Positive Interpretation of Supreme
Court Precedent
Note: The solid line represents the likelihood of positive interpretation of a Supreme Court
Precedent in each circuit within each year. The shaded area represent the 95% confidence
intervals.
Court vitality does not substantively influence the propensity of the courts of appeals
to follow the High Court’s precedents stands in contrast to previous analyses that
demonstrate that prior positive and negative interpretations by the Supreme Court
itself strongly influences the extent to which the lower courts follow the High Court’s
precedents (see Black and Spriggs 2013; Corley 2009; Corley and Wedeking 2014;
Cross and Spriggs 2010; Fowler et al. 2007; Hansford and Spriggs 2006; Westerland
et al. 2010).
Supreme Court case salience is significant and positive. Figure 4.5 illustrates the
effect of Supreme Court case salience on the propensity of the courts of appeals to
follow a Supreme Court precedent. Going from the minimum to the maximum value
of the salience variable results in an increase from .08 probability to approximately
.17. For positive interpretations, this represents a fairly sizable effect. The ideological
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Figure 4.5: Impact of Case Salience and Ideological Distance on Positive
Interpretation of Supreme Court Precedent
Note: The solid line represents the likelihood of positive interpretation of a Supreme Court
Precedent in each circuit within each year. The shaded area represent the 95% confidence
intervals.
distance between the Supreme Court’s majority opinion writer and the median mem-
ber of the Court does not influence lower court positive interpretations of Supreme
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Court decisions. However, the ideological distance between the median members of
the lower court panel and the Supreme Court exerts a statistically significant effect.
Figure 4.5 also presents the effect of ideological distance between the lower court and
Supreme Court medians on the likelihood to positively interpret precedent. The effect
of the distance variable is small. When ideological distance between the lower court
panel and the Supreme Court is at its minimum, the probability of positive interpre-
tation is approximately .06, whereas, when ideological distance is at its maximum,
the probability of positive interpretation decreases to approximately .04.
Circuit vitality exerts a meaningful effect on the propensity of a lower courts to
follow Supreme Court precedent. This effect is plotted in Figure 4.6. Going from a
vitality score of -2 to 6 increases the probability of positive interpretation of Supreme
Court precedent from .05 to .27. Going from the minimum to the maximum value
for 99% of the observations results in is a raw increase in probability of .22. This
is a very large substantive effect. The impact of the circuit of origin responding to
a Supreme Court precedent increases the probability to approximately .16 from .10,
which is the probability of positive interpretation for the peer circuits. Similar to the
citation model, all of the control variables also reach conventional levels of statisti-
cal significance. The circuit of summary decision is also significant in the positive
interpretation model, however, substantively the variable’s impact is very modest
changing from .10 to .11 when a circuit directly receives a Supreme Court summary
decision. Finally, among the control variables, criminal cases, circuit caseload, and
the age of precedent reach conventional levels of statistical significance, whereas, case
complexity and per curium decisions do not exert a statistically meaningful effect.
An important aspect of my theoretical argument is the idea that in order for any
action by the justices to be an effective Supreme Court signal we must observe both
direct and indirect effects in increases in the probability of the circuits to cite and
follow a formally precedent. Therefore, it is necessary to empirically assess the impact
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Figure 4.6: Impact of Circuit Vitality on Positive Interpretation of Supreme Court
Precedent
Note: The solid line represents the likelihood of positive interpretation of a Supreme Court
Precedent in each circuit within each year. The shaded area represent the 95% confidence
intervals.
of the Supreme Court’s summary decision signal on both the circuit that directly
receives a summary decision as well assessing the impact on the remaining circuits
that do not directly receive a summary decision. If the impact of the Supreme Court’s
action is realized by the circuit that directly receives a summary decision but not the
sister circuits, then the Supreme Court’s action is not an effective signal, because in
such a scenario the Court’s actions have no practical effect in increasing reliance to
their precedents. However, if the Supreme Court’s summary decision increases the
probability of citation and positive interpretation in the circuit that directly receives
a summary decision and the sister circuit only then can the Supreme Court’s action
be characterized as effective signals. To evaluate such an effect empirically, I estimate
models for the ‘Principal Circuit’ that directly receives a Supreme Court summary
decision. I also estimate models for the ‘Sister Circuit,’ which are the remaining
circuits that do not receive the Court’s summary decision.
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Figure 4.7: Impact of Summary Decisions on Citation and Positive Interpretation of
Supreme Court Precedent in ‘Sister Circuits’
Note: The solid lines represent the likelihood of citation and positive interpretation to a
precedent in each circuit within each year that is not the circuit that directly receives a
summary decision. The shaded area represent the 95% confidence intervals.
Recall that Table 4.1 also presents the influences on citations to the Supreme
Court’s precedents. On the surface, the coefficient estimates demonstrate that the
Supreme Court’s summary decisions exert a statistically significant and positive effect
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on both the “Principal” and the “Sister Circuits.” Thus, if the Supreme Court issues
a formally argued precedent with a summary decision to any one of the circuits, the
remaining circuits that do not directly receive a summary decision are statistically
more likely to cite the precedent of the Court compared to when such a summary
decision signal is absent. Interestingly, the substantive impact of the Summary deci-
sions signal is stronger within the ‘Sister Circuits.’ That is, going from the minimum
to the maximum value of the summary decisions variable in the ‘Principal Circuit’
model results in a positive change in probability from approximately .44 to .77. The
substantive impact of the summary decisions variable in the ‘Sister Circuits’ model
results in a positive change in probability from approximately .24 to .87. This means
that for the ‘Sister Circuits’ when other circuits receive summary decisions, the non
affected circuits go from a statistical improbability to a near statistical certainty in
the probability of citing a precedent of the Court. This effect is plotted in Figure 4.7.
The results for the influences on positive interpretations to precedent corroborate
the results of the citation models. As Table 4.2 reports, in both the ‘Principal Circuit’
and ‘Sister Circuits’ models the impact of the Supreme Court’s summary decisions is
significant and positively signed. The substantive impact of the summary decisions
variable in the ‘Principal Circuit’ model results in a positive change in probability
from approximately .14 to .27, whereas, the substantive impact of the summary deci-
sions variable in the ‘Sister Circuits’ model results in a positive change in probability
from approximately .14 to .41. Once again, the impact of the Supreme Court’s ac-
tions is stronger in the non-affected circuits than the circuit that directly receives a
summary decision. These results suggest that not only is the Supreme Court able to
meaningfully influence the propensity of the courts of appeals to rely on its prece-
dents, but when the Court send such signals there is significant learning within the
circuits that results in both direct and indirect increases in lower court utility of the
High Court’s precedents.
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Conclusion and Implications
Judicial scholars give regular attention to hierarchical interactions among the courts.
Of particular interest to students of the judiciary are theoretical accounts that in-
form how the lower federal courts respond to the policy pronouncements of the U.S.
Supreme Court. Often the theoretical account associated with such research inquiries
is some variant of a principal-agent framework. However, the studies on the inter-
actions between the U.S. Supreme Court and the lower courts produce conflicting
accounts on the existence of a principal-agent relationship in the American courts.
Where existing studies fall short is in providing an explanation of how information
regarding preferences for policy and precedents is communicated between judicial
actors up and down the judicial hierarchy.
My analysis addresses this void and offers several new contributions to the lit-
erature. First, I offer a theory on the factors that influence lower court responses
to the Supreme Court’s precedents that incorporates both Supreme Court signals
and circuit-level influences. Specifically, I argue that policy-oriented justices seek
that the lower courts adhere to their policy preferences in the form of citations and
positive interpretations to their precedents. My analysis demonstrates that, in fact,
the Supreme Court is capable of not only communicating information regarding their
preferences but to also substantially increase the probability of lower court adherence
to its decisions. Thus, even if it is difficult for the Court to monitor all of the specific
individual treatments of its precedents by the myriad of lower courts, it is possible for
the Court to influence the aggregate impact of its precedents. The Supreme Court
can increase lower court utility of its precedents by taking one of several actions. The
justices can announce one or more summary dispositions that direct a lower court
to re-consider its earlier decision “in light of” a formally argued precedent of the
Supreme Court. The more summary decisions the Supreme Court issues associated
with a precedent, in a given area of law, the more the justices demonstrate their
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willingness to grant similar petitions certiorari that are likely to emerge from the
decisions of judges on the lower courts. Additionally, as previous studies argue, the
Supreme Court can also increase the vitality of its precedents by positively interpret-
ing its precedents in its own future decisions. My analysis, however, provides evidence
against this important expectation. The results suggest that the lower courts are not
substantially motivated by how the Supreme Court tends to interpret its own prece-
dents. The Supreme Court may also demonstrate wide-support among the justices
by adopting a precedent by a large margin. A precedent issued by a large majority
coalition potentially sends the signal that a given precedent is particularly unlikely
to be overturned given the level of support among the justices.
While my analysis demonstrates that these are effective strategies that are avail-
able to the Court, the Court’s impact is also constrained to some degree by circuit
level factors. First, circuits that are ideologically at odds with the Supreme Court
may be less likely to cite and positively interpret its precedents. However, my anal-
ysis demonstrates that the impact of this ideological constraint is of less substantive
significance than the impact of the positive steps that the Court can take to increase
the impact of its precedents. Similarly, whether a given circuit takes prior action to
reinforce the vitality of a precedent and whether the precedent generating case arose
in a given circuit will independently affect the prospect of lower court reliance on
precedent regardless of the actions taken by the Supreme Court. But these circuit
actions also tend to have less substantive impact on the overall impact of a precedent
than the actions taken by the Supreme Court itself, namely the justices decision to
issue one ore more summary decisions that explicitly reference its formally argued
precedents. I believe that this is a significant finding with important implications for
future research that examine hierarchical interactions in the courts. Yet further, even
though the constraining effect of ideology has been noted before, the finding that the
originating circuit from which a Supreme Court precedent eventually emerges will
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more frequently cite and positively interpret that precedent than precedents origi-
nating in other circuits is new. I argue that the decision of the Court to review a
decision from a particular circuit has important implications for a circuit’s law in that
the Supreme Court’s review either affirms or overturns existing circuit law. Such a
direct treatment of a circuit’s decision by the Supreme Court serves an important
signal to members of the circuit, which is likely to increase the likelihood that judges
within such a circuit cite and follow the Supreme Court’s precedent.
My results contribute to a broad literature on the circumstances under which
judicial decision-makers lower down the hierarchical ladder choose to rely on the
precedents and policy preferences of the U.S. Supreme Court. Many scholars have
argued that various factors at the Supreme Court-level influence the decisions ac-
tions of judges on the lower courts. Importantly, I find that upon accounting for the
Supreme Court’s summary decisions and prior interpretations of the Supreme Court
precedents within each circuit, Supreme Court vitality no longer exerts a meaning-
ful effect on the propensity of the lower courts to cite or follow the precedents of
the Supreme Court. My findings challenge a prevailing theoretical account that the
Supreme Court can increase lower court reliance on its precedents by frequently inter-
preting its precedents positively. My study contributes to the literature by providing
an important update to our understanding of the mechanisms that influence the
decisions of judges on the lower courts to rely on the Supreme Court’s precedents.
The analysis presented in this paper confirm the import of some substantive findings
while notably challenging the efficacy of others. My framework additionally con-
tributes by suggesting new, previously unconsidered theoretical factors that impact
the interactions between U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Courts of Appeals. This
analysis, thus, allows for stronger conclusions and a more nuanced understanding of
the mechanisms at work within the American judiciary.
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Chapter 5
Exploring the Causal Mechanisms of U.S.
Courts of Appeals Attentiveness to the
Supreme Court’s Precedents
A persistent theme in judicial scholarship is examination of the extent to which that
lower courts comply with the U.S. Supreme Court. Central to these examinations
is the principal-agent interaction between the Supreme Court as a principal and the
lower court as agents. Indeed, a large body of work examines the hierarchical dynamic
in the American judiciary. To understand hierarchical interactions, scholars focus
their examination in two areas. One line of research examines the Supreme Court’s
supervision of the lower courts (Haire, Songer, and Lindquist 2003; Songer, Segal, and
Cameron 1994). This includes the principal’s strategic auditing of the lower courts
when there is non-compliant behavior (Black and Owens 2012; Boucher and Segal
1995; Cameron, Segal, and Songer 2000; Lindquist, Haire, and Songer 2007). An-
other line of research investigates the extent that lower courts follow Supreme Court
precedent (Benesh 2002; Benesh and Reddick 2002; Songer and Sheehan 1990). Ju-
dicial scholars find conflicting support for motivations for the lower courts to comply
(or defy) Supreme Court precedent. Some scholars find empirical support for the idea
that lower courts consider the likelihood of review by the Court (Baum 1997; Songer,
Segal, and Cameron 1994). In contrast, other studies conclude that the prospect of
review and reversal, is so unlikely that fear of reversal does not factor in to lower
court considerations of treatment of Court precedent (Bowie and Songer 2009; Klein
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and Hume 2003; Songer, Ginn, and Sarver 2003). These studies suggest that instead
of a fear of reversal, ideological (Westerland et al. 2010), legal (Hansford and Spriggs
2006; Klein 2002), and institutional considerations (Hettinger, Lindquist, and Mar-
tinek 2006) influence lower court judges and how lower courts apply the Supreme
Court’s precedent. Overall, the compliance literature provides multiple theoretical
accounts on the motivations for lower court behavior in responding to the prefer-
ences of the Supreme Court. While these studies improve our understanding of the
hierarchical dynamic within the courts, many important questions remain.
I contend that given finite resources and the inability of the U.S. Supreme Court to
examine each instance of lower court defiance or misapplication of precedent, Supreme
Court justices should primarily be attentive to aggregate patterns of lower court inter-
pretations of their precedents. As I allude to throughout this dissertation, the studies
that examine lower court responses to precedents of the Supreme Court find that the
lower courts generally follow the authority of the Supreme Court’s precedent (Benesh
and Reddick 2002; Hansford and Spriggs 2006; Klein 2002; Kassow, Songer, and Fix
2012; Songer 1988; Songer and Haire 1992; Songer and Sheehan 1990; Wahlbeck 1998;
Westerland et al. 2010). Yet, my analysis suggests that substantial variance exists
among the circuit courts in yearly circuit citation and treatment patterns. In some
instances, a Supreme Court precedent may have over 100 lower court citations and
dozens of positive treatments.1 Yet other Supreme Court precedents may not be cited
or followed at all, within the same circuit-year. Given the increasing import of prece-
dent for contemporary judicial research the large variance in citation and treatment
patterns raise an important puzzle, ‘why?’
In the previous chapter, I find that the Supreme Court’s summary decisions, prior
circuit interpretations of precedent, and the circuit from which the Supreme Court
draws a case are the factors that most strongly influence judges on the courts of ap-
1 For instance, see Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
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peals to rely on a given precedent of the Court. Notably, I also find that ideological
differences between courts have a muted effect and that Supreme Court vitality does
not exert a meaningful influence on circuit court reactions to the Supreme Court’s
precedents. Given that my results challenge the efficacy of previous findings, there
may be skepticism on the robustness of the results. In this chapter, I address impor-
tant concerns of spuriousness and explore the causal mechanisms that impact lower
court attentiveness to the Supreme Court’s precedents. I provide both qualitative and
quantitative evidence and replicate an existing dataset to demonstrate the strength
and consistency of my results.
Lower Court Attentiveness to Summary Decisions
A key argument I make throughout this dissertation is that the Supreme Court’s
summary decisions impact lower court reactions to the Supreme Court’s precedents.
An implicit assumption of this argument is that the lower courts actually know and
care about the fact that the Supreme Court issues many summary decisions “in light
of” of a formally precedent announced by the Court. To respond to potential concerns
about whether this assumption is plausible, I first address the causal mechanisms by
which judges are expected to become aware of summary decisions directed at 1) their
own circuit and 2) within other circuits. I then present evidence that judges do in
fact pay attention to the Supreme Court’s summary decisions. First, it is worth
noting that 95% of the summary decisions in my data are “grant, vacate, and remand
orders" (GVRs) that nullify the ruling in an earlier lower court decision and, as a
result, alters circuit precedent that is in effect prior to justices issuing the summary
decision. While it is difficult for circuit judges to pay attention to every formally
argued and summary decision issued by the Supreme Court, it is reasonable to assume
that judges do, in fact, monitor all Supreme Court decisions that impact precedents
of their own circuit. This is especially true when the justices alter the precedent
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within a circuit. A summary decision that overturns the precedent within a particular
circuit is binding precedent, an authoritative pronouncement that the previous circuit
precedent is no longer good law and should not be used in future decisions by lower
court panels within that circuit (Masood and Songer 2013). Consequently, even if
a summary decision is not directed towards a particular panel of judges, all judges
within the circuit that receives a summary decision will quickly become aware of it,
because such an action alters inter-circuit law. Even if a judge does not directly read
the Supreme Court’s orders, other judges, clerks, and the lawyers of litigants will
make this known to the circuit panel prior to the adjudication of a future, related
case. In their recent book, Bowie, Songer, and Szmer (2014) interviewed 60 judges
on the U.S. Courts of Appeals where judges unanimously maintained that they took
changes to precedent seriously when it was clearly relevant to any case before them.
All of the judges indicated that circuit precedent was particularly important to them
and that they routinely read the opinions of other panels in their circuit.2 Given
the relative infrequency with which circuit precedent is overturned by the Supreme
Court, it is reasonable to expect that in any circumstance when one of their own
circuit’s precedents is affected, either by a formally argued decision or a summary
decision by the Supreme Court, the judges and the clerks in the affected circuit will
quickly become aware of it.
In addition, when a summary decision strikes down the precedent of a circuit
different from a judge’s own circuit, the judge may still learn of the summary decision
through the actions of attorneys in subsequent cases. In interviews with Bowie,
Songer, and Szmer (2014), circuit judges indicate that they rely on to a substantial
2 In approximately half of the circuits, each panel is expected to send to all other judges in the
circuit all of their tentative opinions and then wait for comments from the other judges for about
two weeks before formally releasing the final opinion. During this period, circuit judges not on the
three-judge panel are asked to comment on any concerns on the authority for which of the panel’s
decision is based. Thus, in at least these circuits, it is clear that any GVR of a circuit precedent
would quickly come to the attention of the other judges within the circuit.
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degree on the briefs of counsel to bring to their attention the precedents that are
most relevant for the case under consideration. By definition, a GVR directs the
panel of the court of appeals whose decision is overturned to issue a new opinion and
explicitly consider the formally argued precedent of the Supreme Court cited within
the GVR order. Thus, at a minimum, each summary decision that is a GVR produces
at least one new circuit court decision that explicitly discusses the meaning of the
Supreme Court precedent cited within the Supreme Court’s summary decision. Both
the original summary decision and the subsequent circuit decision responding to the
GVR are likely to be discovered and referenced by any competent attorney arguing
a case raising a similar issue.
These precedents presumably will be cited by the party whose case will be strength-
ened by the new precedent. While attorneys will generally prefer a precedent from
their own circuit that supports their argument, they routinely discuss precedents from
other circuits, whenever those precedents are relevant. As a result, it should be ex-
pected that even in circuits other than the circuit that directly receives the summary
decision of the Supreme Court, judges hearing any future case with a similar issue
will be made aware of the summary decision and any alteration to circuit precedent
resulting from the Supreme Court’s GVR order. At times, the Supreme Court issues
multiple summary decisions within several circuits “in light of” of the same formally
precedent. In such a situation, there is an even greater expectation that the attorneys
will reference the actions by the justices that affects circuit precedent in one or all of
the circuits to whom the Supreme Court’s summary decisions are directed.
Several pieces of empirical evidence, both qualitative and quantitative, are consis-
tent with this understanding of the causal mechanism by which appeals court judges
become aware of the Supreme Court’s summary decisions. This account of how judges
become aware of summary decisions and the subsequent appeals court precedent cre-
ated on remand is consistent with the actual citation practices of the courts. To
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conduct one test, I take a sample of twenty summary decisions of the Supreme Court
and Shepardized them to see how often they were cited by the courts below. 17 of
the 20 GVR orders were directly cited in at least one subsequent lower court decision
with an average of 8.2 citations for each of these GVRs. The subsequent precedent
created by the court of appeals on remand from the Supreme Court also received at
least one citation in 17 of the 20 cases with an average of 80.3 citations per appeals
court precedent. These numbers suggest strongly that circuit court judges are paying
attention both directly to the Supreme Court’s summary decisions and perhaps more
importantly to the subsequent circuit precedents created as a result of the remand
that explicitly apply the precedent referenced in the Court’s summary decision.
To provide yet another test of whether judges are paying attention to summary
decisions that reverse or vacate decisions of circuits other than their own, in Chapter 4
I analyze both citations and positive treatments generated in the circuit that received
the summary decision by the Supreme Court. Within these sister circuits, the impact
of having a summary decision at one of the the other circuits, still impacts aggregate
citation and positive treatment patterns. This results provides strong evidence that
non impacted, sister circuits are in fact learning about the Supreme Court’s summary
decisions and that judges are more likely to cite and follow the Supreme Court’s
formally argued precedents that are referenced in summary decisions sent to other
circuits compared with Supreme Court precedents that have no associated summary
decisions. Taken together, there should be little doubt that the Supreme Court’s
summary decisions impact compliance within the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
Exploring Causal Mechanisms
A potential concern with the empirical results presented in this dissertation is that
lower court responses are not driven by the U.S. Supreme Court’s summary decisions,
instead they may be driven by an alternative based on the Supreme Court’s pipeline
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of cases. In other words, what we might think is being caused by summary decisions
may in fact be caused by similar cases in litigation at either the U.S. Supreme Court
or at the U.S. Courts of Appeals. For instance,Clark and Kastellec (2013) explore
a theoretical model on how similar cases can percolate within the courts. In such
a pipeline alternative, one may expect to find that there should be an increase in
the number of citations and lower court positive treatments even without having a
summary decision signal from the Supreme Court.
While this alternative explanation has some plausibility, it is not consistent with
what is known about the practice and process of certiorari decisions and the deci-
sions to issue summary judgments. First, there are a very large number of cases in
the pipeline that encompass many issue areas. In recent years the number of certio-
rari petitions has been over 10,000 cases per year. But in spite of the large number
of cases appealed, both the decision to grant certiorari and the decision to issue a
summary judgment remain rare events with 97% of the petitions denied review. We
know from interviews with the justices and their clerks that certiorari petitions in
a given year often include many cases that raise very similar issues (Perry 1991).
The interviews indicate that even when there are multiple petitions in a single year
that raise similar issues, most of those petitions will be denied review. According to
these interviews, the justices issuing a summary decision is not considered standard
operating procedure even when multiple petitions raise similar issues (Perry 1991,
99). Hellman (1984, 395) concurs, concluding that there is nothing automatic about
the justices issuing a summary decision regardless of the nature of the issue. Below
I provide several tests to corroborate this claim. The four tests include two quali-
tative examinations of a series of cases from the 2000 Supreme Court term, as well
as a quantitative assessment restricted to precedents with few associated summary
decisions.
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Qualitative Analysis
The first qualitative examination focuses on the plausability of issue similarity be-
tween formally argued precedents and lower court cases that receive a summary de-
cision. The pipeline alternative seems to assume that summary decisions are likely
only to focus on lower court cases that have the same, or a related issue, to the orig-
inal precedent. Table 5.1 presents examples from the 2000 term based on a random
sample of twenty summary decisions from that term. Interestingly, on qualitative
inspection of these cases, I find that six of the cases from the sample that had sum-
mary decisions used summary decisions on cases with different issues from the original
precedent. Importantly, the difference of issues is present regardless of what method
one uses to classify issue areas. What this means is that the basis for the summary
decision is not simply based on giving summary decisions to a variety of petitions
that have the same, or closely related issue area, but rather that the basis for issuing
these decisions is demonstrably different.
For the second analysis, I obtain a random sample of twenty precedents with no
associated associated summary decisions from the 2000 Supreme Court term. With
these two formally argued cases, I rely on Westlaw to examine the certiorari pool of
similar petitions for a restricted time period, shortly prior to a particular decision
being issued. In particular, I am interested in denials of certiorari as these would
indicate similar issues that were being appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, but that
were not being heard by the Court, as part of an active decision by the Court. For
the sample of cases, 13 of the 18 cases had issues similar to the issues in an appeals
court decision that was later denied certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court. Table
5.2 lists each specific Supreme Court precedent, along with accompanying petitions
of certiorari that were denied certiorari in close proximity to a plenary case. In
fact, what I find is that for a large portion of the Supreme Court cases that were
in the sample, which ultimately were granted certiorari by the Court, there were
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other similar cases that the justices could have plausibly heard, but chose not to.
This qualitative examination reveals that even for cases that do not have associated
summary decisions, there is still much variation in terms of petitions to the U.S.
Supreme Court, which may vary in certain ways. To put it simply, the act of issuing
a summary decision is a deliberate and procedurally different action for the justices;
it represents a conscious choice rather than a way to deal with multiple petitions
raising similar issues.
Table 5.1: Formally Argued Decisions with Different Issues in Summary Decisions
Case Name Citation Key Note # Spaeth Coding Songer Coding
Waste Agency 531 U.S. 159 149Ek127 80130 (environment 753 (environment
protection) protection)
U.S. v. 235 F.3d 256 350Hk909 10560 (sentencing) 116 (white
Rapanos collar crime)
Glover v. U.S. 531 U.S. 198 110k1519 10120 (counsel) 112 (tax evasion)
Robinson v. U.S. 196 F.3d 748 135Hk202 10170 (double jeopardy) 112 (narcotics)
Lujan v. G&G 532 U.S. 189 92k4179 40020 (due process) 706 (other federal
tax)
DeBoer 206 F.3d 857 78k1376 80110 (local reg- 752 (local econo-
ulation of business) mic regulation)
Cooper Industries 532 U.S. 424 90k4427 80080 economic 712
(punitive (trademarks)
damages)
Time Warner v. 245 Ga. App 334 289k1156 140030 contracts 736 (breach
Six Flags (breach fiduciary fiduciary
duty) duty)
Duncan v. Sherman 533 U.S. 167 197k894 10020 habeas 125 (robbery)
(AEDPA)
Allen v. Hofbauer 111FedAppx363 197k380 10200 prosecutorial 121 (murder)
misconduct
U.S. v. Mead Corp. 533 U.S. 218 92k2405 90120 (judicial 706 (other fed-
review of admin- eral tax)
istrative action
Matz v. TIP 227 F.3d 971 36k1007 70180 Labor (ERISA) 610 (other labor
disputes)
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Table 5.2: Appeals Court Cases Denied Certiorari
Supreme Court Issue - West Topic Appeals Court
Citation Case Name & Key Number Cases
513 U.S. 28 Sinkfield v. Kelly 92VI(A) 165 F.3d 973
Equal Protection-Standing
513 U.S. 356 Uni. of Alabama Bd. 92k3140 136 F.3d 430, 166 F.3d 698
of Trustees v. Garrett Discrimination (ADA) 184 F.3d 999, 191 F.3d 1167
207 F.3d 94, 210 F.3d 732
531 U.S. 438 Lewis v. Marina 354k208 - -
Admirality
532 U.S. 200 United States v. 200k4374 - -
Cleveland Indians Employment Taxes
Collective Bargaining 195 F.3d 1201, 196 F.3d 117
205 F.3d 922, 224 F.3d 316
532 U.S. 645 Atkinson v. Shirley 209k223 196 F.3d 1059, 211 F.3d 1280
Native American Reservations
532 U.S. 769 Arkansas v. Sullivan 48Ak349 182 F.3d 643, 195 F.3d 258
Stop or Arrest as Ruse
533 U.S. 158 Kushner v. King 319Hk33 184 F.3d 74, 191 F.3d 799
Racketeering Enterprise 193 F.3d 85, 208 F.3d 1073
214 F.3d 776, 219 F.3d 1271
533 U.S. 405 United States v. 92k1564 - -
United Foods Compelled Speech
533 U.S. 656 Tyler v. Cain 197k898 215 F.3d 1233, 227 F.3d 331
Habeas Corpus 244 F.3d 803
531 U.S. 278 City News v. Waukesha 92k980 168 F.3d 705, 196 F.3d 727
Case and Controversy
531 U.S. 326 Illinois v. McArthur 35k60 167 F.3d 739, 178 F.3d 334
Duration of Detention 181 F.3d 774, 187 F.3d 663
188 F.3d 829, 189 F.3d 88
209 F.3d 1153
531 U.S. 425 Central Green Co. v. 405k2885 - -
United States Immunity for Damage
531 U.S. 497 Semtek v. Lockheed Martin 170Bk3045 171 F.3d 638, 173 F.3d 1376
Conclusiveness of 178 F.3d 132, 189 F.3d 1107
Judgment 195 F.3d 1225, 200 F.3d 1356
203 F.3d 1190, 208 F.3d 741
532 U.S. 275 Alexander v. Sandoval 78k1330 191 F.3d 1020
Civil Rights (Private Action)
532 U.S. 59 Buford v. 110k1158 171 F.3d 514, 173 F.3d 974
United States Sentencing 177 F.3d 617, 179 F.3d 1056
183 F.3d 374, 195 F.3d 402
196 F.3d 884, 204 F.3d 1021
214 F.3d 908
532 U.S. 706 NLRB v. Kentucky 231Hk982 - -
Community Care Labor law (supervisory)
533 U.S. 262 Idaho v. 209k158 188 F.3d 1010
United States Lands on Reservations 219 F.3d 1127
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Quantitative Analysis
The argument that the effect of summary decisions on lower court responses to prece-
dent are driven by the number of cases in the pipeline is most plausible for those
precedents which are accompanied by a large number of summary decisions, and thus
the presumption that there are a large number of cases in the pipeline raising similar
issues. However, when the Supreme Court has issued only a small number of sum-
mary decisions “in light of” a given precedent in a given year, it would be implausible
to argue that in spite of that small number of summary decisions there are actually
a large number of cases in the pipeline raising the same issue. Consequently, if one is
to maintain that the number of citations and positive treatments by the lower courts
is driven by the number of cases raising issues similar to the issues in a given prece-
dent, one would expect the effects to be greatest in those situations in which there
are a large number of cases in the pipeline raising a given issue. In Tables 5.3 and
5.4, I estimate models that exclude Supreme Court precedents with a large number
of summary decisions. In Table 5.3, I limit the analysis to precedents with fewer
than five summary decisions. In Table 5.4, I restrict the analysis to Supreme Court
precedents with either one or no summary decisions. The two models excluding cases
with a large number of summary decisions demonstrate that that the coefficient for
summary decisions is statistically significant. These results demonstrate that sum-
mary decisions do not only have a statistically significant effect when the number
of summary decisions is high. The effect is present even if a precedent has a single
summary decision issued in light of it. The finding that summary decisions always
matter, even when comparing zero to one summary decision only, greatly reduces the
likelihood that the pipeline alternative is what is driving the results. The substantive
results here show that the impact of summary decisions on lower court responses is
large and consistent with the analysis in the previous chapter.
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Table 5.3: Multilevel Probit Regression of U.S. Courts of Appeals Responses to U.S.
Supreme Court Precedent with Fewer than Five Summary Decisions
Citation Positive Treatment
Variable Model Model
Summary Decision 0.230* (0.019) 0.203* (0.018)
Supreme Court Vitality -0.009 (0.032) -0.011 (0.037)
Supreme Court Vote Margin 0.011 (0.006) 0.005 (0.007)
Ideol Dist - SC Author to SC Median -0.063* (0.017) -0.050* (0.017)
Ideol Dist - CoA Panel to SC Median -0.320* (0.122) -0.397* (0.141)
Circuit Vitality 0.127* (0.014) 0.058* (0.013)
Circuit of Origin 0.706* (0.082) 0.498* (0.084)
Case Salience Index 0.112* (0.009) 0.716* (0.009)
Case Complexity -0.260* (0.056) -0.182* (0.056)
Per Curium Decision -0.701* (0.102) -0.298* (0.101)
Criminal Decision 0.589* (0.049) 0.349* (0.048)
Circuit Caseload 0.042* (0.006) 0.043* (0.007)
Age of Precedent -0.041* (0.004) -0.008* (0.005)
Constant -0.959* (0.076) -2.052 (0.091)
Model Fit Statistics
Observations 27,713 27,713
Cluster Units 3,433 3,433
χ2 Statistic 1075.80 576.01
Probability > χ2 0.000* 0.000*
Note: The outcome variables are the probability of U.S. Courts of Appeals citation and
positive treatment of Supreme Court precedent per circuit-year. The estimates of the
multilevel models are based on random intercepts for each circuit and each Supreme Court
precedent with the standard errors reported in parentheses. *p < 0.05
123
Table 5.4: Multilevel Probit Regression of U.S. Courts of Appeals Responses to U.S.
Supreme Court Precedent with One Summary Decision
Citation Positive Treatment
Variable Model Model
Summary Decision 0.421* (0.042) 0.375* (0.045)
Supreme Court Vitality -0.036 (0.038) -0.044 (0.047)
Supreme Court Vote Margin 0.008 (0.007) 0.012 (0.008)
Ideol Dist - SC Author to SC Median -0.051* (0.019) -0.046* (0.020)
Ideol Dist - CoA Panel to SC Median -0.323* (0.130) -0.451* (0.157)
Circuit Vitality 0.141* (0.016) 0.058* (0.015)
Circuit of Origin 0.697* (0.087) 0.510* (0.093)
Case Salience Index 0.108* (0.010) 0.068* (0.107)
Case Complexity -0.332* (0.059) -0.269* (0.063)
Per Curium Decision -0.750* (0.107) -0.362* (0.113)
Criminal Decision 0.608* (0.053) 0.373* (0.054)
Circuit Caseload 0.040* (0.007) 0.043* (0.007)
Age of Precedent -0.041* (0.005) -0.003* (0.006)
Constant -0.959* (0.082) -2.066 (0.102)
Model Fit Statistics
Observations 23,431 23,431
Cluster Units 2,868 2,868
χ2 Statistic 918.71 415.87
Probability > χ2 0.000* 0.000*
Note: The outcome variables are the probability of U.S. Courts of Appeals citation and
positive treatment of Supreme Court precedent per circuit-year. The estimates of the
multilevel models are based on random intercepts for each circuit and each Supreme Court
precedent with the standard errors reported in parentheses. *p < 0.05
Causation is always difficult to prove. But the analysis in this section makes it
much more plausible to believe that the increase in citations and positive treatments
by the courts of appeals is much more directly the result of the deliberate use of
summary decisions by the justices. The justices seemingly employ summary decisions
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when they deem that a precedent should be applied in a broad array of situations.
When the justices issue one or more summary decisions, there is a sizable increase
in the probability of lower court citation and positive application of the Supreme
Court’s precedents.
Replication Analysis to Assess Robustness of Findings
In the previous discussion, I provide strong evidence that the Supreme Court’s sum-
mary decisions are not just a function of the cases that come before the courts. Sum-
mary decisions represent a conscious choice by the justices and they meaningfully
impact the extent to which the circuits cite and positively apply the Supreme Court’s
precedents. In the absence of the summary decisions, there is a demonstrably lower
rate of adherence by the lower federal courts. Another aspect of my empirical analysis
that merits further exploration are my findings on the lack of influence of Supreme
Court vitality and the muted influence of ideology. A number of studies empirically
demonstrate that the difference between prior positive and negative interpretations
of a precedent by the Supreme Court, itself, strongly influences the extent to which
the lower courts adhere to the Supreme Court’s precedents (see Black and Spriggs
2013; Corley 2009; Corley and Wedeking 2014; Cross and Spriggs 2010; Fowler et al.
2007; Hansford and Spriggs 2006; Westerland et al. 2010). In every model I estimate,
I find evidence against this expectation. Could it be that the results are a function
of the data that I collect? To address this concern, I use an existing public dataset
from Westerland et al. (2010), on lower courts treatments of the Supreme Court, and
re-analyze the data.
Table 5.5 presents two models. The ‘Original Model’ is an exact replication of
the model Westerland et al. (2010) report in their article in the American Journal
of Political Science. This model suggests that several factors impact U.S. Courts of
Appeals treatment of the Supreme Court’s precedents. First, these authors find that
125
Table 5.5: Westerland et al. (2010) Replication Model of Lower Court Compliance
with U.S. Supreme Court Precedent
Original Clustered
Variable Model Model
Contemporary SC-Enacting SC Distance -.635* (.141) -.635 (.364)
Panel-Enacting SC Distance -.069 (.099) -.069 (.126)
Panel-Contemporary Distance .013 (.125) .013 (.142)
Age of SC precedent -.011* (.003) -.011 (.005)
Case Complexity -.008 (.028) -.008 (.067)
Dissenting Opinions -.002 (.031) -.001 (.089)
Concurring Opinions .065* (.032) .065 (.082)
Positive SC treatments .014* (.007) .014 (.018)
Negative SC treatments -.006 (.011) -.006 (.028)
Positive LC treatments -.088* (.006) .088* (.016)
Negative LC treatments .051* (.006) -.051 (.013)
Tau1 -1.013 (.079) -1.012 (.179)
Tau2 -.079 (.079) -.079 (.189)
N 10198 10198
Note: The ‘Original Model’ is the model Westerland el al. report. The ‘Clustered Model’
clusters the errors on the Supreme Court Precedent. Westerland et al. include the following
note: “[t]he dependent variable is whether the lower court complies with Supreme Court
precedent (=3), treats the precedent neutrally (=2), or deviates from the precedent (=1
). Ordered logit estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < .05. LC = lower
court; SC = Supreme Court.”
the ideological distance between the contemporary Supreme Court and the Supreme
Court that enacts the precedent exerts a negative influence on the probability of pos-
itive treatment by the circuit courts. This result is in line with their main hypothe-
sis. Westerland et al. note that “[p]erhaps the central prediction is that ideological
estrangement between the Contemporary and Enacting Supreme Courts should be
reflected in harsher treatments of the Enacting Court’s precedents by the Contem-
porary Lower Court (902). These authors add that “indeed, the empirical findings
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strongly support this central prediction.” The implication of this finding is that it
evinces characteristics of a principal-agent relationship. The lower court’s positive
or negative treatment is influenced by the ideological proximity of the current Court
relative to the Court that issued the precedent. Westerland et al. make additional
predictions on the age of the precedent, concurring opinions, prior positive applica-
tions by the Supreme Court itself, and prior applications at the circuit level that all
appear to have a statistically significant effect in the predicted direction.
A critical shortcoming of Westerland et al.’s research design is that these authors
assume uniformity among all the circuits, all years, and all Supreme Court precedents.
These assumptions are untenable as these are inherently nested data. Each lower
court treatment is nested within each circuit, which is nested within each year and
each Supreme Court precedent. A consequence of not accounting for the nested
nature of the data is underestimating the degree of uncertainty around the estimates,
which increases the probability of committing a Type I error. One can account for
the hierarchical nature of these data by estimating a model that clusters the errors.
Upon doing so, we see substantially different results. The coefficient estimates in
the ‘Clustered Model’ suggest that ideological differences between the contemporary
and enacting Supreme Court do not meaningfully influence lower court treatments
of the Supreme Court’s precedents. In fact, none of the variables for ideology exert
a statistically significant effect. This suggests that ideological differences are not a
key driver of lower court responses. This finding is in line with my results in Chapter
4, where I find that ideological differences have a more muted and a more nuanced
effect than the scholarship suggests.
The prediction by Westerland et al. (2010) on the impact of prior positive treat-
ments by the Supreme Court is noteworthy and the main purpose behind this repli-
cation analysis. Westerland et al. find that prior Supreme Court positive treatments
exert a positive and significant effect on lower court treatments. Their result, in fact,
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corroborates the key finding of Hansford and Spriggs (2006) on the prominence of
precedent vitality driving lower court reactions to Supreme Court precedent. How-
ever, as the clustered model demonstrates prior positive Supreme Court treatments
is not a statistically significant predictor of lower court treatments of precedent. This
updated result contradicts the finding by Hansford and Spriggs (2006). Instead, these
results lend support to my own analysis in that I find that Supreme Court vitality,
or the frequency of prior positive treatments by the Supreme Court do not influence
lower court responses to precedent.
Discussion
Previous studies of judicial impact demonstrate that the overall rate of adherence to
the Supreme Court’s precedents is high and is reasonably predictable (Baum 1997;
Songer and Sheehan 1990; Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994). Several factors that
predict the likelihood of lower court positive treatment of U.S. Supreme Court include
the margin of the U.S. Supreme Court decision, how the Supreme Court has treated
the opinion since it made an initial decision, the ideological congruence between the
U.S. Supreme Court and the lower court, as well as other case factors, such as case
complexity, and the political salience of a Supreme Court decision. These studies
show that when the U.S. Supreme Court reinforces its precedents, lower courts tend
to follow their lead. Specifically, Hansford and Spriggs (2006) find that the strength of
precedent based on Supreme Court interpretations of existing decisions corresponds
with the yearly number of citations and positive treatments of these precedents by
the lower courts. My findings challenge this notion.
In this chapter, I address important questions of causality and the robustness of
the empirical work that are lacking from the existing literature. I design alternate
tests to gauge the impact of Supreme Court signals in motivating U.S. Courts of Ap-
peals attentiveness to the Supreme Court’s precedents. First, I address the concern
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whether the Supreme Court’s summary decision are a mechanism to increase atten-
tiveness to precedents or if they are simply a byproduct of the cases that come before
the courts. On potential argument is that summary decisions relate to existing cases
within the judicial pipeline. I provide both qualitative and quantitative evidence that
this is not the case. The act of issuing a summary decision represents a conscious
choice by the justices, and it separates these decisions from the thousands of cases
that are denied certiorari each term. Second, I provide evidence that in the absence
of the Court’s summary decisions there is a notable decline in lower court adoption
of the Supreme Court’s precedent.
My analysis systematically uncovers the influences on lower court adherence to
precedent. My findings demonstrate that not only is the U.S. Supreme Court capable
of sending various explicit and implicit signals to the circuits, but that such signals
meaningfully influence lower federal court decision making and their interpretations
of the Supreme Court’s precedents, and from these interpretations of precedent the
justices can then decide whether or not to sanction a decision by one or several
of the circuits. My analysis also reveals that ideological differences between the
Supreme Court and the lower courts have a more nuanced impact on the adoption
of the Supreme Court’s precedents than previous studies suggest (see Westerland
et al. 2010). An additional empirical implication of my analysis is the finding that
Supreme Court vitality does not exert a meaningful influence on the likelihood that
the circuit courts will cite or follow a Supreme Court precedent. This result suggests
that judges on the courts of appeals pay little attention or are not moved by the
Supreme Court’s own repeated positive or negative interpretations of its decisions.
Instead these judges appear to be more compelled when the justices direct their
attention to a specific precedent through their summary decisions. The finding on
the lack of influence of Supreme Court vitality conflicts with many previous empirical
studies that consistently demonstrate that the Supreme Court’s own treatment of
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precedents motivate lower court responses. My analysis along with examination of
Westerland et al.’s (2010) data suggest that it is the Supreme Court’s summary
decisions, and not the Court’s treatment of its precedents, that promote horizontal
stare decisis and drive lower court responses. The theoretical implications of my
analysis offer a new way forward for modeling the impact of legal precedent and
improve our understanding of the dynamics of decision making in both the U.S.
Supreme Court and the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Empirical inquiries on the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Courts of Appeals elicit
the majority of attention from judicial scholars. Of particular interest to students of
the judiciary are hierarchical interactions among the courts, especially the nature of
the relationship between the U.S. Supreme Court and the circuit courts. Most often
the theoretical account accompanying such analyses is some variant of a strategic
action framework (see Lax 2003; Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994; Westerland et al.
2010). Collectively, these studies produce a prodigious amount of information on
the conditions that influence a particular court or judge to follow or shirk from the
legal and policy preferences of the Court. Surprisingly, the scholarship devotes little
attention to examining the cumulative impact of Supreme Court decisions on the U.S.
Courts of Appeals. Notably lacking from this rich body of work on the courts are
theories, and the accompanying empirical investigations, of many important questions
on the overall policy impact of Supreme Court decisions on the lower federal courts.
This raises a number of puzzles. First, under what conditions do Court precedents
have the broadest impact on the lower courts, especially on judges within the U.S.
Courts of Appeals? Second, what motivates the circuits to follow some Supreme
Court precedents but not others? Third, what mechanisms are available to Supreme
Court justices to increase circuit court compliance with their decisions? Perhaps most
importantly, how is information regarding the legal and policy preferences of judicial
actors communicated within the American judicial hierarchy?
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My dissertation seeks to answer these critical questions by exploring the nature
of the relationship between judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals and their judicial
superiors on the U.S. Supreme Court. My analysis focuses on the interaction be-
tween these courts centers on circuit court implementation of the Supreme Court’s
precedents. The principal objective of this project is to identify the causal conditions
that either increase or decrease the propensity of judges on the courts of appeals to
comply with the precedents of the U.S. Supreme Court. In this endeavor, I offer a
new theory on how information regarding precedents and policy preferences is com-
municated dynamically within the American judiciary. From this broad theoretical
framework, I derive more precise predictions that I systematically test within the
empirical chapters of this dissertation.
I investigate various potential signals by Supreme Court justices to judges on
the U.S. Courts of Appeals in the first empirical chapter. I offer a theory in which,
given the limited ability of the Supreme Court to review the large number of lower
court decisions, the justices should primarily be interested in aggregate patterns of
compliance in the form of citations and positive interpretations to their precedents
by the individual circuits. I theorize that Supreme Court justices are able to effec-
tively monitor the U.S. Courts of Appeals by focusing on the circuits as individual
organizational units. The justices then allocate their limited resources to review and
reverse the least compliant circuits. The empirical results support my predictions
and demonstrate that patterns of reversals by the Supreme Court at the circuit level
positively affects the future tendency of a circuit to rely on the Supreme Court’s prece-
dents. The second empirical chapter examines the efficacy of the Supreme Court’s
signals on lower court attentiveness to the Supreme Court’s decisions. Specifically,
I investigate the factors that increase or minimize the likelihood that judges on the
courts of appeals rely on the precedents of the U.S. Supreme Court. I test this as-
sumption by examining both trends in citation and positive applications of the High
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Court’s precedents. The key finding in this chapter is that lower court compliance to
a Supreme Court precedent is most likely when a precedent is accompanied by one or
more summary decision and when the preferences of the lower court are ideologically
aligned with the median member of the U.S Supreme Court. The third empirical
chapter identifies fundamental challenges with existing empirical examinations on ju-
dicial impact. In order to address these concerns, I provide new, alternate tests that
address the causal mechanisms that influence the extent to which the circuit courts
comply with the precedents of the Supreme Court.
Contributions to the Literature
My project contributes to the scholarship on judicial impact and judicial decision-
making behavior in a number of ways. First, I advance the theoretical literature by
offering a new perspective on how information regarding preferences is communicated
within the American judiciary. I develop a theory in which information regarding the
preferences of judicial actors flows: (1) top-down, from the Supreme Court to the
lower courts, (2) bottom-up, from the lower courts to the Supreme Court, and (3)
horizontally, within and across the jurisdictions of the circuits. I theorize that key
Supreme Court signals and important circuit-level influences, together, drive circuit
court attentiveness to the High Court’s precedents. The lower court application of the
Supreme Court’s precedents, in turn, communicate information up the judicial ladder
of the policy position of precedents. This upward transmission of information helps
inform justices in setting their agenda. In addition to these conventional channels, I
argue that judges on the courts of appeals also convey vital information, transmitted
horizontally to other judges within the same circuit and to judges across the circuits
within the U.S. Courts of Appeals. My framework suggests that information regarding
the preferences of judicial actors flows dynamically across these three channels, which
forms a feedback loop that ultimately shapes the scope of precedent.
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Second, this study contributes to our understanding of learning in the judicial
hierarchy by identifying new mechanisms through which Supreme Court justices are
able to communicate their preferences that influence the behavior of judges on the
U.S. Courts of Appeals. One such factor that dramatically strengthens the influence
of horizontal stare decisis is the Supreme Court’s summary decisions. Specifically,
I argue that when the Supreme Court issues one or more summary decisions that
directly reference its formally argued precedents, the Supreme Court is able to signal
that a given precedent is particularly important and broadly applicable to diverse
factual situations that come before courts. I find that when the justices issue one or
more summary decisions that direct a lower court to re-consider its earlier decision,
there is a significant increase in circuit court adoption and positive application of
the Supreme Court’s precedents. In fact, my analysis suggests the most meaningful
action the justices can take, vis-á-vis the future decision-making of a circuit to rely
on a precedent, is to reference a precedent within their summary decisions. The
decision of the justices to not deny certiorari and issue a separate summary decision
is unambiguously conscious and distinguishes these decisions from the thousands of
petitions that are ultimately denied review each term. My work on this aspect of
decision making puts the Court’s summary decisions in broader perspective. While
most judicial studies ignore these decisions, summary decisions today make up a
significant portion of the Court’s decision making docket (but see Bruhl 2009; Benesh
et al. 2014; Masood and Songer 2013; Songer and Lindquist 1996). Summary decisions
provide the justices with a low-cost alternative to correct non-compliant behavior and
direct lower court judges to consider a specific precedent. As such, summary decisions
are an important instrument for the justices to achieve legal consistency, legitimize
new precedent, and correct egregious legal errors by the lower courts. By excluding
these consequential decisions from our analyses, we get a systematically incomplete
picture of the overall output of the Supreme Court.
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Third, this project offers a theory on how Supreme Court justices can effectively
monitor the large number of decisions produced by the lower courts, particularly
within the U.S. Courts of Appeals. A central dilemma the hierarchical structure of
the federal judiciary poses is the principal’s inability to monitor all the actions of
its subordinates. The U.S. Supreme Court has limited resources, which constrain its
ability to correct all instances of non-compliance by the lower courts. I argue that
policy oriented justices with finite resources can have effective oversight of the lower
courts by being attentive to aggregate trends of compliance to their precedents. I
make the case that Supreme Court justices can use this bottom-up flow of infor-
mation to monitor the actions of individual circuits rather than three-judge panels
and then review and sanction the circuits that are least supportive of the Court’s
preferences. As such, the justices can demonstrate their willingness to sanction lower
court behavior that consistently deviates from its legal and policy preferences. The
empirical findings demonstrate the Supreme Court can, in fact, induce greater levels
compliance by reviewing and reversing the least compliant circuits. Such Supreme
Court reversals exert a positive effect on future circuit court adherence to the Supreme
Court’s precedents. While an extensive number of studies examine the impact of the
Supreme Court’s reversals, the finding that circuits that receive comparatively higher
rates of reversals are the most likely to follow the Court’s precedents in the following
term is new.
This dissertation also offers empirical contributions. An extensive amount of
original data is collected to conduct the analysis. The first stage of data collection
involved coding the full universe of the Supreme Court’s summary decisions for the
period of the analysis. Regrettably, summary decisions are not part of a public
dataset, such as the expanded U.S. Supreme Court Database (Spaeth et al. 2013). But
as the summary statistics in Chapter 2 demonstrate, these decisions today outnumber
the Supreme Court’s formally argued decisions. The second stage of data collection
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encompassed coding all instances of citations, and positive and negative applications
of the Supreme Court’s precedents by the lower federal appellate courts. Citation
and treatment data have been collected before, however, since I introduce a new unit
of analysis, I code each circuit response to each Supreme Court precedent for every
year that is in the analysis. This strategy yields approximately 30,000 observations
and allows me to offer a more precise test of my predictions than previous attempts.
My dissertation also addresses important questions of causality and the robust-
ness of the empirical work that are lacking from the existing literature. By designing
alternate tests, my empirical analysis systematically uncovers the influences on lower
court adherence to precedent. My findings demonstrate that not only is the U.S.
Supreme Court capable of sending various explicit and implicit signals to the circuits,
but that such signals meaningfully influence lower federal court decision making and
their interpretations of the Supreme Court’s precedents, and from these interpreta-
tions of precedent the justices can then decide whether or not to sanction a decision
by one or several of the circuits. My analysis also reveals that ideological differences
between the Supreme Court and the lower courts have a more nuanced impact on
the adoption of the Supreme Court’s precedents than previous studies suggest (see
Westerland et al. 2010). An additional empirical implication of my analysis is the
finding that Supreme Court vitality does not exert a meaningful influence on the
likelihood that the circuit courts will cite or follow a Supreme Court precedent. This
result suggests that judges on the courts of appeals pay little attention or are not
moved by the Supreme Court’s own repeated positive or negative interpretations of
its decisions. Instead these judges appear to be more compelled when the justices
direct their attention to a specific precedent through their summary decisions. The
finding on the lack of influence of Supreme Court vitality conflicts with many pre-
vious empirical studies that consistently demonstrate that the Supreme Court’s own
patterns of positive versus negative interpretations of its precedents strongly influence
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the propensity of the lower courts to rely on the High Court’s precedents (see Black
and Spriggs 2013; Corley 2009; Corley and Wedeking 2014; Cross and Spriggs 2010;
Fowler et al. 2007; Fowler and Jeon 2008; Hansford and Spriggs 2006).
Avenues for Future Research
The analysis presented in this project raises new questions. One fruitful avenue of
research building on this work is examining why and when the circuit courts decide
to start interpreting a precedent favorably. Specifically, why do some lower courts
comply with a Supreme Court precedent more quickly than others? Current research
suggests that a variety of Supreme Court and circuit-level attributes affect the number
of exposures it takes for lower courts to comply with the Supreme Court’s precedents
(Benesh and Reddick 2002; Hansford and Spriggs 2006). Prior examinations on this
subject are limited to the Supreme Court’s overruled precedents. But decisions that
explicitly overrule a prior precedent constitute a very small sample of the Supreme
Court’s full output of decisions. Should we expect to see differences in the time it
takes to implement Supreme Court precedents that emerge from alterations to past
precedents versus decisions that affirm existing Court precedent? The U.S. Supreme
Court in the vast majority of its decisions affirms existing precedent. Since an affirmed
precedent is always more ‘vital’ than a newly created precedent, one may expect that
lower courts will interpret such precedents positively more quickly than new, less vital
precedents. Research designs exploring the differences in exposure rates between
altered and unaltered precedents can provide important insight on the conditions
under which the circuit courts are likely to promptly implement the Supreme Court’s
decisions within their own. For now, this assumption remains untested.
Future research should also explore citation and treatment patterns within the
district courts. While a rich literature examines the extent to which judges on the
U.S. Courts of Appeals follow the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, relatively
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little is known about the dynamics that motivate the actions of district court judges
to follow or shirk from the precedents of higher courts. A unique aspect of decision
making at the the district level is that trial court judges must be attentive to two sets
of authorities: (1) the binding precedents of the circuit in which they reside and (2)
the national precedents of the U.S. Supreme Court. Ignoring a critical precedent or
reaching a decision that is in conflict with the precedents of either the circuit or the
Supreme Court should increase the probability of a successful appeal of the district
court decision. Recent scholarship reveals that factors such as ideology exert a vary-
ing degree of influence on decision-making behavior at different levels of the federal
judiciary (Zorn and Bowie 2010). Namely, these scholars find that the impact of ide-
ological influences meaningfully depreciates at lower levels of the judicial hierarchy.
Judges on district courts, who are the bottom of the federal judiciary, face consid-
erable constraints, which significantly limit their ability to pursue individual policy
goals. The principal constraint for these judges is mandatory review of any appeal
filed with the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Indeed, empirical work by Randazzo (2008,
669) demonstrates that when “federal trial judges anticipate a negative response on
appeal, they then curtail their ideological influences.” Building on these important
studies can help answer many questions. How does a strong principal-agent environ-
ment impact district court attentiveness to circuit-level precedents? Moreover, when
there are differences between the ideological median of the circuit and the median
member of the Supreme Court, are district court judges more likely to follow the
preferences of their circuit superiors or the Supreme Court? Intuitively, one may as-
sume that judges are most likely to follow the precedents of the court directly above,
however, random panel assignments in the U.S. Courts of Appeals and ideological
differences between the circuit and Supreme Court medians may provide strategic
opportunities for district judges to shirk. The literature requires more rigorous em-
pirical analysis to adjudicate the efficacy of principal-agent claims.
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Similar to research designs examining applications of precedents within the district
courts, there is a need for substantially more work to be done on compliance and
implementation within state courts. Only a handful of studies examine state court
responses to the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedents; moreover, these few studies focus
exclusively on inquiries on state courts of last resort. In one such study, Comparato
and McClurg (2007) find that there is substantial variation in adherence to precedents
among state supreme courts. A recent analysis by Kassow, Songer, and Fix (2012,
65) offers that “state supreme courts generally provided positive treatments of the
U.S. Supreme Court precedents, using the [Supreme Court] precedent as the basis for
their decision in slightly over three-fifths of their cases.” But these scholars also find
that state supreme courts routinely engage in “negative treatment that modified the
practical meaning of the precedent.” Why is this the case and how does this compare
to trends in negative applications of precedent within the lower federal courts? A
single study within the law and courts literature undertakes this challenge comparing
state high court and circuit behavior in levels of compliance with the Supreme Court’s
precedents (see Benesh and Martinek 2009). The findings in this analysis, however,
are limited to a single issue area. Clearly, a lot of work remains in exploring the
impact of precedent within state courts. To date, there are no studies that examine
the extent to which state trial and intermediate appellate courts rely on the precedents
of the U.S. Supreme Court. Such a study would greatly improve our understanding of
how state courts, at various levels, reconcile the influence of national Supreme Court
precedents with inter-state stare decisis. One other promising avenue of research
is the examination of intermediate state court adherence to State Supreme Court
precedents. Is there significant variation in levels of lower court compliance among
state judicial systems? A theoretical account premised on how different modes of
judicial selection may impact levels of lower court compliance within state courts
would be a particularly worthy endeavor.
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The theoretical and empirical work in this dissertation raise yet additional ques-
tions pertaining to high and lower court interactions in comparative settings. First,
are the empirical findings on judicial impact within the American federal courts id-
iosyncratic or are similar trends prevalent in other common law judiciaries? Second,
should judicial scholars export decision-making theories developed specifically for the
U.S. courts and apply them to studies on courts in comparative environments? Apply-
ing U.S. centric attitudinal and strategic frameworks in comparative courts appears
to be a common trend in the nascent, but growing comparative judicial literature.
Taking such an approach opens the door to criticism since there are significant differ-
ences between the U.S. courts and other national courts in the institutional designs,
selection processes, and incentives available to justices to induce greater levels of com-
pliance. For instance, within the Supreme Courts of Canada, the justices are able
to select from a pool of a comparatively smaller number of lower court decisions and
review many more decisions because the justices in Canada decide cases in panels
rather than sitting en banc. Does the increased probability of review evoke greater
levels of compliance within judicial systems? In addition, do ideological influences
play a similar role in motivating lower court responses to precedents within compar-
ative courts? Future studies on hierarchical interactions in comparative courts would
be well served in pursuing these puzzles.
Returning to inquiries within the American courts, an important question that
emerges from this dissertation is the extent to which the U.S. Supreme Court audits
and sanctions non-compliance to its precedent. While principal-agent models are
ubiquitous in the study of courts, existing studies often fall short in examining the
prospect of the Supreme Court sanctioning negative applications of Supreme Court
precedent by judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Thus, the conclusions derived
by most previous examinations of principal-agent accounts fall short of offering a
direct test of principal agency. One strategy to address this void and account for the
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Court’s moral hazard dilemma is to test whether the justices are more likely to grant
certiorari when a circuit explicitly shirks from a Supreme Court precedent. While a
large literature explores agenda setting on the Supreme Court, little is known about
how positive and negative applications of precedent can influence the decisions of the
justices to grant a petition review. Such research designs can unearth whether lower
court actions that run counter to the preferences of the justices are most likely to
induce audit and reversal by the U.S. Supreme Court.
To conclude, while there has been significant development in the study of the ju-
dicial hierarchy more work lies ahead. This dissertation builds on existing scholarship
to make both theoretical and empirical advances in improving our understanding of
the nature of the relationship between the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Courts
of Appeals. In exploring this relationship, my theoretical framework yields new pre-
dictions and novel findings, some of which challenge the efficacy of previous results.
The impetus for this project is to provide a more compelling account of hierarchical
interactions within the American judiciary and a more extensive assessment of the
policy impact of the U.S. Supreme Court on the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Overall,
the implications of my analysis offer an important development for future inquiries
on compliance and implementation, shed new light on our understanding of judi-
cial decision-making behavior within the American courts, and hold importance for
students of law and American institutions.
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